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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the structure and effectiveness of board remuneration 
committees.  The study provides evidence on factors that determine the voluntary 
adoption of corporate governance recommendations regarding remuneration committees 
in 2008.  The findings indicate that remuneration committee existence is significantly 
associated with insider share ownership, institutional shareholding and marginally 
associated with change in CEO.  Composition of the committee is significantly 
explained by independent directors and marginally explained by company complexity 
measured by geographical segments. 
The results suggest that agency costs and board capacity are incrementally relevant 
to adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations, after controlling for 
company characteristics related to company size, governance quality, the appointment 
of a big 4 auditor and leverage.  The results also indicate that companies are less likely 
to adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations in response to shareholder 
dissent on the annual remuneration report. 
The analysis then considers the association between adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations and executive remuneration. Contrary to 
theoretical predications, the results infer that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations does not universally lead to more effective remuneration 
practices.  Particularly, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
is associated in some cases with excessive levels of remuneration of the top five ranked 
executives and does not generally result in a stronger alignment between executives’ 
remuneration and measures of company performance.   
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The results suggest that the association between adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations and executive remuneration varies depending on whether 
the company is experiencing positive or negative return on assets. In companies with 
positive return on assets, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with higher levels of remuneration and weaker pay for 
performance sensitivity in remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives. 
Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is not significantly 
associated with either remuneration levels or pay for performance sensitivity in 
companies with negative return on assets. 
Shareholder voting behaviour in relation to the annual remuneration report is also 
examined as a measure of remuneration committee efficacy.  Adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with shareholder dissent on 
the annual remuneration report. Company characteristics other than executive 
remuneration and its oversight are associated with shareholder dissent. 
The study demonstrates that effectiveness of adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations varies cross-sectionally depending on company 
characteristics.  Policy implications from this research suggest that rather than focusing 
solely on independence as a key indicator of remuneration committee quality, the focus 
should also be on ensuring the quality of the remuneration committee.  That is, ensuring 
that the board members appointed to the committee have the appropriate skills and 
expertise to provide effective oversight of the executive remuneration function.  
Independence in itself does not appear to be the optimal solution to curtailing 
inappropriate executive remuneration practice in Australian listed companies.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
This thesis is concerned with the regulation of corporate executive remuneration 
in Australia. As is the case in most developed economies, Australia has progressively 
implemented substantial regulation of corporate executive remuneration. The key 
regulatory mechanisms are the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and, for listed companies, 
the listing rules of the Australian Securities Exchange Limited (“ASX”). Additionally, 
the Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council has released 
Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations (hereafter referred to as “ASX 
Recommendations”). These guidelines are largely voluntary and seek to outline good 
governance practices.  Regulatory intervention in this area of corporate governance has 
largely been a response to public dissatisfaction with what is perceived as excessive 
executive remuneration, particularly in circumstances where company performance has 
been poor. Despite the substantial regulatory initiatives to date, concerns continue to be 
raised about the effectiveness of existing regulation (Windsor and Cybinski, 2009; 
Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Australian Productivity Commission, 2010).  
For listed companies, governance of executive remuneration is overseen by the 
board of directors.  In some cases the board is assisted by its remuneration sub-
committee. The ASX recommends that listed companies form a remuneration 
committee to promote fair and responsible remuneration practice (ASX Corporate 
Governance Council, 2007, p. 35).  In addition, the ASX recommends the composition 
of the committee be of adequate size and sufficient independence.  The guidelines in the 
ASX Recommendations suggest that the remuneration committee should consist of at 
least three members, the majority of which should be independent and that it should 
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have an independent chairperson appointed (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007, 
Principle 8), (hereafter referred to as the “ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations”). A suitably structured committee monitors executive remuneration 
and provides advice to the board on executive remuneration practice. Adoption of the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations prior to 2011 is voluntary and subject 
to a comply or explain disclosure regime. This means listed companies are required to 
disclose in their annual report the extent to which they adopt the ASX 
Recommendations and to provide an explanation when the ASX Recommendations are 
not followed (ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3).  
Regulation was introduced in 2011 which requires companies included in the S&P 
ASX 300 index (hereafter referred to as “ASX 300 Index”) to form a remuneration 
committee consisting solely of non-executive directors (ASX Listing Rule 12.8). The 
formation and composition of remuneration committees for companies outside the ASX 
300 Index remains voluntary and subject to the comply or explain regime.  This thesis 
examines factors associated with remuneration committee formation and composition 
by Australian companies prior to the implementation of the mandatory formation and 
composition rules in 2011. Consequently, the focus of this thesis is on governance 
choice in a voluntary setting. 
Despite the important role of the remuneration committee in the governance of 
executive remuneration, research into its operation in Australia has been limited. The 
majority of prior theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted in the United 
States (hereafter referred to as “US”) (Guest, 2008; Sapp, 2008). Because US regulation 
mandates the formation and structure of the remuneration committee, related prior 
research has limited application to Australia, a voluntary compliance setting. This thesis 
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adds to the limited Australian research by conducting a comprehensive examination of 
the role of the remuneration committee in managing executive remuneration practice. 
Analyses are presented that consider: (1) the incentives for a company to voluntarily 
form a remuneration committee; (2) the incentives to adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations regarding committee composition; and (3) how adoption 
of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations influences executive 
remuneration levels and the link between remuneration and measures of company 
performance.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 details the research questions 
addressed by the thesis. Section 1.3 provides the motivation for the thesis and outlines 
the contributions to current literature.  An overview of the research methodology is 
included in section 1.4. Section 1.5 summarises the results of the thesis. The structure of 
the thesis is outlined in section 1.6. 
1.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
This thesis focuses on the ASX remuneration committee recommendations as no 
body of evidence exists as to whether the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations are achieving their objective.  The focus of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is to ensure appropriate oversight of the executive 
remuneration function and to promote fair and responsible remuneration practices.  The 
first aim of this thesis is to examine the decision that companies make regarding the 
formation and composition of the remuneration committee. Prior research suggests a 
positive relation between the need for monitoring of managers and decisions about 
remuneration committee formation and composition. Because of their characteristics, 
some companies have greater potential for agency problems related to executive 
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remuneration. For these companies there is an increased likelihood that contracts 
provide for remuneration that favours management at the expense of the company and 
its shareholders. This creates a greater demand for monitoring (Cui et al., 2007; 
Rainsbury et al., 2008). Therefore, the decision made by a company to adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is expected to be positively related to agency 
costs and the related external demand for monitoring.  
In addition, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
requires sufficient board size and diversity. Constraints arise when there is a limited 
supply of potential committee members (Rainsbury et al., 2008). Moreover, it is costly 
for a company to appoint additional board members or reconfigure the board so as to 
enable adoption of the remuneration committee recommendations (Link et al., 2008). 
The decision regarding remuneration committee formation and composition is therefore 
a matter of balancing the benefits of monitoring provided by the committee and the 
costs of adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations. The first 
research question focuses on formation and composition of the remuneration committee. 
Research Question 1a: Why do companies form a remuneration committee? 
Research Question 1b: For companies that form a remuneration committee, what 
factors determine adoption of the ASX remuneration committee composition 
recommendations?  
This thesis also examines the relation between adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations and executive remuneration practice.  The ASX states that 
“companies should ensure the level and composition of remuneration is sufficient and 
reasonable and that its relationship to performance is clear” (Australian Corporate 
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Governance Council, 2007, p. 35).  The ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations are intended to increase the likelihood that remuneration practice 
meets these objectives.  The second research question is therefore: 
Research Question 2: Does adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations influence the level of executive remuneration and the linkage to 
company performance in remuneration awarded to key executives?  
The third research question examines whether adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is associated with levels of dissent on the 
annual remuneration report.  If adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with appropriate levels of remuneration and linkage of 
remuneration to company performance, then it is expected that shareholder dissent 
should be lower in these companies.  That is, where shareholders perceive adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations to be associated with more 
effective remuneration practice, the level of dissent on the annual remuneration report is 
likely to be lower.  The third research question is therefore: 
Research Question 3: Is adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations negatively associated with shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report? 
 
1.3 MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTION 
The study of remuneration committees is motivated by continued questioning of the 
effectiveness of existing regulation of executive remuneration by researchers and 
regulators (Windsor and Cybinski, 2009; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010; Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2010). Regulatory intervention has occurred partly because 
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of public dissatisfaction with perceived excessive executive remuneration, particularly 
where company performance is low. Despite these concerns, Australian research into 
the role of the remuneration committee in the governance of executive remuneration has 
been limited.  This means the existing body of literature is limited in allowing 
assessment of the efficacy of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations in a 
voluntary setting. In particular, there is a lack of evidence to determine appropriate 
regulatory policy.  For example, whether the introduction of mandated rules regarding 
remuneration committee formation and composition is appropriate.  This thesis provides 
evidence relevant to these policy issues. 
The study provides detailed descriptive material on the level of adoption of 
voluntary recommendations relating to the remuneration committee for Australian listed 
companies in 2008.  The analysis also examines the structure of the remuneration 
committee consistent with the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding size and independence.  This study contributes to the literature in a number of 
ways.  First, the study provides detailed information about the use of remuneration 
committees by Australian companies.  A comprehensive examination is undertaken of 
the factors influencing the decision to voluntarily form a remuneration committee in the 
Australian setting.   
The majority of prior board committee studies have been concerned with the audit 
committee and its contribution to ensuring the integrity of financial reporting (Carson, 
2002; Klein, 2003). Overall, research regarding the remuneration committee is a small 
portion of the prior board committee studies (Vafeas, 1999, 2000; Carson, 2002; Sun 
and Cahan, 2009). Previous research has examined the remuneration committee in 
conjunction with a range of corporate governance practices (Kang et al., 2007; 
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Christensen et al., 2010). Australian research on the remuneration committee is less 
developed than in the US and United Kingdom (hereafter referred to as “UK”) (Kiel and 
Nicholson, 2003; Huang et al., 2009).   
Second, much of prior theoretical and empirical research has been conducted in 
the US (Kang et al., 2007; Guest, 2008; Sapp, 2008; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010), 
where regulation mandates the formation and structure of a remuneration committee.  
There are substantial legal, economic and institutional differences between the 
Australian regulatory environment and the US (Bonn, 2004). Conducting analysis in the 
Australian voluntary adoption setting enriches the extant research by providing an 
insight as to how governance choices are made and how the choices are related to 
executive remuneration.  The Australian environment allows us to identify incentives 
for adoption and structure of remuneration committees that do not include complying 
with regulations.   
Third, the diverse sample used in this thesis provides an incremental contribution to 
the current literature. Prior research has focused on smaller samples of larger, more 
established companies (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Daily et al., 1998; Anderson and 
Bizjak, 2003). This issue of limited sample size is particularly the case for Australian 
studies. In contrast, this thesis uses a larger sample, reflecting a range of company sizes 
and age.  Accordingly, the analysis extends to examining the structure and effectiveness 
of remuneration committees for different company sizes.  This is an important 
contribution because extant research demonstrates that size is a relevant factor in 
governance choice (Windsor and Cybinski, 2009) and that adoption of best practice 
guidelines are not necessarily the optimal governance choice for all company sizes 
(Christensen et al., 2012). 
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Fourth, the thesis presents evidence relevant to public policy discussion.  The 
recent Australian Productivity Commission report on executive remuneration in 
Australia contained a number of proposed reforms (Australian Productivity 
Commission, 2010).  The proposals include mandatory remuneration committee 
formation and composition requirements for Australia’s largest 300 companies.  The 
ASX subsequently amended its listing rules, effective from 1 July 2011, to address the 
Australian Productivity Commission’s call for the introduction of prescriptive 
requirements for Australia’s largest 300 companies.  This study provides evidence 
regarding whether it is efficient to allow large companies choice in the adoption of 
governance practices. 
Fifth, a significant component of the existing research into executive 
remuneration focuses solely on CEO remuneration practices (Frydman and Saks, 2010). 
Another contribution of this research is that it examines remuneration for a wider group 
of executives. The remuneration committee monitors and advises the board of directors 
on overall remuneration practice, not only for the CEO. Additionally, the annual 
shareholder advisory vote is on the company’s remuneration report, which incorporates 
disclosures regarding remuneration practices for senior executives, which incorporates 
the directors, CEO and other identified senior executives. Therefore, it is relevant to 
consider the remuneration of a broader group of senior executives in assessing the 
performance of the remuneration committee.  
Sixth, this thesis also contributes to the existing literature in its approach to 
determining the appropriateness of executive remuneration.  Prior studies have 
examined the levels of remuneration and the link between remuneration and measures 
of company performance. This approach is followed in this thesis; however, a novel 
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approach to determining the appropriateness of remuneration is adopted. In this thesis, 
the outcome of the non-binding shareholder vote on the annual remuneration report is 
used as means of measuring the appropriateness of remuneration.  This non-binding 
shareholder vote represents an opportunity for shareholders to express their satisfaction 
or otherwise with company remuneration practice. By extension, the non-binding 
shareholder vote is an indicator of the effectiveness of the board and the remuneration 
committee in mitigating agency problems. 
Additionally the Australian Commonwealth government in 2011 introduced new 
legislation which contains what is referred to as the two strikes rule which allows for a 
board spill if a company receives a negative vote from shareholders on the remuneration 
report of twenty five per cent or higher in two consecutive years (Corporations 
Amendment (Improving Accountability of Director and Executive Remuneration) Bill 
2011 (Cth)).  The new legislative requirement is a further enhancement of the role of 
shareholders regarding executive remuneration practice. This study provides insight into 
the role of the remuneration committee in ensuring remuneration is acceptable to 
shareholders. 
Finally, earlier Australian studies were conducted prior to, or immediately after, the 
introduction of the ASX Recommendations (Australian Corporate Governance Council, 
2003). Consequently the studies were conducted when the ASX Recommendations did 
not exist or were arguably in the early stages of implementation.  These studies were 
conducted using samples consisting of large companies. A broader sample is needed 
before more generalisable conclusions can be drawn.  Therefore, the sample used is 
drawn from a period in which the ASX Recommendations have had sufficient time to 
be assessed and embedded in corporate governance practice. 
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1.4 RESEARCH METHOD 
Hypotheses are developed to address each of the research questions outlined 
above. The research method is empirical analysis of archival data for Australian listed 
companies in 2008. Archival data is obtained from financial databases, company annual 
reports and annual general meeting proxy voting disclosures. Statistical analyses are 
performed of logistic and ordinary least squares multivariate regressions. 
1.5 RESULTS  
Remuneration committee existence is significantly associated with shareholder 
characteristics related to insider shareholdings and institutional shareholding, and 
marginally related to a change in CEO.  Composition of the committee is significantly 
explained by the availability of independent directors and marginally explained by 
company complexity measured by geographical segments.  Whilst agency costs are 
associated with committee formation, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
composition recommendations is associated with board capacity. 
 The findings also suggest that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is not universally associated with more effective remuneration 
practice with regard to the top five ranked executives. Adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendation is generally associated with higher 
remuneration levels, and is not generally associated with remuneration contracts that 
provide stronger links between remuneration and measures of company performance.  
The association between executive remuneration and adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations varies depending on whether the company is 
experiencing positive or negative return on assets. The results indicate that adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations are associated with higher 
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remuneration levels in companies evidencing positive operating performance, measured 
by return on assets.  For companies with negative operating performance, no significant 
association between remuneration and adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is found.  Additionally, for companies with positive return on assets, 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated with 
weaker pay for performance sensitivity. No association between adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations and operating performance was found in 
companies with negative return on assets. 
The results also indicate that in some cases adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with excessive levels of executive 
remuneration.  However, for companies identified as paying excessive levels of 
remuneration to the top five ranked executives, adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with stronger linkage between remuneration 
and measures of company performance.   
Analysis of the sample companies partitioned into large, mid-size and small sub 
samples, suggests that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
is not associated with more effective remuneration practices in large and mid-size 
companies.  However, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
is associated with a stronger link between measures of company performance and the 
remuneration of the top five ranked executives in small companies. 
The analysis of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report shows that 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is generally not 
associated with levels of shareholder dissent.  However, for companies identified as 
paying excessive levels of remuneration to the top five ranked executives, adoption of 
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the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated with lower levels of 
shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report.   
Overall the findings indicate that agency costs and board capacity are incrementally 
relevant to the decision to voluntarily adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations, after controlling for company characteristics related to size, debt 
levels, overall governance quality, auditor and company age.  Additionally, the analysis 
of remuneration committee efficacy suggests that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is not universally associated with more effective executive 
remuneration practice. Only limited support is found regarding the proposition that 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations ensures the company 
implements remuneration arrangements associated with measures of company 
performance adopted in this study. 
1.6 STRUCTURE 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of governance 
practices related to executive remuneration. This includes Australia, the US and the UK 
because the regulatory initiatives in these countries are similar and have to some extent 
influence regulation in Australia. Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework on which 
the thesis is based and provides a comprehensive review of the literature related to the 
research questions.  Following on from Chapter 3, testable hypotheses are developed 
and outlined in Chapter 4.  Chapter 5 outlines the research method adopted and provides 
a summary of the variables used in the statistical modelling used in the study.  
Chapter 6 reports the results of analyses conducted in regard to remuneration 
committee formation and composition. Chapter 7 presents the results of analyses 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
13 
 
conducted to assess remuneration committee effectiveness.  The results presented 
include descriptive statistics of the sample regarding remuneration committee 
formation, composition and effectiveness. Statistical analyses include (1) logistic 
regression models employed to identify factors relevant to remuneration committee 
formation and composition and (2) ordinary least squares multiple regressions 
employed to test various aspects of remuneration committee efficacy. Chapter 8 
discusses the results of the study and their implications, outlines limitations and 
recommendations for future research, and concludes this thesis. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the development of regulation of executive remuneration 
oversight and practice in Australia. It is informative to review US and UK regulatory 
developments because of the influence they have had on Australian regulation (Thomas, 
2009, Clarke, 2011). Australia, the US and UK are all common law countries. “A 
significant proportion of Australia’s regulatory framework for executive [remuneration], 
including the introduction of the ASX [Recommendations] in 2003, and important 
reforms to the Corporations Act in 2004, constituted a direct response to Enron and 
some contemporaneous Australian corporate scandals” (Hill, 2010, p. 8). Additionally, 
Australia’s corporate governance reform agenda has closely followed that of the UK 
and US (Dignam and Galanis, 2004).   
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the changes 
in executive remuneration practice over time. The introduction and evolution of 
corporate governance codes of practice are discussed in section 2.3.  Section 2.4 
outlines regulatory intervention used to provide shareholders with greater input over 
executive remuneration practices.  The corporate governance framework relevant to the 
thesis is discussed at section 2.5.  The chapter is summarised in section 2.6. 
2.2 THE RISE OF EQUITY BASED REMUNERATION  
The complexity of arrangements for executive remuneration has increased over 
time.  This is partially due to the shift from cash payment to more complex packages 
including cash and equity based remuneration. Prior to the 1980s, the components of 
executive remuneration were mainly salary, cash bonuses and long term cash incentives 
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(Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Equity based remuneration was used, but only to a limited 
extent. During the 1980s, US companies began more extensive use of equity based 
remuneration in the form of stock options (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). In a study of 
large US listed companies, Hall and Liebman (1998) examine the use of executive stock 
options. They show that in 1980, 30 per cent of the remuneration awarded to the chief 
executive officer (CEO) was in the form of new stock option grants, yet by 1994, the 
proportion had risen to 70 per cent. Moreover, the study showed that by 1994, 87 per 
cent of chief executives held stock options. Hall and Murphy (2003) also document a 
significant increase in options granted to chief executives, managers and employees in 
US companies during the period from 1992 to 2002.   
Australia and the UK also increasingly adopted equity based remuneration 
arrangements around the same time (Hill and Yablon, 2002). In a study of remuneration 
practices of UK companies between 1980 and 1993, Conyon et al. (1995) note that 
despite the scarcity of detailed data on the issue of stock options during this period, the 
evidence suggests that the importance of stock options increased during the period. In a 
study of Australian companies, Coulton and Taylor (2002b) find that executive stock 
options have grown to form a significant component of remuneration in large Australian 
companies. In their review of 258 companies, 59 per cent of the sample had granted 
stock options to the CEO, with 31 per cent of the companies granting stock options in 
the sample year.  The stock options granted had a median estimated value equivalent to 
27 per cent of total remuneration awarded to the CEO.  However, the authors note that 
the use of executive stock options is not as extensive in Australia, as in the US.  Thomas 
(2011) also notes that between 2002 and 2008, 40 to 55 per cent of the largest 100 
companies in Australia had issued options as part of their remuneration packages.  The 
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stock options granted represented between 6 and 11 per cent of the total remuneration 
awarded to the CEO over that time period (Australian Productivity Commission, 2010). 
Executive based remuneration arrangements can also be used to align the interests 
of shareholders and managers (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Frydman and Jenter, 2010).  
The increased use of equity based remuneration (particularly stock options) across these 
jurisdictions was motivated by favourable taxation treatment and the lack of a 
requirement for the related value to be reported as an expense in company financial 
accounts (Egginton et al., 1993; Coulton and Taylor, 2002a; Hill and Yablon, 2002; 
Hall and Murphy, 2003). In certain circumstances the tax liability relating to the issue of 
the options could be delayed and the employee taxed at a lower capital gains rate 
(Egginton et al., 1993).  Accounting rules were enacted by the US in 2004, and in 2005 
by the UK and Australia, which require expensing of option grants in the annual 
financial report.  
In Australia, the expensing of stock options was introduced via the Australian 
accounting standard, AASB 2 “Share-Based Payment” (Australian Accounting 
Standards Board, 2010). The UK also introduced the requirement via the issue of 
accounting standard FRS (Financial Reporting Standard) 20 (UK Financial Reporting 
Council, 2012).  AASB 2 and FRS 20 are the jurisdictional equivalents to the 
International Accounting Standard, IFRS 2 “Share-Based Payments” (Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 2010; UK Financial Reporting Council, 2012).  Whilst the 
US did not adopt the International Accounting Standards, the requirement to expense 
employee stock options was introduced via the US Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles FAS 123R “Share-Based Payment” (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 
2004).  As a result, stock options became less prevalent (Frydman and Jenter, 2010).  
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While tax and accounting benefits have been removed or limited, there are other 
reasons for using options as a form of remuneration.  For example, they are considered 
an inexpensive way in which small start-up companies could compete with larger more 
established companies to attract talented executives (Coulton and Taylor, 2002a; Hall 
and Murphy, 2003; Hill, 2010). Moreover, executive stock options and other equity 
based remuneration arrangements can be effectively used to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Frydman and Jenter, 2010). Hall 
and Murphy (2003, p. 54) note that theoretical and empirical research in this area 
indicates, with few exceptions, optimal remuneration contracts include the issue of 
employee stock options as a means of mitigating agency costs. Frydman and Jenter 
(2010, p. 89) conclude that “the long run evidence shows that [remuneration] 
arrangements have served to tie the wealth of managers to [company] performance – 
and perhaps to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests – for most of the twentieth 
century”.  
Frydman and Saks’ (2010) review of executive remuneration between 1936 and 
2005 draws a similar conclusion. However, equity based remuneration is still an 
important aspect of executive remuneration contracts. In the Australian context, 
Matolscy and Wright (2007) report that 66 per cent of companies use some form of 
equity scheme. Ernst & Young (2006) and Rankin (2010) note that equity plans, 
particularly options, are the most common component of long term incentives plans 
used by Australian companies. 
The use of equity incentives in remuneration contracts creates greater incentive 
for opportunistic behaviour (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003).  
The issue of employee stock options has been linked to excessive risk taking and the 
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artificial manipulation of company stock prices (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Holmstrom 
and Kaplan, 2003).  Consequently, a persistent criticism is that executive remuneration 
contracts favour management and are not sufficiently linked to company performance or 
shareholder value (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Vafeas, 2000). In addition, use of equity 
incentives requires a more sophisticated approach to managing executive remuneration. 
Hence, governance regulatory reforms seek to increase transparency of executive 
remuneration and limit the ability of executives to influence their own remuneration 
(Finegold et al., 2007). To address these issues governance reform has focused on (1) 
development of corporate governance codes that identify governance best practice for 
managing executive remuneration; and, (2) regulating to allow shareholders greater 
influence over decisions on executive remuneration. 
2.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODES 
The first Australian governance code, the Code of Corporate Practices and 
Conduct, was issued in 1991. It was developed through collaboration of the Australian 
Business Council, the Australian Stock Exchange, the Australian Institute of Company 
Directors, the Australian Society of Certified Practising Accountants, and the Institute 
of Chartered Accountants (Bosch, 2002).  Its development was partly a response to the 
substantial governance failures that became evident following the collapse of several 
large corporations in the late 1980s. The Code of Corporate Practices and Conduct was 
voluntary and it set out principles and guidelines on the structure of corporate boards 
and director conduct (Bosch, 2002).  
Around the same time the Cadbury Committee was appointed to review corporate 
governance practice in the UK. The Cadbury Committee was established in the 
aftermath of large corporate failures, for example, Polly Peck International, Bank of 
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Credit and Commerce International (‘BCCI’) and  Maxwell Communications (Dedman, 
2002).  These failures led to a general lack in investor confidence in corporate 
accountability, governance and auditor performance (Weir and Laing, 2001). In 1992, 
the Cadbury Committee released its final report “Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance” (hereafter referred to as “the Cadbury Report”) (The Committee on the 
Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992). The Cadbury Report proposed best 
practice corporate governance standards.  A consequence of the Cadbury report was the 
introduction in 1992 of the UK Corporate Governance Code (originally called ‘The 
Combined Code’) which is applicable for all listed UK companies (UK Corporate 
Governance Code, 2010). 
The Cadbury Report proposed voluntary governance standards rather than 
legislative requirements as the more appropriate approach to ensuring the effectiveness 
of corporate governance (The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, 1992). In regard to executive remuneration, the recommendations of the 
Cadbury Committee were for the formation of a remuneration committee “consisting 
wholly or mainly of non-executive directors and chaired by a non-executive director, to 
recommend to the board the remuneration of the executive directors in all its forms, 
drawing on outside advice as necessary” (Provision 4.42, Cadbury Report, 1992). Later, 
two separate reviews commissioned by the UK government confirmed the 
appropriateness of the Cadbury recommendation for the establishment of an 
independent remuneration committee.  The first review (known as the “Greenbury 
Report”) focused on directors’ remuneration (The Study Group on Directors' 
Remuneration, 1995), whilst the second (known as the “Higgs Report”) examined the 
role and effectiveness of non-executive directors (Higgs, 2003). The UK Combined 
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Code issued in 1998 (revised in 2003, 2006 and 2010) includes these recommendations, 
and states that only independent directors should be appointed to the committee (Jones 
and Pollitt, 2004, UK Financial Reporting Council, 2003). 
There are many similarities between the UK Corporate Governance Code and the 
ASX Good Governance Principles and Recommendations of 2003. Consistent with the 
UK Combined Code the ASX developed a best practice framework for corporate 
governance, and provided practical guidance on adoption of the ASX 
Recommendations. The stated aim of the ASX Recommendations was to “restore 
investor confidence and to promote transparency to enable shareholders to make 
comparative investment decisions” (ASX Corporate Governance Council,  2003, p. 7).  
The ASX Recommendations outline principles and recommendations on key 
governance practices. In dealing with governance of executive remuneration, the ASX 
Recommendations follow the Cadbury Committee view that a remuneration committee 
is an efficient mechanism to provide oversight of remuneration policies (2007, p. 34, 
Australian Corporate Governance Council).  Principle eight of the ASX 
Recommendations (2007) states that the remuneration committee should review and 
make recommendations to the board regarding company remuneration policies for 
senior executives and directors. The ASX recommends the committee have at least three 
committee members, the majority of which should be independent directors, and that 
the committee should appoint an independent chairperson (ASX Corporate Governance 
Council, 2007).  
Although adoption of their respective codes is voluntary, the Australian Stock 
Exchange and the London Stock Exchange have adopted a comply or explain approach 
for corporate governance regulation. The listing rules of these stock exchanges outline 
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the rule.  In Australia, companies are required to disclose in their annual report the 
extent of their adoption of the ASX Recommendations and provide an explanation for 
any non-adoption.  The rationale for the comply or explain approach is that it enables 
companies to implement corporate governance practices that are relevant to their 
circumstances and operating environment (UK Corporate Governance Code, 2010). 
Hence, the governance codes seek active engagement on the issue of corporate 
governance by listed companies, rather than the adoption of a tick the box compliance 
mentality. 
The US approach to the development of corporate governance regulation has been 
more prescriptive.  The US enacted legislative requirements rather than rely on self-
regulation or voluntary corporate governance codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009). Corporate governance reform in the US has also occurred as a result of the 
regulatory response to corporate failure scandals (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003). The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 
2002 (hereafter referred to as “the Sarbanes-Oxley Act”) was enacted in response to the 
collapse of several large US companies.   
The legislation required significant changes to corporate governance practice 
(Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007). In particular the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act focused on the board, the integrity of financial reporting, executive 
remuneration, internal controls and auditor independence (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003; 
Coates, 2007).  In the executive remuneration context, the new rules allow companies to 
recoup bonuses or other incentive based remuneration paid to and profits from the sale 
of company equity instruments by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial 
Officer resulting from the material misstatement of the company financial report due to 
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misconduct (Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), section 304).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also 
requires companies to form an independent remuneration committee (Dew-Becker, 
2009).  
Mandating committee formation means the US regulatory environment differs 
from the principles based voluntary code arrangement adopted in Australia and the UK. 
There is some movement towards mandatory governance requirements in Australia. A 
recent report into executive remuneration by the Australian Productivity Commission 
(2010) proposed the introduction of mandatory requirements for the formation and 
composition of the remuneration committee.  As a result, effective from 1 July 2011, the 
ASX Listing Rules were amended to require companies included in the ASX 300 Index 
to form a remuneration committee consisting exclusively of non-executive directors 
(ASX Listing Rule 12.8). 
2.4 SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL OF EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
Recall that executive remuneration governance reform has focused on (1) 
development of corporate governance codes that identify governance best practice for 
managing executive remuneration; and, (2) regulating to allow shareholders greater 
influence over decisions on executive remuneration.  The relevant corporate governance 
mechanisms have been discussed in the previous section.  This section expands on the 
regulation designed to facilitate shareholder engagement of executive remuneration.  Of 
particular relevance to this thesis is the introduction of the requirement for shareholders 
to vote on the annual remuneration report. The shareholder vote provides feedback to 
the directors and the remuneration committee as to shareholder satisfaction with the 
company’s remuneration policy and practices (Carter and Zamora, 2009). 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
23 
 
Regulation requiring shareholders to vote on the company remuneration report 
was first introduced in the UK (Deane, 2007).  The legislation was the Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations (2002). The aim of the regulation was to enhance 
transparency in the remuneration setting process, improve accountability to shareholders 
and promote executive remuneration practices that were more effectively linked to 
shareholder outcomes (Deloitte, 2004). The legislation introduced enhanced disclosure 
requirements of executive remuneration practices and an annual non-binding 
shareholder voting requirement for listed UK companies. As the shareholder vote is 
non-binding, it is considered advisory only.  More recently, in March 2012, the UK 
Government released a consultation paper outlining proposals to introduce an annual 
binding shareholder vote on company remuneration policy for the coming year and on 
termination payments (Department for Business Innovation and Skills, 2012). 
Similar reforms were introduced in Australia by means of the Corporate Law 
Economic Reform Package Number 9 Act (2004) (also known as ‘CLERP 9’). The 
legislation requires the company annual remuneration report to be subjected to a non-
binding or advisory shareholder vote.  Sheehan (2009) notes that the goal of the reform 
is to align the interests of  managers and shareholders by ensuring executive 
remuneration is appropriately aligned with company performance, and to promote 
shareholder engagement in the area of executive remuneration. Historically, few 
Australian remuneration reports have registered significant opposition by shareholders 
(Australian Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 95). However, a higher proportion of 
companies have experienced a higher protest vote by shareholders since 2008 (Thomas, 
2011).  Deane (2007) suggests that UK and Australian investors believe the annual non-
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binding shareholder vote has resulted in improved pay for performance sensitivity in 
executive remuneration and decreased risks of rewarding failure.  
Whilst descriptive and anecdotal evidence exists regarding shareholder voting 
behaviour, empirical research in this regard is quite limited (Dew-Becker, 2009) and 
largely UK focused.  Sheehan (2010) finds that the shareholder vote on an annual 
remuneration report has influenced remuneration practice in the UK and Australia. 
However, the analysis examines the shareholder vote in the first three years of its 
operation and focuses on large UK and Australian companies.  The results are largely 
inconclusive as to whether the annual shareholder vote has resulted in an improvement 
in executive remuneration practice.  However, a recent study by Clarkson et al. (2011) 
found that between 2001 and 2009 the annual shareholder vote is associated with 
improved pay for performance linkage in Australian large companies. This conclusion 
is consistent with Deane’s (2007) comments.   
In the US, similar legislation was introduced by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) (hereafter referred to as the ‘Dodd-Frank 
Act’).  The Dodd-Frank Act contained wide-ranging financial reforms and sought to 
“create a sound economic foundation to grow jobs, protect consumers, rein in Wall 
Street and big bonuses, end bailouts and too big to fail, and prevent another financial 
crisis” (US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 2010, p. 1). In 
addition to targeting banks and the financial regulatory system, the Dodd-Frank Act also 
introduced a number of corporate governance provisions, including mandatory periodic 
shareholder advisory voting on executive remuneration. Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act requires the shareholder vote to occur at least once every three years, with 
shareholders being entitled to vote every six years on whether the resolution should 
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occur every year, or every second year or every third year (Jenson et al., 2010). The first 
shareholder resolution was required for any annual meeting held on or after January 21, 
2011. Consistent with the UK and Australian approach, the shareholder vote is not 
binding.   
In 2010, the Australian Productivity Commission reviewed executive 
remuneration regulation and practices. The resulting report, “Executive Remuneration 
in Australia” (Australian Productivity Commission, 2010) recommended strengthening 
the annual non-binding shareholder vote. It proposed that a company receiving a 
negative vote of 25 per cent or greater on its annual remuneration report to shareholders 
must disclose in the next annual report how shareholder concerns have been addressed. 
Additionally, the Australian Productivity Commission proposed that if a company 
receives two consecutive negative votes of 25 per cent or greater on its annual 
remuneration report to shareholders, shareholders should have the opportunity to require 
the full board to stand for re-election (also known as the “two strikes rule”).   
The Australian government introduced legislation “Corporations Amendment 
(Improving Accountability of Director and Executive Remuneration) Bill 2011 (Cth)”, 
effecting the Productivity Commission’s recommendations. The amended legislation is 
effective from 2011.  In the event of triggering the two strikes rule, the directors are 
required to put a spill resolution to shareholders at the same annual general meeting.  If 
50 per cent or more of eligible shareholders vote in favour of the spill resolution, the 
directors are required to call a general meeting within 90 days. The directors in office at 
the time of approving the annual remuneration report are required to stand for re-
election at the general meeting. 
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2.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS 
In developing the research framework it is important to consider the institutional 
settings.  Corporate governance systems have historically been classified into two 
models (Denis and McConnell, 2003). One system of corporate governance is the 
Anglo-American model  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) which is typical of the Australian, 
UK and US.  This model is defined by dispersed shareholding, and reliance on 
managers acting as agents of shareholders in controlling the company (Dignam and 
Galanis, 2004).  The separation of ownership and control and the inherent agency 
problems are the main focus of corporate governance in the Anglo-American model 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Brennan and Solomon, 2008).  
The alternate model is the stakeholder model, which is historically applied to 
German and Japanese markets.  This model is characterised more by concentrated 
shareholding and greater involvement and control by shareholders and creditors 
(Dignam and Galanis, 2004).  
The Anglo-American model is the model relevant to this study.  Therefore, the 
development of this thesis is extensively guided by discussion and prior studies that 
have been conducted in a similar setting, namely the US and UK. 
Farrar (2001) identifies four means by which corporate governance is 
implemented in the Anglo-American model. The sources are legal regulation, stock 
exchange listing rules, financial reporting standards, codes of conduct and ethical 
standards. Corporate governance in Australia is derived from all four sources. 
The Australian regulatory setting for listed companies is a mixture of regulatory 
requirements, listing rules, governance regulation and recommendations. The principle 
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regulations are included in the Corporations Act 2001(Cth), the ASX Listing Rules 
which have legislative backing, and the mandated comply or explain requirements of the 
ASX Recommendations. This study focuses on regulation specific to remuneration 
committee formation, composition and operation. 
2.6 SUMMARY 
The discussion outlined in this chapter demonstrates the evolution of regulatory 
reform relevant to executive remuneration.  Formal regulation has largely focused on 
mandating disclosure, supporting the development of governance codes and facilitating 
shareholder engagement in the UK and Australia, whereas the US has adopted a more 
prescriptive approach.  Regulators in Australia, the US and the UK recognise that the 
remuneration committee performs an important role, and therefore governance reforms 
in each jurisdiction focus on the formation of an independent remuneration committee. 
The remuneration committee remains a key governance mechanism in ensuring 
companies adopt appropriate remuneration practices.  
The discussion in this chapter is relevant as the two key mechanisms that 
regulatory reform focuses on to ensure the effective oversight of executive remuneration 
are directly examined by this study. Specifically, this research examines the 
remuneration committee and the shareholder vote on the annual remuneration report.  
The thesis examines determinants of adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and whether adoption influences remuneration levels and the link to 
measures of company performance in remuneration awarded to key executives.  The 
next chapter discusses extant research relevant to the thesis.   
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews prior literature relevant to the research questions presented in 
Chapter 1.  The research questions are concerned with (1) factors that are associated 
with the formation and composition of the remuneration committee, (2) whether 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations influences executive 
remuneration levels and the linkage between remuneration and company performance, 
and (3) whether adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations are 
negatively associated with shareholder dissent regarding remuneration practices.  Prior 
studies that have addressed these questions are reviewed in detail.  Other areas of 
corporate governance literature relevant to the thesis are also reviewed, including 
agency theory and models of remuneration practice. This chapter does not review all the 
literature included in the broader executive remuneration and corporate governance 
streams.  Instead the focus is on studies directly relevant to the thesis. Some studies 
included in the broader executive remuneration and corporate governance streams are 
informative to the development of hypotheses and research method and are discussed 
further in Chapter 4. 
This chapter proceeds as follows.  Section 3.2 defines corporate governance and 
summarises the interaction between corporate governance and executive remuneration 
oversight and practice. Section 3.3 discusses theoretical models of executive 
remuneration contracting. Section 3.4 reviews studies that have examined the 
relationship between the board of directors and executive remuneration, while section 
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3.5 reviews studies that have examined remuneration committee formation and 
operation. Key points from the chapter are then summarised in Section 3.6.  
3.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
Numerous definitions of corporate governance have been suggested in prior 
accounting and finance literature. The definitions highlight the role of governance in 
protecting investors by mitigating the self-interested behaviour of managers and view 
governance as mechanisms that aim to ensure managers make choices that maximise the 
value of the company. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p. 737) define corporate 
governance in terms of investor protection as the “ways in which suppliers of finance to 
[companies] assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”.  Similarly, 
Denis and McConnell (2003, p. 2) define corporate governance as “the set of 
mechanisms – both institutional and market based – that induce the self-interested 
controllers of a company (those that make decisions regarding how the company will be 
operated) to make decisions that maximise the value of the company to its owners (the 
suppliers of capital)”. Core, Guay and Larcker (2003, p. 27) focus on management 
decision-making in their definition of corporate governance as “the set of 
complementary mechanisms that help align the actions and choices of managers with 
the interests of shareholders”.  
The role of contracting in governance is the focus of Armstrong, Guay and Weber 
(2010, p. 181) who define corporate governance as “the subset of a [company’s] 
contracts that help align the actions and choices of managers with the interest of 
shareholders”. The ASX defines corporate governance in terms of its regulatory 
framework as “the framework of rules, relationships, systems and processes within and 
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by which authority is exercised.  It encompasses the mechanisms by which [companies], 
and those in control, are held to account” (ASX Corporate Governance Council, p. 3). 
This thesis is concerned with aspects of corporate governance that are highlighted 
in these definitions.  This study addresses the role of the remuneration committee in 
reducing agency problems related to executive remuneration.  Remuneration practice is 
the subject of contracts between the company and its managers.  In addition, 
remuneration committee formation and composition are subject to the regulatory 
framework established by the ASX. 
Defining corporate governance by reference to its role in mitigating agency 
problems is directly relevant to this thesis. The remuneration committee plays a central 
role in assisting the board of directors to devise appropriate remuneration contracts. 
This is achieved by ensuring remuneration contracts align the interests of managers and 
shareholders (Matsumura and Shin, 2005). By ensuring that remuneration is positively 
related to shareholder wealth, remuneration contracts encourage executives to focus on 
maximising shareholder wealth (Eisenhardt, 1989; Denis, 2001; Florackis, 2008; Dew-
Becker, 2009).  
Executive remuneration incentives are an important governance mechanism that 
complements the monitoring of managers that is provided by the board of directors 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Core et al., 2003; Gillan, 2006; Ward et al., 2009). It is 
generally accepted that remuneration contracts are incomplete as it is impossible to 
address all possible actions and outcomes (Hart, 1995). Consequently, an effective 
remuneration committee plays an important role in advising the board regarding 
appropriate and effective executive remuneration contracting.  
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3.3 THEORETICAL MODELS OF REMUNERATION CONTRACTING  
Remuneration contracts are used to reduce agency costs and as such incorporate 
different components designed to align the interest of the executive with that of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). Competing models have been 
proposed to explain the process of remuneration contracting. These are the optimal 
contracting and managerial power models (Arthur and O'Neill, 2010). The optimal 
contracting model  (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) has been the dominant theory until the 
managerial power model was proposed by Bebchuck and Fried (2003) (Geiler and 
Renneboog, 2011).    
The optimal contracts model predicts that boards of directors establish optimal 
remuneration contracts with executives on an arm’s length basis (Bebchuk and Fried, 
2003; Weisbach, 2007). The model suggests that remuneration contracts link executive 
and shareholder interests, minimise agency costs, and enhance company value (Core et 
al., 2003).  
The alternative managerial power model predicts that managers, particularly the 
CEO, exert power over boards and use this influence to extract rents subject to an 
outrage constraint (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Weisbach, 2007). Outrage constraint 
suggests that executive remuneration is constrained by costs related to public reaction to 
excessive executive remuneration (Weisbach, 2007). These costs relate to reputational 
damage to the directors, executives and company and other overt action by 
disenfranchised investors (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). The result is that remuneration 
contracts are likely to favour management, and negatively impact company value as 
resources are diverted into excessive remuneration contracts at the expense of 
shareholders (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Core et al., 2005). 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
32 
 
Prior studies have tested the optimal contracting and managerial power models’ 
ability to explain contracting practice, but the empirical evidence is mixed (Frydman 
and Jenter, 2010). Some studies have reported results that are inconsistent with the 
managerial power model (Core et al., 2005; Dew-Becker, 2009; Frydman and Saks, 
2010).  Other studies have found that the optimal contracting and managerial power 
models are complementary explanations. That is, suboptimal contracting can occur but, 
in the long-run, incentive contracts are relatively efficient at addressing agency conflicts 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Sapp, 2008).  
Tosi et al. (2000) conducted a meta analysis of empirical literature on executive 
remuneration. They find evidence consistent with the managerial power model for 
executive-controlled companies, and evidence supporting the optimal contracts model 
for shareholder-controlled companies.  Literature tends to classify companies as 
shareholder-controlled if a minimum of five per cent of issued ordinary equity is held 
directly or indirectly by one shareholder who is not involved in the management of the 
company (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987).  Management-controlled companies are those 
companies where no shareholder, directly or indirectly, holds five per cent or more of 
the issued ordinary equity (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987).  This suggests that the ability of 
managers to manipulate remuneration contracts for their benefit is dependent on 
company circumstances, and that neither model provides a complete explanation. 
This thesis is concerned with the role of the remuneration committee in 
implementing remuneration contracts that reduce agency conflicts.  In an optimal 
contracting environment, the remuneration committee provides advice to the board to 
improve the design of remuneration contracts. In a contracting environment affected by 
managerial power, the monitoring role of the remuneration committee is likely to 
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minimise the extent to which managers are able to use their influence to extract rents. 
Therefore, regardless of whether remuneration contracts are determined as an optimal 
contract or as the result of managerial power, the remuneration committee has an 
important role in aiding the board with developing effective executive remuneration 
practice. 
3.4 BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
This section reviews prior studies that have considered the role of the board of 
directors in determining executive remuneration. These studies are relevant to this thesis 
because directors are ultimately responsible for executive remuneration oversight and 
the remuneration committee is a sub-committee of the board. Board research has 
considered the relation between board composition and executive remuneration levels, 
structure, and pay for performance sensitivity.  In terms of board composition, the 
characteristic mainly examined is board independence on the basis that independent 
directors reduce agency costs associated with executive remuneration.  In addition, the 
studies have tended to focus on remuneration of the company CEO.  Where the study 
has also examined the role of the remuneration committee in addition to the role of the 
board, the discussion related to the remuneration committee is included in section 3.5. 
Several US studies find that board composition is associated with effective 
remuneration contracts.  Core et al. (1999) examine whether CEO remuneration is 
associated with corporate governance quality.  The study uses measures of total 
remuneration, cash remuneration and salary (i.e. the fixed component of remuneration) 
of the CEO of 205 large US companies over a three year period between 1982 and 
1984.   The study finds that board characteristics related to higher levels of CEO 
remuneration include CEO duality, board size, greater proportion of affiliated directors, 
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outside directors appointed by the CEO or otherwise considered non independent, the 
number of additional board appointments and director age. Shareholder characteristics, 
in particular, block holders, are associated with lower levels of CEO remuneration.  The 
study also shows that traditional economic determinants of CEO remuneration, for 
example company size, growth opportunities, company risk and measures of company 
performance are associated with the level of CEO remuneration. The results suggest that 
companies with weaker governance structures have higher agency costs and pay their 
CEOs higher remuneration.   
Ryan and Wiggins (2004) examine the relation between board composition and 
director remuneration for 1,018 US companies in 1997.  They find that companies with 
less independent directors, CEO duality, and a powerful entrenched CEO have 
inefficient remuneration contracts.  The results indicate monitoring of remuneration is 
impeded by a lack of board independence particularly in circumstances where there is a 
strong CEO.  
Brick et al. (2006) analyse the relationship between cash and total remuneration 
levels of CEO and directors in 1,441 US companies between 1992 and 2001. They 
control for company, governance and CEO characteristics.  Whilst the focus of the 
study is on examining the correlation between CEO remuneration and director 
remuneration, they find that the need for monitoring of managers is positively 
associated with director remuneration.  The results also indicate cronyism between 
directors and the CEO is reflected in the CEO’s remuneration arrangements.  Overall, 
the study suggests that the board of directors is not necessarily able to effectively 
minimise agency costs related to executive remuneration.   
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Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) study CEO remuneration and board structure 
for 865 US companies operating during the period from 2000 to 2005.  The study 
examines whether the stricter requirements for board composition introduced by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and new listing rules of the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations 
(NASDAQ) stock market influence remuneration decisions.  Specifically, the study 
focuses on three board structure requirements, a majority of independent directors, the 
formation of an independent nomination committee and the formation of an independent 
remuneration committee. The components of CEO remuneration used are total 
remuneration, equity based remuneration and non-equity based remuneration.  They 
control for economic determinants of executive remuneration, company size, company 
performance, CEO tenure and industry effects.  They find the introduction of the rules is 
associated with a decrease in CEO remuneration for companies that were least 
compliant prior to the new rules.  In particular, board independence is found to be 
strongly associated with a decrease in CEO remuneration.  The decrease was observed 
to be greater for bonus and stock option-based remuneration.   
The authors find that non-affiliated block shareholders and institutional 
shareholders provide monitoring of remuneration.  They conclude that the importance of 
independent directors in the executive remuneration contracting process reduces when 
these substitute monitoring mechanisms exist. They also conclude that expanding the 
board to achieve board independence when other monitoring mechanisms exist can 
result in sub-optimal remuneration arrangements.  Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) 
suggest that the results indicate board independence is more important than 
remuneration committee independence in the executive remuneration contracting 
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process.  Overall, the study shows the relation between board characteristics and the 
determination of remuneration.   
US studies show that board characteristics are a relevant determinant of executive 
remuneration, particularly the CEO.  These studies demonstrate that the need for 
monitoring of executive remuneration is related to agency costs experienced by the 
company.  Sapp’s (2008) study extends this line of research by examining remuneration 
arrangements for the wider executive team. 
Sapp (2008) examines the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and 
executive remuneration for the top five executives of 400 listed Canadian companies 
between 2000 and 2005. In particular, the study analyses the role of ownership 
characteristics, regulatory environment, the board and the remuneration committee in 
determining executive remuneration.  Sapp (2008) finds that the level and structure of 
executive remuneration is influenced by characteristics related to the board, 
remuneration committee, CEO, shareholders and the competitive environment.  Board 
characteristics associated with higher levels of remuneration are board size, additional 
director positions held and longer board tenure.  Overall, the results provide further 
evidence that monitoring of remuneration is impeded by a lack of board independence.  
These studies demonstrate that in addition to economic determinants of 
remuneration, board characteristics are relevant to remuneration arrangements of the 
CEO and the wider executive team.  Studies of UK companies provide mixed evidence 
as to the impact of board structure on the remuneration contracting process.  UK studies 
also focus predominantly on the remuneration of the CEO. 
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Conyon and Peck (1998) examine the association between board structure and the 
remuneration committee on CEO remuneration for 100 large UK companies between 
1991 and 1994.  The companies included in the sample represent 75 per cent of the 
market capitalisation of listed companies during the sample period. They examine the 
impact of non-executive directors, the remuneration committee, and the presence of 
non-executive directors on the remuneration committee on CEO remuneration levels 
and the pay for performance sensitivity of CEO remuneration. They find that the 
presence of non-executive directors does not impact CEO remuneration.  However, the 
presence of executive directors is associated with higher CEO remuneration levels. The 
study also finds that the presence of non-executive directors has a positive influence on 
the pay performance sensitivity of CEO remuneration.  The results suggest that while 
non-executive directors do not significantly influence CEO remuneration levels, they 
are associated with aligning the CEO’s remuneration with company performance. 
Ozkan (2007) analyses the influence of ownership and board structure on total 
CEO remuneration in 414 large UK companies in 2004.  Higher CEO cash 
remuneration levels are associated with higher board independence and board size.  The 
results indicate that institutional shareholders, block holders and increases in director 
shareholdings are negatively associated with CEO remuneration. Higher growth 
opportunities and company size are also associated with higher levels of CEO 
remuneration.  Overall the findings suggest that monitoring of executive remuneration 
is not strengthened by board independence, but by external shareholder characteristics 
related to institutional shareholders and block holders.  This result supports the 
conclusion drawn by  Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2009) in their study of US 
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companies, that increasing board independence where other substitute monitoring 
mechanisms exist does not necessarily result in optimal remuneration arrangements. 
Johnston (2007) examines the association between market forces and internal 
controls on the CEO’s salary in 220 large UK companies in 1996.  The internal control 
measures examined reflect board and board committee characteristics that are consistent 
with the recommendations included in the Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report 
(1995) and Hampel Report (1998).  In particular, (1) the board should appoint a 
minimum of three non-executive directors, (2) the roles of CEO and board chairperson 
should be separated, (3) the CEO should not be a member of the remuneration 
committee, and (4) only non-executive directors should be appointed to the 
remuneration committee, two of which are independent.  The study finds board 
independence is associated with higher levels of remuneration. CEO duality has no 
impact on the CEO’s salary. The study also indicates that company profitability, sales 
revenue and industry are positively associated with higher CEO salaries.  Consistent 
with Ozkan (2007), the author finds that increased board independence leads to higher 
CEO remuneration levels on a cross–sectional basis. 
Two UK studies have examined executive remuneration arrangements between 
1983 and 2005.  Gregory-Smith (2009) examines the association between board 
characteristics and the composition of the remuneration committee on the CEO 
remuneration contracting process in 290 large UK companies between 1996 and 2005.  
He finds that the appointment of a higher proportion of insiders to the board leads to 
lower CEO remuneration. The study also reports that prior year remuneration, company 
size and total shareholder return are positively associated with higher levels of 
remuneration awarded to the CEO. Companies in which the role of the CEO and board 
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chairperson are performed by the same person are not associated with higher 
remuneration levels. The overall conclusion of the study is that in UK companies there 
is no evidence of rents’ capture in the remuneration contracting process.   
Guest (2010) examines the impact of board structure on the cash remuneration of 
the CEO for 1,880 UK companies between 1983 and 2002.  The study examines the 
impact the Cadbury Report (1992) has had on remuneration practice.  In particular the 
study examines the impact of voluntary adoption of the Cadbury Report 
recommendation that the board has at least three non-executive directors.   Specifically, 
the study examines the role of non-executive directors in the remuneration contracting 
process and the influence board size has over the remuneration contracting process.   
Guest (2010) finds that companies that voluntarily adopt the Cadbury Report 
recommendation regarding board structure are associated with a lower rate of increase 
in CEO remuneration and that board size increases the rate of growth in CEO 
remuneration.  The results also indicate that the pay for performance sensitivity of CEO 
remuneration is generally weak.  However, the pay for performance link becomes 
stronger as the proportion of non-executives appointed to the board increases.  The 
study demonstrates that voluntary governance codes influence corporate practice and 
that non-executive directors perform an important role in aligning the CEO’s 
remuneration contract with shareholder interests. 
The UK studies have shown that, contrary to expectations, board independence as 
a key monitoring mechanism is not necessarily effective at moderating the level of 
remuneration awarded to the CEO.  However, studies that have examined the 
association between remuneration and company performance, demonstrate that board 
independence is associated with remuneration arrangements that evidence a stronger 
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link to company performance. The Australian evidence also suggests that board 
independence is not an effective moderator of CEO remuneration. 
In Australia, an early study by Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) examined 100 of 
the largest Australian companies in 1995.  The study considered whether board 
composition was related to company performance and whether board structure and 
remuneration committee composition influenced the CEO’s remuneration.  They find 
the proportion of independent directors appointed to the board does not influence the 
CEO’s salary or bonus.  This study suggests that in Australian companies in 1995, the 
independent directors did not play a significant role in the determination of the CEO’s 
remuneration.  
Evans and Evans (2001) considered the relation between non-executive directors 
and CEO cash remuneration. The study examined 178 companies drawn from the ASX 
500 index in 1997. The study controls for company size and company performance.  
They find that board independence measured by the proportion of non-executive 
directors does not significantly impact CEO remuneration.  Consistent with US and UK 
research, the results also provide evidence that company size and performance are 
economic determinants of CEO remuneration. Contrary to expectations, the study 
suggests board independence does not have the desired impact on remuneration 
contracting process. 
Heaney et al. (2010) examine determinants of total CEO remuneration for 1,144 
listed Australian companies in 2006. Total remuneration incorporates all components of 
remuneration awarded to the CEO, including salary, short term bonuses, other short 
term non-monetary benefits, long term incentive plans, share options, other long term 
benefits, superannuation, pension benefits and other post-employment benefits.  Whilst 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
41 
 
the study is also a cross-sectional study, the author extends the Australian literature by 
using a larger sample and incorporating a larger number of economic determinants into 
the model.  Company characteristics included in the analysis include board 
characteristics, block holders, institutional shareholders, leverage, company size, 
performance, growth and industry effects.  The study period follows the introduction of 
Australia’s version of the international accounting standards (AIFRS) in 2005, requiring 
more detailed disclosure rules related to executive remuneration.   
Board characteristics examined by Heaney et al. (2010) include board size, the 
proportion of non-executive directors, and whether the roles of Chairperson and CEO 
were performed by the same person.  They find that board size is positively associated 
with CEO remuneration levels, whilst the proportion of non-executive directors is not 
significantly associated with CEO remuneration levels.  Further, contrary to 
expectations, the study finds that where the CEO is also the chairperson of the board 
lower total remuneration is awarded to the CEO.  The results also suggest that current 
year remuneration does not result in increased company performance in the following 
year.  The results indicate that performance and the level of ownership by block holders 
are not associated with CEO remuneration, however the presence of a large singular 
block holder moderates CEO remuneration.  Although the study period is nine years 
after the Evans and Evans (2001) study, the findings provide consistent evidence, across 
a broader sample, that on a cross-section basis, voluntary governance reform did not 
have the anticipated impact on the CEO remuneration contracting process.  
Three studies examine the remuneration practice of Australian companies between 
1999 and 2006.  Chalmers et al. (2006) is one of the first Australian studies to examine 
the association between economic, governance and ownership characteristics as 
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determinants of CEO remuneration over time.  The study examines 200 large Australian 
listed companies between 1999 and 2002.  In particular, the authors examine whether 
CEO remuneration arrangements provide evidence of rent extraction or reflect optimal 
contracting arrangements.  The study adopts the methodology used by Core et al. 
(1999).  The study extends the Australian literature by examining different components 
of remuneration of the CEO rather than focusing solely on cash remuneration. The 
components of CEO remuneration used in the study are total remuneration, fixed 
remuneration (i.e. salary, superannuation and non cash benefits), bonuses, value of 
options awarded and shares issued to the CEO.  The study includes board 
characteristics, ownership characteristics, performance, company size, growth and 
industry effects in the regression analysis.   The study finds some evidence of rents 
capture, however the evidence is negligible and not persuasive.  Consistent with extant 
research, board size is associated with higher total remuneration and higher salary and 
bonus awarded to the CEO.  The study does not provide evidence that board 
independence plays a significant role in the executive remuneration contracting process. 
Tian and Twite (2010) analyse a sample of 1,693 Australian companies for the 
years 2000 to 2005. The study examines the relation between ownership characteristics 
and board characteristics on the pay for performance sensitivity in CEO remuneration 
contracts. Multiple measures of CEO remuneration are used in the study.  These are 
short term cash remuneration, short term total remuneration, equity based remuneration, 
long term remuneration and total remuneration.  The study controls for company 
performance, company size, growth and industry effects.   Tian and Twite (2010) find 
that board independence has little influence on the pay for performance link in 
Australian listed companies. Company size is a significant determinant of total CEO 
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remuneration, short term cash remuneration, equity based remuneration and long term 
remuneration.   The results also indicate the presence of block holders has a positive 
impact on the link between pay and performance in CEO remuneration.  Overall the 
study provides evidence that the oversight provided by external block holders, rather 
than independent directors, is a more effective monitor of executive remuneration. 
Capezio et al. (2011) examine  CEO cash remuneration and board structure of 
663 large Australian companies in the period from 1999 to 2006. The components of 
cash remuneration incorporated into the study are total cash remuneration, annual cash 
incentive and annual non incentive cash remuneration.  The study controls for company 
size and risk.  The study finds that the appointment of an independent board does not 
significantly influence CEO cash remuneration.  Consistent with expectations, board 
size is positively and significantly associated with higher remuneration levels of the 
CEO.  However, contrary to expectations, insider boards are not associated with 
excessive CEO remuneration.  The study’s results identify only a weak link between 
board independence and pay for performance sensitivity in CEO remuneration. The 
study suggests that boards that adopt accepted best practice governance practice 
regarding board structure are not more effective at moderating CEO remuneration or 
ensuring remuneration contracts are linked to company performance, when compared to 
boards with a majority of insider directors.  
The studies reviewed above demonstrate that in addition to economic 
determinants of remuneration, board characteristics are relevant to remuneration 
arrangements. The research reviewed indicates that board independence does not 
consistently influence executive remuneration levels as expected. Australian studies find 
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that non-executive directors do not moderate CEO remuneration levels, nor are they 
more effective at linking remuneration to company performance. 
Governance reform in each jurisdiction focuses on board independence as an 
important monitoring mechanism to reduce agency costs. An independent remuneration 
committee is identified as the appropriate governance mechanism to enhance the 
remuneration contracting process. In examining executive remuneration, consideration 
of the remuneration committee’s presence and operation is necessary (Johnston, 2007). 
The next section examines research related to remuneration committee composition and 
practice. 
3.5 REMUNERATION COMMITTEES AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION 
Corporate governance regulation in Australia, the US and the UK include 
recommendations or requirements for the formation and composition of audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees. Prior literature dealing with the governance 
role of the remuneration committee is of direct relevance to this study and is reviewed 
in this section. 
Board committees are formed to assist the board in carrying out their duties 
effectively (Brown et al., 2011).  In their review of extant research on boards and 
corporate governance, Adams et al. (2010) show that board committees are performing 
an increasing amount of board work. Committees are acknowledged as improving the 
quality of corporate governance provided by the board because of their extensive time 
commitment to specific tasks and greater mastery of complex information (Spira and 
Bender, 2004). Detailed review of key operational matters often occurs at board 
committee level, which serves to inform decisions of the full board (Kesner, 1988; 
Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Spira and Bender, 2004).  Huang, Lobo and Zhou (2009) 
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find that the effectiveness of board monitoring is improved by delegation of duties to a 
board committee. 
The majority of prior board committee studies have been concerned with the audit 
committee and its contribution to ensuring the integrity of financial reporting (Carson, 
2002; Klein, 2003). Overall, research regarding the remuneration committee is a small 
portion of prior board committee studies (Sun and Cahan, 2009). Furthermore, 
Australian research on the remuneration committee is less developed than in the US and 
UK (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Huang et al., 2009).  
3.5.1 The Remuneration Committee – Formation and Composition 
The Demand for Monitoring of Executives 
The review of board studies highlights the demand for effective monitoring of 
executive remuneration.  As this thesis is focused on the use of remuneration 
committees to reduce agency costs associated with executive remuneration, the 
relationship between agency costs and corporate governance is directly relevant.  The 
following section examines studies that provide insight into the relation between agency 
costs and the demand for corporate governance mechanisms.  Prior studies show a 
positive association between external demand for monitoring of executives and agency 
costs (Cui et al., 2007; Rainsbury et al., 2008).    
Dey (2008) examines the relation between agency problems and corporate 
governance mechanisms employed by 371 large US companies between 2000 and 2001. 
The study uses exploratory principal component analysis to a range of corporate 
governance variables to identify key governance factors.  These factors broadly reflect 
the board, executive remuneration, auditor independence, the audit committee and the 
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integrity of financial reporting.   Company characteristics used to measure the level of 
agency problems experienced by each company are company size, company 
complexity, shareholder characteristics, growth opportunities, leverage, risk and free 
cash flows.  
Dey (2008) finds the governance mechanisms used by a company are directly 
related to the level of agency costs experienced by the company.  In particular, the 
results are more pronounced with regard to the composition and operation of the board 
of directors and the audit committee.  The results also indicate that company size, 
widely dispersed shareholding, leverage and risk are associated with the demand for 
good corporate governance practice.  Overall the study highlights that companies with 
higher agency costs experience greater demand for the adoption of appropriate 
governance mechanisms. 
Focusing on the audit committee, Klein (2002) examines the determinants of audit 
committee independence for 400 S&P 500 US companies between 1991 and 1993.  She 
finds that the presence of an independent audit committee is positively related to the 
demand for monitoring.  The results also indicate that the ability to constitute an 
independent audit committee is related to board capacity, in particular, the availability 
of independent directors. 
In a similar vein, Rainsbury et al. (2008) examine the factors associated with 
voluntary adoption of New Zealand’s best practice governance guidelines regarding 
audit committee composition in 56 listed New Zealand companies in 2001. In particular 
they examine the influence agency costs related to leverage, shareholder characteristics, 
growth opportunities, auditor quality, and board capacity have on adoption of best 
practice guidelines.  They find that agency costs are not significantly related to adoption 
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of best practice audit committee composition guidelines.  Their results indicate that 
companies with greater board capacity, that is larger board size and greater board 
independence, are more likely to adopt the best practice guidelines. Overall the study 
provides direct empirical evidence that board capacity is an important determinant of 
board committee independence.   
Huang et al. (2009) examine the determinants and consequences of the voluntary 
formation of a governance committee in 1,500 S&P companies between 1996 and 2002.  
They find that higher agency costs are associated with the committee’s formation.  The 
results also indicate that board capacity, in particular larger board size, availability of 
independent directors and board diligence is also positively associated with the 
formation of a governance committee. 
Overall, the studies reviewed show that the demand for monitoring of management 
is related to agency costs. The studies by Klein (2002), Rainsbury (2008) and Huang et 
al. (2009) also demonstrate that the ability to constitute independent board committees 
is also constrained by the board’s capacity.  These findings are directly relevant to 
addressing the research questions posed in this thesis.  
A review of the studies that have directly examined factors relevant to the 
formation and composition of remuneration committees is included in the following 
section.  For the purposes of this review, prior studies of the remuneration committee 
are categorised into two groups that are consistent with the areas of research outlined in 
the research questions for this thesis. The first group of studies are those that have 
considered the determinants of remuneration committee formation and composition. 
The second group of studies are those that have considered the operation of the 
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remuneration committee, that is whether there is an association between committee 
formation and composition and effective remuneration contracts.      
Remuneration Committee Formation and Composition 
This section reviews studies that have directly examined remuneration committee 
formation and composition.   Table 3-1 provides a summary of the key points from each 
of the studies reviewed.  Early US studies examine the relation between composition of 
the board of directors and the remuneration committee. Over time, this research has 
tested this relation for an increasingly wider range of board characteristics. These board 
characteristics include board tenure, independence, gender, additional board 
appointments and shareholding. 
The first two studies discussed here examine a number of board committees.  
Kesner (1988) conducted an early empirical study of the determinants of audit, 
nomination, remuneration and executive committee composition for 250 large listed US 
companies in 1983. The study found that directors with longer tenure, independent 
directors, and directors with a business background are more likely to serve on one of 
the committees.   
In an extension of the Kesner (1988) study, Bilimoria and Piderit (1994) 
examined 300 large US companies listed in 1984. The focus of their study was 
determining gender bias in board committee membership.  Consistent with Kesner 
(1988) they find that director tenure and independence are associated with committee 
composition. The results also indicate that the number of other board positions held by 
directors is also significant.  
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Vafeas (2000) further extends this line of research in a study of 6,607 directors of 
576 large US listed companies in 1994. The study focuses solely on the determinants of 
remuneration committee composition.  The findings of prior studies with regard to 
director independence, tenure and other board positions are confirmed. Vafeas (2000) 
finds a very low level of non-independent director committee membership and reports 
that the number of executive directors participating as committee members steadily 
declines in US companies during the 1990s.  He shows that independent directors on the 
committee usually serve on other board committees, which suggests committee 
participation by non-independent directors is an indication of a concentration of power.   
The same relation was not observed for independent directors.  Vafeas (2000) also does 
not find that the level of director shareholding is related to remuneration committee 
membership.  Overall, Vafeas (2000) suggests the findings indicate that the board’s 
monitoring of committee membership improves composition, which serves to protect 
shareholder interests. 
Newman (2000) examines in more detail how ownership structure is associated 
with the  decision to appoint non-independent directors to the remuneration committee 
for 161 US Fortune 250 companies between 1991 and 1993. Newman introduces 
company size as a control mechanism in the regression analysis. Newman (2000) finds 
that CEO shareholding is negatively associated with the independence of the 
remuneration committee, and that outside shareholding is positively associated with 
independence of the committee. The results also indicate that as company size increases, 
the proportion of insider members appointed to the remuneration committee decreases.  
Overall the results suggest that CEO shareholding provides the CEO with power to 
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control board decisions regarding the appointment of non-independent directors to the 
remuneration committee. 
Overall, the evidence suggests that remuneration committees in US companies 
have become more independent over time (Conyon, 2011). Newman and Mozes (1999) 
find that 47 per cent of remuneration committees appoint at least one insider member to 
the committee.  Newman and Mozes (1999) find that of these committees, the mean 
percentage of insider members appointed is 36 per cent. Vafeas (2000) reports that the 
number of executive directors participating as committee members steadily declines for 
US companies during the 1990s.  Conyon (2011) finds that between 1998 and 2008 the 
number of independent directors appointed to remuneration committees increases.  
Increasing committee independence in US companies reflects changes to the US 
institutional environment which mandates the formation of independent remuneration 
committees.  
UK research has largely focused on remuneration committee operation.  However, 
one UK study has directly examined remuneration committee formation.  Main and 
Johnston (1993) examine remuneration committees in 220 large UK listed companies in 
1993.  They find that as company size and turnover increases, the likelihood the 
company forms a remuneration committee also increases. Board size was also identified  
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TABLE 3-1: REMUNERATION COMMITTEE STUDIES – FORMATION AND COMPOSITION  
Study Year Period Country Size Scope of Study and Key Findings 
Kesner 1988 1983 US 250  Examines the structure of board committees. 
 External directors, director tenure and director independence are 
associated with remuneration committee composition. 
Bilmoria and Piderit 1994 1984 US 300  Focus on the appointment of female directors to board committees.  
 Extends Kesner (1988) study. 
 Director independence, board tenure, the number of additional board 
appointments, occupation and gender are associated with remuneration 
committee composition. 
Vafeas 2000 1996 US 576  Extends Kesner (1988) and Bilmoria and Piderit (1994) studies. 
 Remuneration committees are becoming more independent over time. 
 External directors, directors’ tenure, the number of additional board 
positions held by the directors and directors age are associated with 
remuneration committee composition. 
Newman 2000 1991-93 US 161  Examines the relation between shareholder characteristics on 
remuneration committee composition. 
 CEO shareholding is positively associated with the composition of the 
remuneration committee including insider directors. 
 Outside shareholding is positively associated with remuneration 
committee independence. 
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Study Year Period Country Size Scope of Study and Key Findings 
Main and Johnston 1993 1990 UK 220  Examines remuneration committee composition and operation. 
 Larger companies, the presence of non-executive directors, and companies 
experiencing high turnover are more likely to form a remuneration 
committee. 
 Board tenure and director age are not associated with remuneration 
committee formation. 
Carson 2002 1996 Australia 361  Examines the factors related to the presence of board committees. 
 Big 6 auditor, number of additional board appointments, higher institutional 
shareholding, and the proportion of independent directors are associated with 
remuneration committee formation. 
Cotter and Silvester 2003 1997 Australia 109  Examines the determinants of board composition and the composition of 
audit and remuneration committees. 
 Strong association between board independence and committee 
independence. 
Windsor and Cybiniski 2009 2001 Australia 123  Examines the relation between remuneration committees and CEO 
remuneration. 
 Composition of 40 per cent of committees had 70 per cent or more 
independent directors appointed. 
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as a determinant of committee formation. However, other board characteristics related 
to board tenure and director age were not associated with committee formation.   
In Australia, remuneration committee composition research is less developed. The 
studies conducted use data that predates the introduction of the ASX Recommendations 
in 2003.  To date, no comprehensive study of determinants of remuneration committee 
formation and composition in Australian companies has been conducted. Consistent 
with US research, the few studies that have considered remuneration committee 
formation examine a range of board committees rather than focusing solely on 
remuneration committees. 
Carson (2002) examines the factors associated with formation of the audit, 
remuneration and nomination committees for a sample of 361 large listed companies in 
1996. The study finds that 57 per cent of the sample companies have formed a 
remuneration committee. Carson (2002) reports that the engagement of a Big 6 auditor, 
the extent of board inter-corporate relationships measured by the number of other 
directorships held by the directors, and higher levels of institutional shareholding are 
positively associated with committee formation.  
Cotter and Silvester (2003) analyse the composition of the board of directors and 
the audit and remuneration committees of 109 of the largest 200 listed Australian 
companies in 1997. The rationale for the large company focus of the study is that larger 
companies are more likely to form board sub-committees. The focus of the study is on 
determinants of board and board committee independence.  They extend the literature 
by examining committee composition and by including a wider range of company 
characteristics in their analysis.  The authors document a strong positive association 
between board independence and remuneration committee independence, and observe 
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that the audit and remuneration committees have higher levels of independence than the 
board.  The results indicate that company characteristics related to complexity measured 
by industry and geographical segments, growth, leverage, management shareholding, 
company performance and company size are not associated with remuneration 
committee independence. Overall the results suggest that boards use their sub-
committees as monitoring mechanisms with regard to the integrity of financial reporting 
and executive remuneration oversight.  
Windsor and Cybinski (2009) analyse the moderating influence of remuneration 
committee independence on CEO remuneration, company size and company 
performance in 123 large Australian listed companies in 2001. Whilst the study’s focus 
is on remuneration committee operation, they find that approximately 40 per cent of 
remuneration committees in 2001 had 70 per cent or more non-executive directors. 
The review of extant research shows that very few studies have directly examined 
factors relevant to remuneration committee formation and composition.  No Australian 
study has examined determinants of remuneration committee formation and 
composition subsequent to the introduction of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.   This thesis addresses this gap by providing detailed descriptive 
material on the level of adoption of ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
across a broad range of company sizes. The Australian environment allows the 
identification of incentives for adoption and structure of remuneration committees that 
do not include complying with mandated requirements. This allows for a comparison 
with other jurisdictions that either mandate remuneration committee formation and 
composition such as the US, or have implemented voluntary guidelines that differ from 
the ASX Recommendations, such as in the UK.  
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Theory suggests that independent remuneration committees are a response to 
agency issues related to executive remuneration. The results of prior studies show that 
managerial power can be a factor, and that regulation has increased the level of 
remuneration committee independence. However, the issue as to whether the formation 
and composition of remuneration committees are a response to agency costs has not 
been directly assessed in extant literature.  
Additionally, prior studies use samples of large companies. A broader sample is 
needed before more generalisable conclusions can be drawn.  This thesis seeks to 
address these gaps in the literature. 
3.5.2 Remuneration Committee Efficacy 
This thesis is also concerned with the operation of the remuneration committee in 
implementing remuneration contracts that reduce agency costs and align the interests of 
managers and shareholders. This section reviews studies that have directly examined the 
operation of the remuneration committee.  Prior studies have generally considered this 
issue by examining the level of remuneration and the sensitivity of executive 
remuneration to company performance.  A review of this literature follows.  The review 
is then extended beyond the approach adopted in extant literature by incorporating the 
non-binding shareholder vote on the annual remuneration report as a measure of 
remuneration committee efficacy. A review of the limited literature on the non-binding 
shareholder vote is then presented.    
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Remuneration Committee Operation 
This section reviews studies that have considered the operation of the 
remuneration committee by examining the level of remuneration and the sensitivity of 
executive remuneration to company performance.  A number of studies reviewed have 
considered the level of remuneration and the sensitivity of remuneration to company 
performance.  The findings of these studies are separated and discussed below. Studies 
that have considered the association between the remuneration committee and the level 
of executive remuneration are reviewed first. Then, studies that have examined the 
relation between the remuneration committee and the pay for performance sensitivity in 
executive remuneration are reviewed. The research is predominantly focused on the 
remuneration of the CEO.   Table 3-2 summarises the key findings of these studies. 
Remuneration Levels 
A number of prior studies have examined the association between the 
remuneration committee and the level of executive remuneration, particularly that of the 
company CEO.  The research examines whether insiders appointed to the remuneration 
committee results in rents capture.  Subsequent to governance reform, the research has 
examined whether independent committees moderate the levels of remuneration 
awarded executives, in particular the CEO.   
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TABLE 3-2: STUDIES OF REMUNERATION COMMITTEE OPERATION 
Study Year Period Setting Size Pay Examined Scope of Study and Key Findings 
     Level Performance  
Newman and Wright 1995 1993 US 161    Examines the relation between remuneration committees and CEO 
remuneration. 
 Non independent remuneration committees are associated with 
higher remuneration.  Independent remuneration committees are 
associated with stronger pay for performance sensitivity in CEO 
remuneration. This finding is pronounced where company 
performance is unfavourable. 
Daily, Johnson, 
Ellstrand and Dalton 
1998 1992- 
94 
US 194    Examines whether remuneration committees are a determinant of 
CEO remuneration. 
 No evidence affiliated directors are associated with higher levels 
of remuneration.  
Newman and Mozes 1999 1991 - 
93 
US 161    Examines the composition of the remuneration committee and the 
CEO remuneration process. 
 Whilst remuneration levels are not affected by the appointment of 
executive directors to the remuneration committee, the structure of 
the CEO’s remuneration is more favourable when insiders are 
appointed to the remuneration committee.   
 Committee independence is not related to remuneration.  
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Study Year Period Setting Size Pay Examined Scope of Study and Key Findings 
     Level Performance  
Anderson and Bizjak 2003 1985 - 
98 
US 110    Examines the relation between remuneration committee 
compositon and the stucture of CEO remuneration. 
 Remuneration committee independence does not have a significant 
influence on the level of CEO remuneration. The appointment of 
executives to the committee does not result in more opportunistic 
behaviour. 
 Mandating the use of independent remuneration committees may 
not be effective at reducing the levels of executive remuneration or 
ensuring stronger pay for performance sensititivity. 
Vafeas 2003 1991 - 
97 
US 271    Examines relation between the composition of the remuneration 
committee and CEO remuneration. 
 No association between the presence of insiders on the 
remuneration committee and CEO remuneration levels.   
 Identifies some opportunistic behaviour by insiders prior to change 
in SEC rule and Internal Revenue Rules.  
 Stronger pay for performance sensitivity in CEO remuneration was 
identified following the changes in regulation. 
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Study Year Period Setting Size Pay Examined Scope of Study and Key Findings 
     Level Performance  
Conyon and He 2004 1998 - 
2001 
US 455    Examines remuneration committees and CEO remuneration in 
companies engaged in an initial public offering. 
 The appointment of executive directors or CEOs to the 
remuneration committee is not associated with higher levels of 
CEO remuneration or weaker pay for performance incentives. 
Sun and Cahan 2009 2001 US 812    Examines the the relation between remuneration committee quality 
and CEO cash remuneration. 
 High remuneration committee quality is associated with a stronger 
pay for performance alignment in CEO cash remuneration. 
Sun, Cahan and 
Emanuel  
2009 2001 US 474    Examines the the association between remuneration committee 
quality,  the award of CEO stock option grants and future company 
performance. 
 High remuneration committee quality results in enhanced incentive 
alignment in the executive remuneration contracting process. 
Main and Johnston 1993 1990 UK 220    Analyses remuneration committee composition and operation. 
 Remuneration committees are associated with higher levels of 
remuneration and do not result in a stronger pay for performance 
sensitivity in CEO remuneration. 
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Study Year Period Setting Size Pay Examined 
Scope of Study & Key Findings 
     Level Performance  
Conyon 1997 1988 - 
93 
UK 213    Examines the relation between (1) directors’ remuneration, 
company size and company performance; and (2) the existence 
of a remuneration committee and directors’ remuneration. 
 Remuneration committees are associated with lower growth rates 
in director remuneration in some circumstances. 
Conyon and Peck 1998 1991 - 
94 
UK 94    Examines the association between the presence and composition 
of the remuneration committee on CEO remuneration.  
 The presence of a remuneration committee is associated with 
higher levels of CEO remuneration.   
 Remuneration committee independence is associated with higher 
levels of CEO remuneration and stronger pay for performance.  
Benito and Conyon 1999 1985 –
94 
UK 211    Analyses determinants of directors’ remuneration. 
 Remuneration committees do not influence cash remuneration.   
 Weak evidence that the presence of a remuneration committee 
leads to stronger pay for performance sensitivity.   
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Study Year Period Setting Size Pay Examined Scope of Study and Key Findings 
     Level Performance  
Bonet and Conyon 2005 2002 UK 504     Examines the relation between remuneration committee 
composition and directors’ remuneration. 
 Insiders on the committee is associated with higher 
remuneration. 
Johnston  2007 1996 UK 220    Examines the association between market forces and internal 
controls on the remuneration contracting process. 
 The appointment of executives to the remuneration committee is 
not associated with opportunistic behaviour.   
 The appointment of at least three non-executive directors to the 
committee is associated with lower levels of CEO remuneration. 
Gregory-Smith 2009 1996 - 
2005 
UK 290    Examines the remuneration committee and CEO influence on the 
remuneration contracting process. 
 The composition of the remuneration committee does not affect 
CEO remuneration.   
 Remuneration committee independence is not associated with 
lower levels of remuneration, however a greater proportion of 
executive directors appointed to the remuneration committee is 
associated with lower levels of remuneration.   
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Study Year Period Setting Size Component 
Examined 
Scope of Study and Key Findings 
     Level Performance  
Sapp 2008 2000-
05 
Canada 416    Examines the role of corporate governance mechanisms in the 
remuneration arrangements of the CEO and top five executives. 
 Remuneration committee independence and the appointment of 
the CEO to the committee are associated with higher 
remuneration.  
 Performance based equity component represents a larger 
proportion of CEO remuneration when remuneration committee 
is independent and the CEO is a member of the committee. 
Lawrence and 
Stapledon 
1999 1995 Australia 100    Examines whether board structure and remuneration committee 
composition influences the remuneration of the CEO. 
 Less independent remuneration committees are not associated 
with higher CEO remuneration.  Independent remuneration 
committees are not associated with a stronger pay for 
performance sensitivity. 
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Study Year Period Setting Size Component 
Examined 
Scope of Study and Key Findings 
     Level Performance  
Windsor and 
Cybinski 
2009 2001 Australia 123    Examines the remuneration committee and CEO remuneration. 
 Remuneration committees in large companies are more 
effective at moderating CEO remuneration, however 
remuneration committees in small companies are not effective 
moderators of CEO remuneration. 
Capezio, Shields and 
O’Donnell 
2011 1999 - 
06 
Australia 663    Examines the relation between board structure, remuneration 
committees on CEO cash remuneration. 
 Independent remuneration committees are more likely to award 
higher remuneration to the CEO.  Independent committees are 
not associated with greater pay for performance alignment. 
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The US research stream provides mixed evidence in this regard.   Newman and 
Wright (1995) examine 161 large US companies in 1993.  They find that non-
independent remuneration committees were associated with higher CEO remuneration.  
In particular they report the appointment of at least one executive, or otherwise 
affiliated director, results in higher levels of CEO remuneration.  This suggests that a 
lack of committee independence impedes the monitoring of remuneration, resulting in 
rents capture.   
Daily et al. (1998) examine executive remuneration for 194 Fortune 500 US 
companies between 1991 and 1994.   The study is one of the earliest US longitudinal 
studies to specifically focus on the role of the remuneration committee in the executive 
remuneration contracting process. The components of executive remuneration analysed 
by the study are total CEO remuneration, changes in CEO remuneration and the 
structure of CEO remuneration.  Company size, company performance, ownership 
structure, CEO tenure and prior year remuneration were included as controls.  Contrary 
to the findings of Newman and Wright (1995), the authors find no evidence that 
affiliated directors, nor the appointment of the CEO to the remuneration committee 
result in higher levels of CEO remuneration.  They also report that prior year 
remuneration and company size are positively associated with the CEO’s remuneration.   
Newman and Mozes (1999) examine whether composition of the remuneration 
committee affects the total remuneration awarded to the CEO in 161 Fortune 250 US 
companies in 1992.  Consistent with extant research, company size, company 
performance, ownership characteristics and CEO tenure are used in the regression 
analysis.  They find that the level of total remuneration awarded to the CEO is not 
related to independence of the remuneration committee. They report that the 
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appointment of at least one insider to the remuneration committee does not result in a 
difference in total remuneration when compared against the remuneration awarded by a 
remuneration committee with no insider members.   Company size and company 
performance are significant determinants of CEO total remuneration.  Overall the results 
of the study are consistent with Daily et al. (1998) and suggest that monitoring of 
executive remuneration levels is not impeded by a lack of committee independence.   
Several US studies were conducted after the introduction of reforms introduced by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Internal Revenue Code (IRC).  The  
reforms are designed to increase transparency with regard to executive remuneration 
and limit the power of executives to influence their own remuneration (Finegold et al., 
2007).  In 1992, the SEC adopted executive disclosure rules (Release No. 33-6962) 
which required US listed companies to disclose all forms of executive remuneration, a 
comparison of remuneration and stock performance and an explanation for incentive-
based remuneration.  Additionally, in 1993 IRC Rules (s162 (m)) were introduced 
which disallow tax deductibility where any of the top five executives’ remuneration 
exceeds $1 million unless the remuneration is performance-based and approved by an 
independent remuneration committee.  The reforms recognise that the formation of a 
remuneration committee is key to ensuring an appropriate, transparent and robust 
remuneration framework (Vafeas, 2003). 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) investigate the association between remuneration 
committee composition and the CEO remuneration contracting process of 110 US 
companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange between 1985 and 1998. The 
sample is partitioned into two time periods reflecting pre-regulation and post-regulation.  
The study examines whether changes in regulation affect executive remuneration 
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oversight and practice.  The study controls for company size, performance, risk, 
company growth, CEO tenure, change in CEO, founder shareholders and industry 
effects.  They find that the regulation did result in increased independence of 
remuneration committees.  However, the results indicate that remuneration committee 
independence does not significantly affect the level of CEO remuneration, measured as 
the sum of salary and bonuses, nor the overall structure of CEO remuneration.  
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) conclude that the appointment of insiders or the CEO to 
the committee does not result in rent capture. Overall, the study suggests that 
introducing rules mandating committee independence does not necessarily lead to more 
optimal executive remuneration practices.  
Vafeas (2003) examines the relation between the composition of the remuneration 
committee and CEO remuneration for 271 large US companies between 1991 and 1997. 
The study analyses three components of the CEO’s remuneration, cash remuneration 
(salary and bonuses), long term incentive remuneration and total remuneration. CEO 
age, CEO tenure, ownership characteristics, company size and performance are used as 
controls.  He finds no association between the presence of insiders on the remuneration 
committee and CEO remuneration levels. The results suggest that CEO tenure and 
company performance are associated with CEO remuneration levels. Overall Vafeas 
(2003) suggests that the evidence does not provide strong support that the reforms 
achieved the desired outcome. 
Conyon and He (2004) analyse the relation between remuneration committee 
composition and CEO remuneration in a sample of 455 newly listed US companies 
between 1998 and 2001.  The study incorporates a three tier hierarchical model to 
operationalise the hypotheses, instead of the traditional principle-agent contracting 
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model.  Total CEO remuneration and total CEO equity incentives are the components of 
CEO remuneration analysed by the study.  Controls used in the study are CEO 
characteristics, board structure and company economic characteristics.  They find no 
evidence of rent capture, that is the presence of insiders on the remuneration committee 
is not associated with higher CEO remuneration levels.  The results also indicate that if 
a remuneration committee member is also a significant shareholder the level of 
remuneration awarded to the CEO is lower.  Board size, company size and volatility are 
positively associated with remuneration levels, whilst growth is negatively associated 
with remuneration levels awarded to the CEO.   
Overall, the studies focusing on the introduction of the SEC and IRR rules suggest 
that the monitoring of executive remuneration levels is not impeded by a lack of 
committee independence.   
Sapp (2008) examines the relation of a range of corporate governance mechanisms 
on the remuneration arrangements in 400 Canadian companies between 2000 and 2005.  
Sapp (2008) extends the literature by directly examining the remuneration arrangements 
of the wider executive team.  Few studies examine the remuneration arrangements 
beyond the CEO.  Controls used in Sapp’s (2008) study are company size, performance 
and industry effects.  He finds that remuneration committee independence and the 
appointment of the CEO to the remuneration committee are associated with higher 
levels of remuneration awarded to the CEO and key executives. The association is more 
pronounced in relation to the CEO’s remuneration.  The results also indicate that CEO 
and to a lesser extent other key executive remuneration levels are positively associated 
with company size.  Industry effects are also relevant to the level of remuneration 
awarded to the CEO and key executive team.   
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Whilst the US institutional setting has mandated the use of independent 
remuneration committees, the literature provides mixed evidence as to whether these 
committees moderate the level of remuneration award to the CEO. Of the studies 
reviewed, only one considers the relation between the remuneration committee and 
remuneration of executives other than the CEO.  Whether independent remuneration 
committees are effective moderators of the level of remuneration awarded to other 
executives remains an unanswered question.   
Although the UK institutional setting differs to the US, UK research has also 
produced mixed evidence as to the efficacy of independent remuneration committees. A 
number of the studies use the remuneration of the highest paid director to proxy for 
CEO remuneration.  Over time, the research has adopted an increasingly rigorous 
approach to examining the association between remuneration committees and 
remuneration.    
Main and Johnston (1993) examine the characteristics associated with disclosure 
of the presence of a remuneration committee, the composition of these committees and 
their influence on remuneration.  The study analyses 220 large UK listed companies in 
1990.  The study examines a period where the voluntary disclosure of the presence of a 
remuneration committee is new in the UK setting. The study was one of the first UK 
studies to examine the composition and operation of the remuneration committee. Due 
to lack of transparency in the disclosure of executives’ remuneration during the sample 
period, the study investigates the remuneration of the highest paid director. Main and 
Johnston (1993) suggest that in UK companies the highest paid director is either the 
Chairperson, CEO or managing director.   
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The study examines total remuneration as disclosed in the annual financial report. 
Main and Johnston (1993) find the existence of a remuneration committee is associated 
with higher remuneration.  Company size, performance and ownership characteristics 
are incorporated into the study. They also show that appointment of the highest paid 
director to the remuneration committee does not result in opportunistic behaviour.  
Further, they find that a larger proportion of non-executive directors being appointed to 
the remuneration committee does not constrain the remuneration of the highest paid 
director.  The results indicate that remuneration committees are not effective at 
constraining executive remuneration. 
Three longitudinal studies examined the association between the presence and 
composition of the remuneration committee on executive remuneration between 1988 
and 1994.  Conyon (1997) uses panel data analysis from 1988 to 1993 to consider the 
relation between director remuneration, company size and corporate performance; and 
the existence of a remuneration committee and executive remuneration for 213 UK 
companies. The data related to remuneration committee operation were obtained via a 
survey instrument sent to 1,000 of the largest UK companies. The final sample of 213 
companies are listed companies.   The study examines the total remuneration, excluding 
the value of options awarded, of the highest paid director.  They find that the existence 
of a remuneration committee is associated with a slower growth in director 
remuneration in some circumstances. The results also indicate that prior year 
remuneration and company size as opposed to shareholder returns are important 
determinants of future remuneration awarded to directors. Overall the results provide 
some evidence that monitoring of executive remuneration is more robust when an 
independent remuneration committee is constituted. 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
70 
 
Conyon and Peck (1998) also use panel data to examine the association of board 
structure and remuneration committees on remuneration between 1991 and 1994.  The 
sample consists of 342 data points related to 94 large publicity listed UK companies. 
Consistent with Main and Johnston (1993) and Conyon (1997) the remuneration data 
focuses on the highest paid director, as disclosure of other executives’ remuneration was 
not required during the sample period. The components of remuneration examined by 
the study are total salary and bonuses. They find that the presence of a remuneration 
committee is associated with higher levels of remuneration.  They report that 
remuneration committees with a higher proportion of non-executive directors appointed 
is also associated with higher levels of remuneration.  The results suggest that neither 
remuneration committee presence nor its independence constrains executive 
remuneration.    
Benito and Conyon (1999) also use panel data to examine (1) the relation between 
directors’ cash remuneration and shareholder return; (2) whether the pay for 
performance sensitivity in directors’ cash remuneration has varied over time; and (3) the 
relation between the company’s corporate governance mechanisms and directors’ 
remuneration. Consistent with Conyon and Peck (1998), the cash remuneration analysed 
is the director’s salary and bonuses.  The governance mechanisms analysed are the 
separation of the roles of CEO and Chairman and the adoption of nomination and 
remuneration committees.  Benito and Conyon (1999) use survey data to examine the 
relation between these corporate governance mechanisms and directors’ remuneration in 
211 UK companies. The survey data adds new insight into governance mechanisms 
employed by UK companies as this information was not generally available. Overall 
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they find that these governance mechanisms do not significantly influence the cash 
remuneration of directors.   
Bonet and Conyon (2005) use panel data to examine the relation between 
remuneration committees and directors’ remuneration in 504 listed UK companies in 
2002.  The sample is drawn from the entire population of listed UK companies. They 
note that the sample is the largest and most comprehensive to date.  The study examines 
three components of executive remuneration, total remuneration, the value of options 
exercised and the proportion of the executives’ remuneration that is bonus-based. Their 
findings indicate that the appointment of insiders to the remuneration committee results 
in higher CEO remuneration levels. 
Johnston (2007) examines whether opportunistic behaviour is constrained by 
market forces and internal governance mechanisms. The study examines the salary of 
the highest paid director in 220 large UK companies in 1996. The governance 
mechanisms examined by the study are the board structure and board committee 
characteristics that are consistent with the recommendations included in the Cadbury 
Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995) and Hampel Report (1998).  Company size, 
performance, industry effects and ownership structure are incorporated into the study. 
The findings regarding board structure are discussed at section 3.4.  The findings related 
to remuneration committee operation indicate that increasing the number of independent 
directors on the remuneration committee to at least three is associated with lower levels 
of executive remuneration.  The results also indicate that the appointment of the CEO or 
executive directors to the remuneration committee does not result in opportunistic 
salary-setting practices. Company size, performance and industry effects were also 
positively associated with remuneration levels. Overall despite no evidence of rents 
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capture, the study provides some evidence that monitoring of executive remuneration is 
strengthened by committee independence.  
Gregory-Smith (2009) uses panel data to examine the remuneration contracting 
process in 290 UK companies that are members of the FTSE 350 between 1996 and 
2005. The study examines the association between board characteristics and the 
composition of the remuneration committee on CEO remuneration. Gregory-Smith 
(2009) employs a more stringent test of ‘independence’ than that used in prior research. 
Company size, company performance and prior year remuneration are used as controls 
in the analysis.  He finds that neither the composition of the remuneration committee 
nor its independence significantly affects the remuneration awarded to the CEO.  
Company size and prior year remuneration are associated with remuneration awarded to 
the CEO.  Overall, the results provide no evidence of rents capture in large UK 
companies during the sample period.  
Although the research has sought to increase the rigour in the models adopted to 
examine the relation between remuneration committees and executive remuneration 
levels in UK companies, the research still yields mixed results. Consistent with US 
research, none of the studies has extended their analysis beyond the CEO or highest 
paid director.  Australian research, although less developed, has followed in a similar 
vein to the US and UK research streams. 
In addition to examining board structure and CEO remuneration, Lawrence and  
Stapledon (1999) examined the relation between the composition of the  remuneration 
committee and CEO remuneration in 72 of the largest 100 listed Australian companies 
in 1995. The methodology adopted is consistent with the methodology adopted by 
Newman and Wright (1995).  Lawrence and  Stapledon (1999) do not find that less 
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independent remuneration committees are associated with higher levels of CEO salary 
and bonuses.   
Windsor and Cybinski (2009) analyse a sample of 123 Australian ASX 300 
companies in 2001. The study examines whether the associations between CEO 
remuneration, company size and company performance are moderated by the 
independence of the remuneration committee.  Industry effects are included as a control.  
They split the sample into three groups based on company size.  They find that for 
larger companies independent remuneration committees are more effective at 
moderating CEO remuneration. However, their findings in relation to the smaller 
companies included in the sample suggest that remuneration committees are not 
effective at managing executive remuneration.  Overall, the study suggests that 
company size is relevant to the overall efficacy of the remuneration committee. 
In one of the most comprehensive Australian studies to date, Capezio et al. (2011) 
examine CEO cash remuneration.  The study uses panel data to analyse 4,456 company 
years covering 663 companies and 1,257 CEOs between 1999 and 2006.  Company 
size, company performance and risk are incorporated into the model.  Contrary to 
expectations, they find that independent remuneration committees are likely to award 
higher cash remuneration to the CEO and that insider-dominated remuneration 
committees are likely to award lower levels of cash remuneration to the CEO.  
Company size is positively associated with CEO cash remuneration.  Overall, the 
Australian research suggests that independent remuneration committees are not always 
effective at moderating remuneration awarded to company executives. 
Overall, neither the US nor the UK evidence provides consistent evidence that 
remuneration committee independence is an effective moderator of the level of 
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remuneration awarded to the key executive.  The Australian evidence is also mixed in 
this regard. The level of remuneration awarded is one component of the executive 
remuneration equation.  The following section reviews studies that have analysed the 
role of the remuneration committee in relation to incentive-based component of 
executive remuneration.   
Pay for Performance Sensitivity 
In considering whether remuneration committees are effective at aligning the 
interests of shareholders and managers, prior research has focused on whether 
remuneration committees are associated with greater sensitivity of remuneration to 
company performance. Performance based remuneration is considered an appropriate 
means to align the interests of shareholder and managers, and thereby reduce agency 
costs (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that corporate assets 
are not being managed efficiently if there is no meaningful link between executive 
remuneration, particularly the CEO, and company performance.  Regulators in Australia 
and other jurisdictions promote the use of performance based remuneration for 
executives. 
The relation between CEO remuneration and company performance is the subject 
of an extensive body of literature.  The results of these studies indicate that the 
association is generally quite weak (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Clarkson et al., 2006; 
Capezio et al., 2009; Arthur and O'Neill, 2010; Tian and Twite, 2010). In their meta-
analysis of empirical literature regarding CEO pay for performance Tosi et al. (2000) 
reports that only 5 per cent of the variance in executive remuneration is associated with 
company performance. 
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The relation between remuneration and company performance has been 
considered in a number of Australian studies.  Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) do not 
find a statistically significant relation between CEO remuneration and company 
performance for the 100 largest Australian companies in 1995.  In a study of 722 
Australian companies between 1990 and 1999, Merhebi et al. (2006) find that CEO cash 
remuneration is related to company size and company performance.  Clarkson et al. 
(2006) examined a sample of 48 companies between 1999 and 2004, and report 
evidence of an increased alignment between remuneration and company performance 
over the sample period.  Arthur and O’Neill (2010) examine executive remuneration for 
performance linkage of CEO bonus payments in Australia’s largest companies between 
2005 and 2008 and find no relationship between total cash remuneration and accounting 
measures of performance. Heaney et al. (2010) analyse 1,144 listed Australian 
companies in 2006 and do not find any evidence to support an association between CEO 
remuneration and subsequent company performance.  The Australian evidence 
regarding the pay for performance sensitivity is therefore inconclusive (Heaney et al., 
2010).   
However, the focus of this thesis is whether adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with a stronger alignment between 
remuneration of the top five ranked executives and company performance. As such, the 
focus is on the role of the remuneration committee in executive remuneration being 
linked with company performance.  Research regarding the influence of remuneration 
committees on pay for performance is limited (Capezio et al., 2011).  The US and UK 
research streams in this area are more developed than in Australia. 
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Newman and Wright (1995) report that independent remuneration committees are 
associated with stronger pay for performance sensitivity in the remuneration awarded to 
the CEO of 161 large UK companies.  The authors note that the result is more 
pronounced in companies evidencing unfavourable performance. 
Newman and Mozes (1999) also examine performing and non-performing 
companies in their study of US companies.  They find that executive remuneration 
structures are skewed in favour of the CEO when non-independent directors serve on 
the remuneration committee in certain circumstances. In particular, the study reports 
that when companies are performing, the appointment of insiders to the remuneration 
committee does not result in more favourable remuneration. However, in under 
performing companies, the structure of the remuneration awarded to the CEO is biased 
towards the CEO where insiders are appointed to the remuneration committee.  Overall, 
the study provides further evidence that the pay for performance sensitivity is 
strengthened by committee independence, particularly in underperforming companies. 
Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find that for a sample of 110 large US companies 
between 1985 and 1998, remuneration committee independence is not associated with 
improved alignment between CEO remuneration and company performance.  Contrary 
to expectations, they find no evidence that when the CEO is appointed to the committee 
lower pay for performance incentives are awarded to the CEO.  Overall they suggest 
that the mandating of remuneration committee independence may not lead to more 
effective remuneration contracts. 
 The Vafeas (2003) study of  500 US companies between 1991 and 1997 finds no 
association between the presence of insiders on the remuneration committee and CEO 
remuneration sensitivity. Recall the study examines the changes in the SEC rules in 
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1992 and the Internal Revenue Rules which sought to improve the efficiency of the 
executive remuneration contracting process.  The sample is then split between pre-
regulation and post-regulation. In these tests, Vafeas (2003) finds that remuneration 
committees with insiders appointed prior to the change in regulation award more 
favourable remuneration structures to the CEO, and the pay for performance sensitivity 
in CEO remuneration is stronger following the changes in the regulation.  Overall 
Vafeas (2003) suggests that the evidence does not provide strong support that the 
reforms achieved the desired outcome. 
Conyon and He (2004) analyse 455 newly listed US companies between 1998 and 
2001.  They find no evidence that the presence of insiders on the remuneration 
committee are associated with lower levels of incentive-based remuneration. CEO age 
CEO tenure, CEO duality and company growth are positively associated with CEO 
equity incentives, whilst board size, insiders appointed to the board and company size 
are negatively associated with equity incentives awarded to the CEO.   The results also 
indicate that if a remuneration committee member is also a significant shareholder, the 
CEO’s remuneration includes a higher component of performance based equity 
incentives. 
The studies reviewed above have focused on independent versus non-independent 
remuneration committees. The logic being that independence is a proxy for 
remuneration committee quality.  The following two studies develop a more 
comprehensive proxy for remuneration committee quality rather than focusing solely on 
committee independence.   Sun and Cahan (2009) examine the relation between 
remuneration committee quality, CEO cash remuneration and company performance in 
812 US companies in 2001. Each company included in the sample had constituted a 
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fully independent remuneration committee. They extend the literature by introducing a 
multi-faceted measure of remuneration committee quality. A composite score based on 
six characteristics reflecting remuneration committee efficacy is developed to measure 
the overall quality of the remuneration committee. The measures incorporated into the 
composite score are the proportion of committee members appointed by the CEO, 
committee members’ years of expertise, the proportion of committee members that are 
also the CEO of another company, the number of board positions held by committee 
members, the committee members’ shareholding in the company, and committee size. 
Sun and Cahan (2009) find that despite requirements that remuneration 
committees be independent, the relation between remuneration committee quality and 
pay for performance sensitivity of CEO cash remuneration varies between companies 
on a cross-sectional basis.  In companies with a high quality remuneration committee, 
the cash remuneration awarded to the CEO reflects stronger pay for performance 
sensitivity. However, in high growth companies and loss making companies, 
remuneration committee quality is associated with weaker pay for performance 
sensitivity in cash remuneration.  The results also indicate that company performance is 
positively associated with CEO cash remuneration. 
Sun et al. (2009) extend the above line of research to consider the relation 
between remuneration committee quality, stock options awarded to the CEO and future 
company performance in 474 listed US companies in 2001. They find that high 
remuneration committee quality is associated with more effective incentives 
incorporated into the remuneration structure awarded to the CEO which result in higher 
subsequent company performance.  Overall the study shows that a high quality 
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remuneration committee results in greater alignment between CEO incentives and 
shareholder interests.   
In his examination of Canadian companies Sapp (2008) examines the wider 
executive team.  He reports the equity component represents a larger proportion of the 
CEO’s remuneration in Canadian companies when the remuneration committee is 
independent and the CEO is not a member of the remuneration committee. 
Overall, the US research provides mixed evidence regarding the efficacy of the 
remuneration committee.  The research identifies that remuneration quality varies on a 
cross-sectional basis and that remuneration committee quality is associated with 
stronger pay for performance sensitivity in remuneration awarded to the CEO.  
Research into the pay for performance sensitivity in UK companies has also yielded 
mixed results.  Consistent with the US research, the UK research focuses on the CEO. 
The Main and Johnston (1993) study of 220 UK companies in 1990 finds the 
existence of a remuneration committee is not associated with stronger pay for 
performance alignment. Conyon and Peck’s (1998) analysis of 100 UK companies 
between 1991 and 1994 finds that independent remuneration committees lead to a 
stronger pay for performance sensitivity in the remuneration awarded to the highest paid 
director. Overall the results of this study suggest that the alignment of executive 
remuneration with company performance is enhanced by independent remuneration 
committees.  Benito and Conyon (1999) examine 211 UK companies between 1985 and 
1994 and report weak evidence that independent remuneration committees are 
associated with stronger pay for performance sensitivity over the sample period. 
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The Australian evidence on remuneration committees and executive incentives is 
sparse.  Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) analyse 100 large companies in 1995 and report 
that independent remuneration committees are not associated with stronger pay for 
performance sensitivity in the remuneration awarded to the CEO.  Windsor and 
Cybinski (2009) examine the relation between remuneration committees, CEO 
remuneration, company size and company performance for 123 of the largest Australian 
companies in 2001.  Their sample is split into three groups based on company size.  
They find that independent remuneration committees are more effective at linking 
bonuses paid to the CEO with company performance in larger and medium sized large 
companies, however, are ineffective in smaller companies. 
A study by Capezio et al. (2011) examined the role of the remuneration committee 
of 663 large companies between 1999 to 2006. They find no evidence that independent 
remuneration committees are associated with better alignment of total CEO cash 
remuneration to company performance. In particular, the non-incentive component of 
CEO cash remuneration is higher in companies that constitute an independent 
remuneration committee. The results also indicate that the pay for performance 
sensitivity of CEO remuneration is not related to company performance, company size 
or company risk factors.   
A number of points can be synthesised from the discussion of prior research.  A 
large component of the research is US and UK based, with samples generally focusing 
on large companies.  A significant portion of the research stream has focused on CEO 
remuneration as opposed to the CEO and top tier executives.  Generally it can be seen 
that the remuneration committee as a corporate governance mechanism employed to 
strengthen the alignment of shareholder and manager interests in the context of 
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executive remuneration arrangements has yielded mixed results. No Australian study 
has examined the influence of adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations on executive remuneration.  Consequently, questions regarding the 
structure and efficacy of the remuneration committee, particularly in the Australian 
context remain open.  These issues are explored in this thesis. 
Shareholder Dissent on Executive Remuneration 
As outlined in Chapter 2, one of the most recent regulatory initiatives for 
executive remuneration is the introduction of binding or non-binding shareholder vote 
on company remuneration arrangements (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). The vote provides 
an opportunity for shareholders to express their satisfaction or otherwise with 
remuneration contracts devised by the board and the remuneration committee. A 
significant vote against the remuneration report is tantamount to a no confidence vote 
on executive remuneration arrangements (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). That is, a negative 
vote on remuneration arrangements indicates a failure by the board and its remuneration 
committee to satisfy shareholders that remuneration contracts are appropriately aligned 
with the interests of shareholders. Accordingly, this thesis incorporates the shareholder 
vote as an additional measure of remuneration committee effectiveness.   
As the non-binding shareholder vote is a more recent regulatory mechanism, 
empirical research in this regard is limited (Dew-Becker, 2009). Most of the significant 
studies to date have been conducted using data from the UK. Regulation requiring 
shareholders to vote on the company remuneration report was first introduced in the UK 
in 2002, and Australia introduced similar regulation in 2005 (Hemphill and Lillevik, 
2009).  None of the existing studies specifically focus on the remuneration committee. 
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Ferri and Mauber (2009) conducted one of the first studies to consider the 
shareholder advisory vote, which was an event study that investigated CEO cash 
remuneration and total director remuneration in 600 UK companies before and after the 
introduction of the shareholder advisory vote.  After controlling for other determinants 
of executive remuneration related to company performance and size, they find the level 
and growth of CEO cash remuneration is not sensitive to shareholder dissent.  However, 
they did find that after the introduction of the non-binding vote, the sensitivity of the 
pay for performance linkage in CEO cash and total remuneration, particularly 
components shareholders perceive as rewarding failure, increased.  Whilst the 
sensitivity of CEO remuneration to poor performance was more pronounced in 
companies that received a higher proportion of shareholder dissent on the non-binding 
vote, there is evidence that in some circumstances companies react to the threat of 
shareholder dissatisfaction regarding these arrangements.  The results indicate that 
shareholder dissent is largely associated with remuneration perceived as excessive as 
opposed to high.  The results suggest that the introduction of the non-binding 
shareholder vote results in a stronger pay for performance alignment in the 
remuneration awarded to the CEO. 
Carter and Zamora (2009) extend the literature by examining the relation between 
the shareholder non-binding  vote and changes in the structure of CEO remuneration in  
1,669 CEO years of 410 FTSE 350 UK companies during the period from 2002 to 2006. 
In particular, their study seeks to identify the components of CEO remuneration 
associated with shareholder dissent and whether companies respond to shareholder 
dissent by altering the remuneration arrangements of the CEO.  Carter and Zamora 
(2009) find that shareholders generally disapprove of excessive salaries and weak pay 
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for performance sensitivity in bonus structures.  The results indicate shareholders are 
sensitive to equity remuneration structures that have the capacity to significantly dilute 
shareholder interests. They also report that companies that receive higher levels of 
shareholder dissent amend the CEO’s salary quicker than companies where the dissent 
is not as high.  The results also suggest that bonuses and the award of equity grants are 
subsequently reduced in companies that receive the highest level of shareholder dissent.  
Overall the study provides further evidence that the introduction of the non-binding 
shareholder vote influences CEO remuneration arrangements in UK companies. 
Conyon and Sadler (2010) further extend the literature by analysing 44,787  
shareholder annual resolutions between 2002 and 2007. The study examines a range of 
shareholder resolutions, and is therefore not limited to a review of the non-binding 
shareholder vote.  Of relevance to this thesis is that the study examines whether 
shareholder dissent is associated with CEO cash remuneration and whether CEO cash 
remuneration is altered after receiving high levels of shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report.  Conyon and Sadler (2010) report that companies generally receive 
a low level of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report, with the average 
level of shareholder dissent recorded at between 7 and 10 per cent.  Despite the low 
levels of dissent recorded on the annual remuneration report, they note that the highest 
level of dissent across a range of shareholder resolutions relates to the vote on the 
annual remuneration report.  Conyon and Sadler (2010) find that excessive cash 
remuneration is more likely to attract a negative shareholder response. The results 
indicate that higher levels of shareholder dissent are not necessarily associated with 
lower CEO cash remuneration in subsequent periods.    
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Overall, the studies on UK companies provide evidence that shareholders use their 
vote on the annual remuneration report to signal their dissatisfaction with executive 
remuneration arrangements. 
Deane (2007) reports that there has been no empirical research regarding the 
operation of the Australian non-binding shareholder vote to date. However, one 
Australian study examining the relation between executive remuneration disclosure, the 
pay for performance sensitivity of executive remuneration and shareholder oversight has 
subsequently been published by Clarkson et al. (2011).  Whilst the study does not 
directly examine the remuneration committee, it does provide insight into the operation 
of the non-binding vote. 
Clarkson et al. (2011) examine whether enhanced executive remuneration 
disclosure requirements and the non-binding shareholder vote result in a perceived 
improvement in the pay for performance sensitivity in CEO remunerating arrangements 
in 240 Australian listed companies between 2001 and 2009.  The study focuses on 
shareholder perception of total reported remuneration of the CEO.  They find that the 
introduction of increased oversight by shareholders has improved the pay for 
performance sensitivity in CEO remuneration arrangements over the sample period.   
Clarkson et al. (2011) report that strengthening of the company’s governance 
structure, measured by board independence, CEO and board chairperson duality, 
presence of a remuneration committee and the appointment of the CEO to the 
remuneration committee, plays a limited or insignificant role in the oversight of 
executive remuneration arrangements.  Company size, audit quality, and company risk 
are positively associated with CEO remuneration arrangements, whist leverage and 
change in CEO is negatively associated with CEO remuneration arrangements.   
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Overall, the study provides preliminary evidence that the non-binding shareholder vote 
influences the pay for performance sensitivity of CEO remuneration arrangements in 
Australian listed companies.   
The UK and Australian evidence suggests that shareholders use the non-binding 
vote on the annual remuneration report to signal their dissatisfaction with executive 
remuneration arrangements.  The evidence also indicates that components of 
remuneration awarded to the CEO are sensitive to the non-binding vote in some 
circumstances.  In each jurisdiction the empirical evidence to date is limited. 
Consequently, further research is required to determine the impact of the non-binding 
shareholder vote on executive remuneration contracts.   
Whilst the studies have examined the sensitivity of remuneration arrangements of 
the CEO to the non-binding vote, none of the studies examined have directly examined 
the relation between the non-binding shareholder vote and the remuneration committee.  
Similarly, they have not considered the remuneration of the wider executive team.  The 
annual remuneration report, on which the vote is based, includes disclosure of the 
remuneration arrangements of key executives, not just the CEO.  Therefore a broader 
understanding as to shareholder satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the remuneration 
arrangements of the key executive team has not been examined in extant research. This 
thesis addresses these gaps in the literature. 
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3.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter reviews literature relevant to the structure and efficacy of 
remuneration committees. The ASX Recommendations focus on the use of 
remuneration committees, and particularly independent remuneration committees, to 
ensure companies adopt responsible remuneration practices. Whilst theory suggests that 
independent remuneration committees are a response to agency issues related to 
executive remuneration, extant literature does not directly assess whether remuneration 
committee formation and composition is a reflection of agency costs.   
Research as to whether remuneration committees are associated with more effective 
remuneration practice is limited and has largely yielded mixed results. Importantly, 
extant research tends to focus on periods prior to the implementation of the ASX 
Recommendations, resulting in a lack of research regarding the effectiveness of 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations. This is of particular 
relevance given the introduction in 2011 of mandated rules regarding remuneration 
committee formation and composition for large Australian companies.   
In addition, existing research concentrates on the remuneration awarded to the 
CEO in large companies.  As the remuneration committee provides advice regarding 
company remuneration practice, research regarding the role of the remuneration 
committee is required.  Therefore, in assessing committee efficacy it is relevant to 
consider the remuneration of a broader group of senior executives across a range of 
company sizes.  
Research on the non-binding shareholder vote on the annual remuneration report is 
also sparse. A search of the literature located one empirical study that has examined the 
non-binding vote in Australia.  The research has also focused on the relation between 
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the non-binding vote and the CEO’s remuneration arrangements, as opposed to the 
wider executive team.  Additionally, extant research does not directly assess the relation 
between the remuneration committee and the shareholder non-binding vote.  Therefore a 
broader understanding as to shareholder satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the 
remuneration committee’s oversight of the remuneration arrangements of the key 
executive team has not been examined in detail in prior research.  
The next chapter develops hypotheses to operationalise the research questions 
outlined in Chapter 1, which seek to address the limitations identified in the review of 
prior literature as discussed in this chapter. The development of the hypotheses draws 
on the research reviewed in this chapter and the broader governance and executive 
remuneration research streams. 
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4. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter develops testable hypotheses for the research questions identified in 
Chapter 1.  Prior literature discussed in Chapter 3 shows that committee composition is 
systematically related to various factors. That is, some directors are more likely to be 
appointed than others. In the US, regulatory intervention has resulted in more 
independent remuneration committees.  There is evidence of this being beneficial in 
terms of appropriate remuneration (i.e. greater pay for performance sensitivity, lower 
levels of remuneration and smaller increases over time).  There are also tensions.  CEO 
power is negatively associated with committee independence. Also, there is evidence 
that board monitoring results in committee membership that protects shareholder 
interests.  Overall, however, there is no clear evidence as to the extent of appropriate 
decisions regarding committee formation.   
Recall that the first research question is concerned with the decision to form a 
remuneration committee, and to adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations regarding its composition.  The next research question is concerned 
with the association between adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and executive remuneration practice.  The third research question 
examines the association between adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report: 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the hypotheses related to 
remuneration committee formation and composition. Section 4.3 outlines the hypothesis 
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related to remuneration committee operation.  A summary of the chapter is included at 
section 4.4. 
4.2  REMUNERATION COMMITTEE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION 
The first research question addresses the decision to form a remuneration 
committee and the choice of its composition: 
Research Question 1a: Why do companies form a remuneration committee? 
Research Question 1b: For companies that form a remuneration 
committee, what factors determine adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee composition recommendations? 
The ASX recommends the formation of a remuneration committee, and for it to be of 
adequate size and independence, so that it can provide adequate monitoring of executive 
remuneration (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007, Principle 8). If the board 
provides monitoring of committee composition to the benefit of shareholders, then an 
association between agency costs and composition is to be expected.  Several prior 
empirical studies show a positive association between external demand for monitoring 
of executives and agency costs (Cui et al., 2007; Rainsbury et al., 2008). Therefore, the 
decisions made by a company regarding formation and composition of the remuneration 
committee are likely to be positively associated with agency costs and the related 
external demand for monitoring. Theoretical (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) and empirical (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ward et al., 2009) studies  identify that 
agency costs arise when the interests of shareholders and managers diverge and 
managers seek to maximise their personal wealth rather than the value of the company.  
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The demand for monitoring increases as agency costs increase (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
Prior studies identify that corporate governance mechanisms are related to the 
level of agency problems experienced by the company (Dey, 2008).  This thesis focuses 
on the formation and composition of the remuneration committee as a mechanism to 
reduce agency problems associated with executive remuneration arrangements.  
Therefore it is expected that the demand for adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with the level of agency costs experienced by 
the company.   
Prior research identifies numerous measures of agency costs.  These include 
patterns of share ownership, organisational complexity, growth, free cash flows, 
leverage and company size (Brick et al., 2006; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008; 
Dey, 2008; Linck et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2009).  A discussion of these agency costs 
and their relevance to the formation and composition of the remuneration committee 
follows. 
Patterns of shareholding have been shown in prior research to be associated with 
agency costs. Companies with widely dispersed share ownership have greater separation 
between equity holders and management of the company. In this situation, management 
has significant power over the use of company resources (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003). 
Dispersed share ownership therefore increases the capacity of executives to act 
opportunistically and secure favourable remuneration contracts at the expense of the 
company. This results in greater demand for monitoring of management (Cotter and 
Silvester, 2003; Dey, 2008; Sapp, 2008; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009).  
Therefore, it is expected that the demand for companies to adopt the ASX remuneration 
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committee recommendations is greater when the shareholding of the company is widely 
dispersed. 
Prior research has found that substantial ownership of shares by managers is likely 
to result in a better alignment of the interests of managers and the company, thereby 
reducing agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1993; Singh and Davidson, 
2003; McKnight and Weir, 2009).  However, CEO shareholding has been found to be 
associated with increased influence of the CEO over the decision-making and structure 
of the board of directors (Linck et al., 2008).  This influence extends to board decision-
making regarding remuneration contracts (Ryan and Wiggings, 2004) and remuneration 
committee appointments (Newman, 2000; Weisbach, 2007).  Doukas (2007) finds that 
high levels of equity ownership by officers and directors (also referred to as insiders) 
are associated with high agency costs, because of entrenchment problems.  
Consequently, it is expected that companies with higher insider shareholding have 
higher agency costs and experience greater demand to adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations. 
The level of institutional shareholding has also been found to be relevant to 
agency costs associated with executive remuneration.  Institutional shareholders actively 
monitor company operations and have influence over management and board decisions 
(Bathala and Rao, 1995; David et al., 1998; Carson, 2002; Krishnan and Zhongxia, 
2005; McKnight and Weir, 2009). It is expected that institutional investors with high 
shareholdings in investee companies expect these companies to evidence strong 
corporate governance.  The demand for an effective remuneration committee to reduce 
the agency costs associated with executive remuneration is more likely to come from 
institutional investors (Carson, 2002).   Therefore, it is expected that companies with 
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higher levels of institutional shareholding experience greater pressure to adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. 
The discussion above identifies an expected association between certain 
shareholding characteristics and an increase in external demand for the company to 
adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  This leads to hypotheses 1a, 
1b and 1c as follows: 
H1a: Companies with more widely dispersed shareholding adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations.   
H1b: Companies with greater management share ownership adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. 
H1c:  Companies with higher institutional shareholding adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. 
CEO entrenchment has been found to influence executive remuneration and 
remuneration committee practice (Vafeas, 2003; Sapp, 2008). Ryan and Wiggins (2004) 
suggest that CEO entrenchment indicates significant agency issues in board governance. 
Evidence suggests an entrenched CEO has greater influence over company 
remuneration practices and the composition of the remuneration committee (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1988; Newman, 2000; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004). It is expected that CEO 
entrenchment is associated with greater demand for the company to adopt the ASX 
Recommendations, leading to Hypothesis 2. 
H2:  Companies with CEO entrenchment adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations. 
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Agency costs have been found to increase with the complexity of company 
operations (Bushman et al., 2004; Boone et al., 2007).  More complex operations 
increase the potential for information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, 
resulting in a greater need for effective monitoring of managers by the board of 
directors (Doukas et al., 2000; Bushman et al., 2004).  In addition, the level of executive 
remuneration increases and executive remuneration contracts are more difficult to 
negotiate (Gomez-Mejia et al., 1987) as the company becomes more complex. Hence, as 
company complexity increases it is expected that the demand for executive 
remuneration oversight increases, leading to Hypothesis 3: 
H3:  Companies with greater complexity adopt ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations. 
Other company characteristics such as company growth opportunities, free cash 
flow and asset turnover have been associated with agency costs. High company growth 
increases managerial power and is associated with greater levels of information 
asymmetry (Jensen, 1986).  High growth companies have greater demand for effective 
monitoring of management because the operating environment makes it difficult to 
determine the appropriateness of management decisions (Smith Jr and Watts, 1992). 
Further, empirical evidence suggests that companies with high growth are more likely to 
use equity incentives in remuneration contracts in an attempt to focus managers on 
shareholder outcomes (Gaver and Gaver, 1995; Mehran, 1995; Himmelberg et al., 1999; 
Palia, 2001).  Consequently, companies exhibiting high growth have greater demand for 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.   
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Jensen (1986) shows that divergence between manager and shareholder interests 
is likely to be greater when a company has substantial free cash flows. A cash holding 
in excess of investment and operating requirements increases the likelihood that 
managers make sub-optimal investments rather than provide a return to shareholders as 
dividends (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, companies with substantial free cash flows have 
higher agency costs (Jensen, 1986; McKnight and Weir, 2009). In relation to 
remuneration, surplus cash means it is more likely that managers attempt to 
opportunistically increase their wealth through inefficient remuneration contracts.  
Therefore the demand for effective oversight of executive remuneration is expected to 
increase in these companies.  
Asset turnover is incorporated into the study on the basis that lower asset turnover 
is associated with higher agency costs (Singh and Davidson, 2003; Florackis, 2008).  
Companies with higher asset turnover are associated with utilising the company’s assets 
in a manner that creates shareholder value, while conversely, companies experiencing 
lower asset turnover are associated with inefficient use of the company’s assets and 
opportunistic behaviour by management (Singh and Davidson, 2003; Florackis, 2008).  
It is therefore expected the companies evidencing lower asset turnover have higher 
agency costs and greater demand for adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.  The discussion in the preceding paragraphs leads to Hypotheses 4a, 
4b and 4c. 
H4a:  High growth companies adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations. 
H4b:  Companies with greater free cash flows adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations 
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H4c:  Companies with lower asset turnover adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations. 
Apart from external demand for strong governance created by agency costs, the 
implementation of governance mechanisms is also related to the capacity of a company 
to adopt the recommendations and the costs of adoption. The ASX recommends 
formation of a remuneration committee with a minimum of three members, a majority 
of which are independent directors, and the chairperson should be independent (ASX, 
2007: Recommendation 8.1). The ability of a company to adopt these specifications for 
the committee is limited by board size and the number of independent directors on the 
board (Klein, 2002; Rainsbury et al., 2008; Huang et al., 2009).   
Constraints arise when there is a limited supply of potential committee members 
for the remuneration committee. Moreover, it is costly for a company to appoint 
additional board members or reconfigure the board so as to enable adoption (Linck et 
al., 2008). The remuneration committee formation and composition decision is therefore 
a matter of balancing the benefits of monitoring provided by the committee and the 
costs of adoption of the recommendations.  
The implementation of governance mechanisms is also related to the capacity of a 
company to adopt recommendations regardless of external demand created by agency 
costs. Optimal governance occurs when the choice of governance mechanisms properly 
balances marginal benefits and marginal costs (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).  The 
ability of a company to adopt these specifications for the committee is limited by board 
size and the number of independent directors on the board (Klein, 2002; Rainsbury et 
al., 2008; Huang et al., 2009).   
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Consequently, board capacity is expected to be related to adoption of ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations.  The discussion leads to Hypotheses 5a and 
5b: 
H5a: Companies with larger board size adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations. 
H5b: Companies with a higher proportion of independent directors adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee composition recommendations. 
 
4.3 REMUNERATION COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS 
4.3.1 Remuneration Levels and Pay for Performance Sensitivity 
The next research question is concerned with the association between adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and remuneration practice: 
Research Question 2: Does adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations influence the level of executive remuneration and the 
linkage to company performance in remuneration awarded to key 
executives?  
Prior research suggests that weak overall corporate governance is associated with 
excessive remuneration (Core et al., 1999; Brick et al., 2006; Sun and Cahan, 2009). 
Excessive executive remuneration is often cited as evidence of decision-making failure 
by the board and the remuneration committee (Conyon, 2011). This suggests that an 
independent board committee should make better decisions with regard to executive 
remuneration. The ASX suggests that appropriate remuneration is structured in a way 
that motivates executives to focus on the company’s long term growth and success, and 
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that the level and structure of the remuneration contract should be reasonable and 
performance-based  (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007).  Consequently, the 
remuneration committee should ensure executive remuneration contracts provide for 
appropriate levels of remuneration and incorporate appropriate linkage to company 
performance.  
Despite the theoretical justification for the presence of an independent 
remuneration committee, empirical evidence to date has provided mixed results. 
Overall, the US and UK literature suggests that independent remuneration committees 
are more effective at ensuring the CEO’s remuneration arrangements are linked to 
company performance. However, independent remuneration committees are not 
effective at constraining the level of remuneration (Newman and Wright, 1995; Conyon 
and Peck, 1998; Sapp, 2008).  Australian evidence suggests that remuneration 
committees are not effective at constraining the CEO’s remuneration nor at ensuring a 
stronger pay for performance link in the CEO’s remuneration arrangements (Lawrence 
and Stapledon, 1999; Capezio et al., 2011).  Recall that none of the Australian studies 
has examined the association between adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and remuneration practice.  This discussion leads to the following 
hypotheses:  
H6a: Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is 
associated with the level of cash remuneration awarded to key executives. 
H6b: Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is 
associated with stronger pay for performance sensitivity in remuneration 
awarded to key executives. 
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4.3.2 Shareholder Dissent 
Recent regulatory changes have provided for a greater involvement by 
shareholders in the determination of executive remuneration contracts. In particular, 
shareholder involvement takes the form of an annual non-binding advisory vote on the 
company’s remuneration report.  The aim of the reform is to align the interests of 
managers and shareholders by ensuring executive remuneration is appropriately aligned 
with company performance, and to promote shareholder engagement in the area of 
executive remuneration (Sheehan, 2009).   
The non-binding vote provides an opportunity for shareholders to express their 
satisfaction or otherwise with remuneration contracts and company remuneration 
practice.  Shareholders may also use the non-binding vote to express dissatisfaction with 
other aspects of the company’s management. Krishnan and Ye (2005) show that 
shareholder voting on company resolutions reflects perceptions of the performance of 
directors.  The final research question is concerned with the relation between adoption 
of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and levels of shareholder dissent 
on the annual remuneration report: 
Research Question 3: Is adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations negatively associated with shareholder dissent on the 
annual remuneration report? 
Recall that in Australia, shareholders vote each year to approve the annual 
remuneration report.  A significant vote against the remuneration report is the 
equivalent of a no confidence vote on company remuneration practices (Ferri and 
Maber, 2009; Conyon and Sadler, 2010). Moreover, a negative vote is likely to occur if 
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shareholders consider the remuneration committee to be ineffective. Therefore, the non-
binding shareholder vote is determined by how effectively executive remuneration 
practice is managed. If remuneration is poorly managed and contracts reflect the 
opportunistic appropriation of wealth by managers, then it is unlikely to secure the 
approval of shareholders. Companies adopting the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations have implemented what is considered best practice for executive 
remuneration oversight. To the extent that this improves the effectiveness of 
remuneration practice, companies adopting the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations are more likely to receive lower levels of shareholder dissent on the 
annual remuneration report.  This discussion leads to Hypothesis 7: 
H7: Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated 
with less shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report.   
 
4.4 SUMMARY 
Using an agency framework and prior literature, this chapter develops hypotheses to 
investigate aspects of remuneration committee formation, composition and 
effectiveness.  The next chapter outlines the research methodology used to test the 
hypotheses outlined above. 
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5 RESEARCH METHOD 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter outlines the research method used to test Hypotheses 1 to 7 
developed in Chapter 4.  Hypotheses 1 to 5 focus on determinants of the formation of a 
remuneration committee, and the adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
composition recommendations.  Hypotheses 6 and 7 consider the relation between 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and aspects of 
executive remuneration practice.  Hypothesis 6 examines the relation between adoption 
of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and executive remuneration 
levels and linkage with company performance.  Hypothesis 7 examines the relation 
between adoption of the remuneration committee recommendations and shareholder 
dissent on the remuneration report. Empirical archival analysis is used to test 
Hypotheses 1 through 7. 
This chapter is presented as follows. Section 5.2 describes the research method 
and provides the variable specifications used in the analysis of remuneration committee 
formation and composition. Section 5.3 describes the research method and outlines the 
variable specifications incorporated in the analysis of remuneration practice. Section 5.4 
outlines the sample selection process. Finally section 5.5 provides a summary of the 
chapter. 
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5.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION – REMUNERATION COMMITTEE FORMATION AND 
COMPOSITION 
The first part of this thesis examines agency related demand and board capacity as 
determinants of a company forming a remuneration committee and adopting the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations regarding committee composition. 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 examine agency related demand characteristics, whilst Hypothesis 5 
examines board capacity.  As Hypotheses 1 to 5 examine the association of adoption of 
the specific committee characteristics included in the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations, logistic regression analysis is used to test the hypotheses. Model 1 
examines committee formation and Model 2 examines committee composition.  The 
relationship is expressed in Models 1 and 2 below: 
Model 1(Committee Formation):  
Remuneration Committee = β0 + β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding 
+ β3Business Segments + β4Geo. Segments + β5CEO Entrenchment + β6Growth + 
β7Free Cash Flow +  β8Asset Turnover+ β9Board Size + β10Company Size +  
β11Governance  Quality + β12Leverage + β13Big4 Auditor + β14Company Age + 
β15Industry + ε  
Where: 
Remuneration Committee = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
formed a remuneration committee as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Ownership Structure (shareholder dispersion and insider shareholding) = Natural log of the 
percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by directors, management, large individual 
shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related parties as at 30 June 2008. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
Business Segments = Number of business segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Geo. Segments = Number of geographical segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
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Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity as at 30 June 2008, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Free Cash Flow = Difference between the gross cash flow from operations less gross 
investment as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Asset Turnover = Operating revenue divided by average total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the Board as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Governance Quality = Score determined by adding one point for adoption of nominated 
ASX governance recommendations as disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Leverage = Total assets divided by total liabilities as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per 
cent. 
Big 4 Auditor = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has engaged a Big 4 
audit firm as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Age = The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
 
Model 2 (Committee Composition): 
ASX Adopter = β0 + β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding+ β3CEO 
Entrenchment + β4Business Segments + β5Geo. Segments + β6Growth + β7Free Cash 
Flow + β8Asset Turnover +  β9Board Size +β10Board Independence + β11Company Size 
+  β 12Governance  Quality + β13Leverage + β14Big4 Auditor + β15Company Age 
+β16Industry +ε 
 
Where: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Ownership Structure (shareholder dispersion and insider shareholding) = Natural log of the 
percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by directors, management, large individual 
shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related parties as at 30 June 2008. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Business Segments = Number of business segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
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Geo. Segments = Number of geographical segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity as at 30 June 2008, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Free Cash Flow = Difference between the gross cash flow from operations less gross 
investment as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Asset Turnover = Operating revenue divided by average total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the Board as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = Number of independent directors divided by the number of directors 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Governance Quality = Score determined by adding one point for adoption of nominated 
ASX governance recommendations as disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Leverage = Total assets divided by total liabilities as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per 
cent. 
Big 4 Auditor = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has engaged a Big 4 
audit firm as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Age = The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
The following sections provide a detailed description of the dependent variables, 
independent variables and control variables used to operationalise the constructs 
analysed in Models 1 and 2. 
5.2.1 Measurement of Variables – Model 1 (Committee Formation) and  
Model 2 (Committee Composition) 
Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable in Model 1 is a dichotomous variable indicating whether 
the company has formed a Remuneration Committee. The variable has a value of one 
(1) if the company has formed a remuneration committee and zero (0) otherwise.   
To measure adoption of the ASX recommendations regarding committee 
composition, a second dichotomous dependent variable indicates whether the company 
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has adopted all three membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations or not.  That is, the committee consists of at least three 
members, the majority of which are independent and is chaired by an independent 
chairperson.  In Model 2, ASX Adopter is coded one (1) if the committee composition is 
consistent with the three membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Variables   
Hypotheses 1 to 4 examine the relation between agency related demand 
characteristics and adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  
Chapter 4 of this thesis identified from the existing literature a number of proxy 
measures of agency costs, including patterns of shareholding, CEO entrenchment, the 
complexity of company operations, high company growth, high free cash flows and low 
asset turnover. 
Patterns of shareholding examined in the study are: shareholder dispersion, insider 
equity ownership and institutional equity ownership. One measure is used as a proxy for 
shareholder dispersion and insider share ownership on the basis that lower insider 
equity ownership indicates greater shareholder dispersion and vice versa.   Ownership 
Structure is measured as the natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity 
owned by insiders (Singh and Davidson, 2003). Insiders are defined as directors, 
management, large individual shareholders deemed to be related parties, and their 
related parties. Institutional Shareholding is measured as the percentage of ordinary 
shares held by institutional shareholders identified from the top twenty shareholders 
disclosed in the 2008 annual report.  Shareholding by financial institutions, insurance 
companies, fund management companies, superannuation and pension funds, 
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investment companies, and investment and unit trusts are considered institutional 
holdings (Henry, 2008).  
A further agency cost associated with management is CEO Entrenchment.  CEO 
Entrenchment is measured as a dichotomous variable taking the value of one (1) if there 
has been a change in CEO in the two years prior to the release of the 2008 financial 
report and zero (0) otherwise
1
 (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003;  Lee, 2009).  It is 
considered that the longer the CEO holds his or her position the greater the opportunity 
for the CEO to influence the Board and the remuneration committee.  Therefore holding 
the position for longer than two years is considered sufficient time for the CEO to 
become entrenched and to wield influence over the Board and remuneration committee. 
Prior studies identify a number of possible measures of the complexity of 
company operations. These include: the number of industry and geographical segments 
in which the company operates (Denis et al., 1997; Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 
2008), the number of industry classifications (GICS) identified in the annual report 
(Denis et al., 1997; Dey, 2008), a Herfindahl-Hirschman index measure (Denis et al., 
1997; Bushman et al., 2004), the number of subsidiary entities, and the number of 
employees (Kent et al., 2010). As all Australian listed companies are required to 
disclose business and geographical segment revenue and assets in their annual reports, 
the study uses business and geographical segments on the basis that this information 
provides a more complete data set. Business Segments is measured as the number of 
business segments disclosed in the 2008 financial report. Geo. Segments is measured as 
the number of geographical segments disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
                                                 
1
 CEO Tenure is used as an alternate measure of CEO Entrenchment in robustness testing. 
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Other company characteristics associated with agency costs are company growth, 
asset turnover and free cash flows.  Company Growth is measured by the book to 
market ratio of equity (Dey, 2008; Rainsbury et al., 2008; Lehn et al., 2009; Sun and 
Cahan, 2009; Frydman and Saks, 2010). The variable is winsorised at 1 per cent for 
inclusion in the analysis.  Asset Turnover is measured as operating revenue divided by 
the average value of assets (Ang et al., 2000; Singh and Davidson, 2003; Florakis, 2008; 
Lin and Liu., 2009).  Free Cash Flow is measured as the difference between the gross 
cash flow from operations less gross investment.    The variable is winsorised at 1 per 
cent. 
The ability of companies to adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is also related to board capacity. Hypotheses 5a and 5b examine the 
relation between board capacity and adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.  Board capacity is operationalised by board size and the number of 
independent directors. Board Size is measured as the number of directors and Board 
Independence is measured as the number of independent directors divided by the 
number of directors. Board size is of direct relevance to the decision to form a 
remuneration committee whereas board independence is relevant to the decision 
regarding committee composition.  As the ASX Recommendations include a 
recommendation that the board have a majority of independent directors (ASX 
Corporate Governance Council, 2007, Recommendation 2.1), board independence is 
incorporated into the governance quality score used as a control measure in the analysis 
for committee formation. However, board independence is included as a separate 
independent variable in the committee composition analysis and the governance quality 
score adjusted accordingly. 
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Control Variables 
Other company characteristics identified in the literature as being relevant to the 
decision to adopt the ASX Recommendations are company size, leverage, engagement 
of a Big 4 audit firm, the overall strength of a company’s governance framework, 
company age and industry effects.  Other company characteristics are identified in the 
literature as being relevant to the decision to adopt the ASX Recommendations. 
Measures of these characteristics are included in the analyses as control variables.  The 
control variables include company size, leverage, engagement of a Big 4 audit firm, the 
overall strength of a company’s governance framework, company age and industry 
effects. 
Company Size is included in the analyses as a control variable for a number of 
reasons. First, the shareholding of larger companies is anticipated to be more widely 
held than smaller companies, thereby increasing the need for effective monitoring by 
directors. Larger companies tend to have greater scope of operations and hierarchy 
thereby increasing the potential for management to act opportunistically or otherwise 
shirk their responsibilities (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Hughes et al., 2003). Larger 
companies are likely to have a greater institutional shareholding base and potentially be 
exposed to greater scrutiny by analysts, regulators and institutional shareholders (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1990; Krishnan and Zhongxia, 2005).  Executives in larger companies 
are more likely to receive larger remuneration packages and therefore are more likely to 
attract greater scrutiny from stakeholders and market participants, compared to smaller 
companies (Krishnan and Zhongxia, 2005; Edmans and Gabaix, 2009).  Consequently, 
it is anticipated that larger companies experience higher agency costs  (Edmans and 
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Gabaix, 2009), and therefore greater demand to adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.  Company Size is measured by the natural log of total assets.  
Prior studies suggest that larger companies are more likely to voluntarily 
implement governance structures whereas smaller companies tend to have limited 
capacity to implement best practice governance frameworks (Rainsbury et al., 2008; 
Kent et al., 2010). Prior studies have also identified that the cost of implementing best 
practice governance is substantially greater for small companies (Dedman, 2000; Linck 
et al., 2008).  
Companies that have debt in their capital structure are subject to requirements of 
debt contracts with lenders. As debt levels increase, providers of debt capital are more 
likely to actively monitor the borrowing company so as to reduce expropriation of their 
wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Cotter and Silvester, 2003; Florackis, 2008).  In 
addition, lenders are likely to require borrowing companies to implement best practice 
governance arrangements. Accordingly, leverage is included in the analyses as a control 
variable.  Leverage is measured as the ratio of total assets to total liabilities, and is 
winsorised at 1 per cent for inclusion in the analysis.   
Prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors encourage their clients to adopt best 
practice governance guidelines (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Carson, 2002).  
Therefore, the appointment of a Big 4 audit firm is included in the analyses as a control 
variable. Big 4 Auditor has a value of one (1) if the company has engaged a Big 4 audit 
firm, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Prior research suggests that company age can also be used to proxy for the 
company’s diversity and complexity.  Older companies are also more likely to have 
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larger and more diverse boards  (Boone et al., 2007) as internal governance structures 
generally evolve over time (Berry et al., 2006).  Consequently company age is 
incorporated into the analyses (Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008).    Company Age 
is measured as the number of years since the company listed on the ASX (Boone et al., 
2007).   
In addition to the remuneration committee, other governance mechanisms are 
related to remuneration practices (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). Research 
suggests that excessive executive remuneration occurs in companies that have poor 
corporate governance quality (Core et al., 1999; Singh, 2006; Sun et al., 2009). 
Therefore, a measure of the company’s overall governance quality is included in the 
analyses as a control.  Approaches to measuring overall governance strength include the 
development of additive governance indices (Gompers et al., 2003). Other studies have 
applied factor analytic techniques to develop governance scores (Larcker et al., 2007; 
Dey, 2008; Beekes et al., 2010).  The approach by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, (2003) 
of developing an index is followed in this study.  
The purpose of the Gompers et al. (2003) index was to develop a measure of 
shareholder rights for US companies. The score was determined by considering 24 
shareholder rights items and adding one point for the existence or absence of an item 
that reduced shareholder rights. Following this approach, the current study develops a 
Governance Quality index by adding one point for adoption of the ASX 
Recommendations. The score only includes those ASX Recommendations for which 
adoption can be objectively determined from the governance statement included in the 
annual report of each company. Table 5-1 summarises the relevant ASX Corporate 
Governance Principles and Recommendations items and the measurement of the index. 
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TABLE 5-1:  GOVERNANCE QUALITY INDEX 
Principle / Recommendation Score 
2.1 The majority of the board should be independent directors
2
. + 1 if adopted, 0 otherwise 
2.2 The board chairperson should be an independent director. + 1 if adopted, 0 otherwise 
2.3 The roles of the board chairperson and chief executive 
officer should not be exercised by the same individual. 
+ 1 if adopted, 0 otherwise 
2.4 The board should establish a nomination committee. + 1 if adopted, 0 otherwise 
4.1 The board should establish an audit committee. + 1 if adopted, 0 otherwise 
4.2 The audit committee should be structured so that it: 
- consists of only non-executive directors  
- consists of a majority of independent directors 
- is chaired by an independent chair, who is not chair of the 
board  
- has at least three members. 
+ 1 if adopted, 0 otherwise 
Total Possible Maximum Score: 6 
Source: ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007. 
The types of governance mechanisms introduced by companies to reduce agency 
costs are likely to be associated with industry characteristics in addition to individual 
company characteristics (Bathala and Rao, 1995). Consistent with extant research, the 
analyses control for industry effects (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Brick et al., 2006; 
Sapp, 2008; Windsor and Cybinski, 2009).  Dummy variables for Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) industry sectors are included to control for industry 
effects. 
                                                 
2
  In the formation analysis (Model 1), board independence is included in the governance quality score. 
In the composition analysis (Model 2), board independence is excluded from the governance quality 
score and included as a separate independent variable.  Consequently in the composition analysis, the 
governance quality score reduces from a possible maximum score of six to a possible maximum score 
of five. 
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A summary of the variables incorporated into the Models 1 and 2, to test 
Hypotheses 1 to 5 is included below at Table 5-2. 
TABLE 5-2: SUMMARY OF VARIABLES – COMMITTEE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION 
Dependent Variables Measure 
Remuneration Committee 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
formed a remuneration committee, and zero (0) 
otherwise. 
ASX Adopter 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
adopted all three membership guidelines included in the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) 
otherwise. 
Independent Variables Measure (Agency Costs) 
Ownership Structure 
Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity 
owned by directors, management, large individual 
shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
CEO Entrenchment 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the 
company has changed in the two years prior to the 2008 
financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Institutional Shareholding 
Percentage shareholding by institutional entities 
identified from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in 
the 2008 annual report. 
Business Segments 
Number of business segments in which the company 
operates, as disclosed in the 2008 annual report. 
Geo. Segments 
Number of geographical segments in which the 
company operates, as disclosed in the 2008 annual 
report. 
Growth 
Book value of equity divided by market value of equity,  
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Asset Turnover Operating revenue divided by average total assets. 
Free Cash Flow 
Difference between the gross cash flow from operations 
less gross investment.  The variable is winsorised at 1 
per cent. 
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Table 5-2:  SUMMARY OF VARIABLES – COMMITTEE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION 
(cont.) 
Independent Variables Measure (Board Capacity) 
Board Size Number of directors appointed to the Board. 
Board Independence 
Number of independent directors divided by the number 
of directors. 
Control Variables Measure 
Company Size Natural log of total assets. 
Leverage 
Total assets divided by total liabilities, winsorised at 1 
per cent. 
Big 4 Auditor 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
engaged a Big 4 audit firm, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Age 
The number of years since the company listed on the 
ASX. 
Governance Quality 
Score determined by adding one point for adoption of 
nominated ASX Recommendations included in 
governance strength index. 
Industry 
Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) industry sector. Ten industry 
classifications were used to classify company industry. 
 
5.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION – REMUNERATION COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS 
The second part of this study analyses the association between adoption of the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations and aspects of executive remuneration 
practice.  Hypothesis 6 examines how adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations influences executive remuneration levels and pay for performance 
sensitivity.  Hypotheses 7 examines whether adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with higher shareholder satisfaction 
regarding executive remuneration arrangements.  The dependent variable in each 
analysis is a continuous variable.  Therefore, ordinary least squares multiple regression 
analysis is employed to test Hypotheses 6 and 7. 
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Existing research has considered the effectiveness of executive remuneration by 
considering the level of remuneration and whether remuneration is linked with financial 
performance. Hypothesis 6 expects that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with executive remuneration levels and stronger pay for 
performance sensitivity in executive remuneration. Two measures of remuneration 
practice are suggested in Hypothesis 6: remuneration levels and the link between 
remuneration and company performance.  
Prior research on executive remuneration has largely focused on the remuneration 
of the CEO (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Murphy et al., 1999; Merhebi et al., 2006; 
Matolcsy and Wright, 2007).  However, reporting of remuneration of the senior 
executive team, not just the CEO, in the annual report of listed Australian companies 
has been required for some time (Rankin, 2010).  In Australia, disclosure of the top five 
executives has been required since 2005, although research in this regard is limited 
(Rankin, 2010).  In addition, the annual non-binding shareholder vote, which is also 
examined as part of this study, relates to the entire remuneration report encompassing 
remuneration of the senior executive team, not just the CEO.  Consequently, this study 
examines the remuneration of the top five ranked executives.  
The disclosure of the five senior executives is generally referred to in the annual 
report as either the key management personnel or the five highest paid executives. This 
distinction arises due to inconsistency between executive remuneration disclosure 
requirements outlined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (s300A(1)(c)) and the 
disclosures required by the relevant Australian Accounting Standard (AASB 124 
“Related Party Disclosures”).  Key Management Personnel are defined by the 
accounting standard as “those persons having authority and responsibility for planning, 
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directing and controlling the activities of the [company]” (AASB 124:9,  2007). 
Consequently key management personnel do not necessarily reflect the five highest paid 
executives.  Incorporation of the senior executive team also encompasses the CEO. 
The models developed to test Hypothesis 6 are expressed at Models 3 and 4 
below. Model 3 tests the relation between adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and the level of cash remuneration of the key executives (H6a), whilst 
Model 4 tests the relation between adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and the pay for performance sensitivity in the remuneration of key 
executives (H6b).    
Model 3 (Remuneration Levels): 
Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2ROA + β3 ASX Adopter* ROA + 
β4TSR + β5Insider Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding + β7Company Size + 
β8Board Size + β9Board Independence + β10Separate Board Chair + β11Independent 
Board Chair + β12CEO Entrenchment + β13Growth + β14Risk + β15Industry + ε 
Where: 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives. 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA = Return on Assets for 2008. 
ASX Adopter*ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ROA. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
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Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
Model 4 (Pay for Performance Sensitivity): 
∆ Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2∆ROA + β3ASX Adopter*∆ROA + 
β4TSR + β5Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 +β6Insider Shareholding + β7Institutional 
Shareholding + β8Company Size + β9Board Size + β10Board Independence + 
β11Separate Board Chair + β12Independent Board Chair + β13CEO Entrenchment + 
β14Growth + β15Risk + β16Industry + ε 
 
 
 
Where: 
∆ Ln Cash Remuneration = One year change in the natural log of cash remuneration for the 
top five ranked executives between 2007 and 2008. 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
∆ROA = the change in return on assets. 
ASX Adopter * ∆ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ∆ROA. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives in the prior year. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
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Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
Whilst Hypotheses 6a and 6b focus on measures of executive remuneration, 
Hypothesis 7 examines the shareholders’ views regarding remuneration practice.  
Extending the proposition that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations leads to effective remuneration practice, Hypothesis 7 expects that 
companies that adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations experience 
low levels of shareholder dissent regarding the shareholder vote on the annual 
remuneration report. Hence, the study also incorporates the annual shareholder non-
binding vote as a measure of the effectiveness of the remuneration committee.  The 
model developed to test Hypotheses 7 is expressed as Model 5 below. 
Model 5 (Shareholder Dissent): 
Shareholder Dissent = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2Ln Cash Remuneration + β3ROA + 
β4TSR + β5Insider Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding + β7Company Size + 
β8Board Size + β9Board Independence + β10Industry + ε 
Where  
Shareholder Dissent = The number of negative votes cast on the 2008 annual remuneration 
report / (number of votes cast for + number of votes cast against the 2008 annual 
remuneration report). 
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ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments to the top five ranked executives. 
ROA = Earnings from continuing operations divided by total average assets. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties and their related parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
The following sections provide a detailed description of the dependent variables, 
independent variables and control variables used to test Hypotheses 6 and 7. 
 
5.3.1 Measurement of Variables – Models 3, 4 and 5 (Remuneration Committee 
Effectiveness) 
Dependent Variables  
Remuneration Levels and Pay for Performance Sensitivity:  
Hypothesis 6 examines remuneration committee efficacy by reference to 
remuneration levels (H6a) and the alignment of executive remuneration to company 
performance (H6b).  Therefore two models are used to test Hypothesis 6.   
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Cash remuneration is incorporated as the dependent variable in Model 3. 
Empirical evidence suggests that cash remuneration is an appropriate proxy for total 
CEO remuneration (Tosi et al., 2000) and a more appropriate proxy than other 
individual cash components of CEO remuneration (Sun and Cahan, 2009).   
Additionally, extant research on Australian companies has demonstrated that not all 
Australian companies provide equity based remuneration (Matolcsy and Wright, 2007).  
Whilst the use of risk incentive remuneration has increased in recent years, the use of 
long term incentive plans represents less than twenty per cent of total remuneration 
(Rankin, 2010).  Ln Cash Remuneration of the top five ranked senior executives is 
measured as the natural log of total salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments (Merhebi et al., 2006; Windsor and Cybinski, 2009). 
The log transformation of cash remuneration used in the study is consistent with 
prior research (Core et al., 1999; Sapp, 2008; Ferri and Maber, 2009; Sun and Cahan, 
2009; Heaney et al., 2010; Tian and Twite, 2010; Armstrong et al., 2012).  As the 
methodology employs ordinary least squares regression analysis, the log transformation 
helps to achieve a normal distribution in the dependent variable and is likely to reduce 
the effect of heteroskedasticity (Sun and Cahan, 2009). 
In considering the pay for performance sensitivity of remuneration, the dependent 
variable in Model 4 reflects the change in executive cash remuneration. The measure 
used in the pay for performance analysis is the one year change in the natural log of 
cash remuneration (∆ Ln Cash Remuneration) of the top five ranked executives (Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990; Sun and Cahan, 2009).  
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Shareholder Dissent on the Annual Remuneration Report 
The dependent variable in Model 5 measures the level of shareholder dissent with 
the company’s remuneration arrangements of its key executives.  Recall that 
shareholders vote on the annual remuneration report which is included in the company’s 
annual report. Although this vote is non-binding, it is an external measure of the 
shareholder’s satisfaction with the executive remuneration practices of the company.  It 
is therefore considered to be a measure of shareholder satisfaction with the 
remuneration committee in those companies that have chosen to form a remuneration 
committee or fully adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  The 
study incorporates the proxy results published by the company at the end of the annual 
general meeting.  
Shareholder Dissent is measured as the number of shareholder votes cast against 
the annual remuneration report divided by the sum of no and yes votes cast.  This 
measure is consistent with the approach adopted by Carter and Zamora (2009) and 
Clarkson et al. (2011). Whilst alternate measures of shareholder dissent have been used 
in the literature (Conyon and Sadler, 2010), the measure adopted by this study reflects 
the Australian institutional setting (Clarkson et al., 2011). 
Table 5-3 summarises the dependent variables incorporated into the analysis 
regarding the effectiveness of the remuneration committee. 
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TABLE 5-3: REMUNERATION COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS – DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Remuneration Levels & Pay for performance sensitivity (H6a,b)    
Ln Cash Remuneration 
Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and 
cash bonus payments to the top five ranked executives. 
∆ Ln  Cash Remuneration 
One year change in the natural log of cash remuneration 
for the top five ranked executives between 2007 and 
2008. 
Shareholder Vote (H7)  
Shareholder Dissent 
Total no votes cast / (no votes cast + yes votes cast) on 
the annual remuneration report. 
 
Independent Variables  
Remuneration Levels and Pay for Performance Sensitivity: 
Independent variables used in the analysis have been selected by reference to the 
current literature.  Recall that Hypothesis 6 examines the association between adoption 
of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and (a) executive remuneration 
levels and (b) the link between remuneration and company performance.  The variables 
of key interest are the adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
and the interaction variable related to adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and a measure of company operating performance. ASX Adopter is a 
dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three of the 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations, 
and zero (0) otherwise.  The interaction variable ROA * ASX Adopter is measured as 
ROA*ASX Adopter.  
Interaction variables have been incorporated into prior studies (Sun and Cahan, 
2009; Windsor and Cybinski, 2009). The interaction determines whether the 
remuneration committee is associated with executive remuneration that is linked to 
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company performance. In analysing the pay for performance sensitivity, the interaction 
variable ∆ROA * ASX Adopter is substituted for ROA * ASX Adopter.  ∆ROA * ASX 
Adopter is measured as ∆ROA*ASX Adopter.  Whilst some researchers recommend 
mean centering the continuous variable included in the interaction to reduce the 
potential impact of multicollinearity, extant research suggests that mean centering is not 
necessary where the variable has a meaningful zero point (Dalal and Zickar, 2012).  
Therefore, the untransformed version of the continuous variable is included in the 
interaction. 
The other independent variables used in Models 3 and 4 reflect company 
characteristics identified in extant literature as being determinants of executive 
remuneration.  Measures of accounting return and stock return are incorporated into 
Models 3 and 4 (Core et al., 1999; Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Merhebi et al., 2006; 
Sapp, 2008; Sun and Cahan, 2009).  Prior studies include both measures of 
performance, as stock return reflects short and long term effects of management 
decisions and are subject to less manipulation than accounting measures of 
performance, whilst accounting measures provide a more direct reflection of actions by 
management (Ferri and Maber, 2009). Additionally, the use of accounting based 
performance as incentives, for example short term bonuses or long term incentive plans 
is widely accepted practice (Murphy et al., 1999).  Return on Assets is used in this study 
as extant research identifies those incentive components of CEO remuneration contracts 
are often based on accounting return (Clarkson et al., 2006).  Return on Assets (ROA) is 
measured as earnings from continuing operations divided by total average assets.  
Shareholder return reflects the annual return to shareholders of ordinary equity.  Total 
Shareholder Return (TSR) is measured as the dividend adjusted annualised percentage 
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change in stock price. In analysing the pay for performance sensitivity, change in ROA 
(∆ROA) is substituted for ROA. ∆ROA is measured as the change in return on assets 
between 2007 and 2008. 
Consistent with Sun and Cahan (2009), prior year remuneration is incorporated as 
an independent variable in the pay for performance sensitivity analysis. Prior year 
remuneration is considered to be a significant determinant of future remuneration levels 
(Conyon, 1997; Girma et al., 2007; Gregory-Smith, 2009). Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 is 
measured as the natural log value of the prior year’s total cash remuneration for the top 
five ranked executives. 
Shareholder Dissent  
Recall Hypothesis 7 expects that the presence of a remuneration committee that 
adopts the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated with lower 
levels of shareholder dissent regarding executive remuneration. Consistent with the 
above discussion, ASX Adopter is incorporated into the model as an independent 
variable.  This variable examines the relation between the presence of a remuneration 
committee that adopts the ASX remuneration committee recommendation and the 
annual shareholder non-binding vote on the remuneration report. This variable is 
measured the same way as outlined in the earlier analysis regarding committee 
formation and composition.  Additionally as the shareholder non-binding vote relates to 
the annual remuneration report, executive remuneration is incorporated into the model 
as an independent variable.  Cash Remuneration is included in the model and takes the 
same value as outlined above.  
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Control Variables  
Remuneration Levels and Pay for Performance Sensitivity 
Other economic and company characteristics are considered relevant to executive 
remuneration practice and oversight.  These characteristics are drawn from prior 
theoretical and empirical studies, and incorporated into the analyses as control variables. 
These variables proxy for economic determinants and company characteristics 
considered relevant to executive remuneration practice and oversight.   
Consistent with extant literature, it is expected company size and company growth 
opportunities are related to executive remuneration (Core et al., 1999; Tosi et al., 2000) 
as larger companies are expected to pay higher remuneration (Conyon and Murphy, 
2000; Sapp, 2008).  Further, companies exhibiting higher growth opportunities and 
greater complexity are also expected to be associated with higher executive 
remuneration (Core et al., 1999).  Consequently, company size and growth are included 
in the analyses as control variables.  Some studies incorporate the natural log of total 
sales and sales squared (Core et al., 1999; Leone et al., 2006; Sun and Cahan, 2009) as 
the proxy for company size in order to control for potential non-linear size effects. 
Leone et al. (2006) suggest that incorporating total assets to proxy for company size or 
the log of the proxy for company size achieves similar results.  Accordingly, Company 
Size is measured by the natural log of total assets (Anderson and Bizjak, 2003; Merhebi 
et al., 2006; Capezio et al., 2011).  Company Growth is measured by the book to market 
ratio of equity (Ferri and Maber, 2009; Matolcsy and Wright, 2011). The variable is 
winsorised at 1% for inclusion in the analysis.  
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As company risk has also been identified as relevant to executive remuneration in 
other empirical studies (Smith Jr and Watts, 1992; Core et al., 1999), company risk is 
incorporated into the study as a control variable. Company risk reflects the degree to 
which the financial valuation of the company’s common equity varies in relation to 
movements of the broader market (Ozkan, 2007). A frequently used measure of 
company risk is the beta of a company’s stock, calculated by regressing a company’s 
monthly stock return on the corresponding country’s market index return (Ozkan, 2007). 
Risk is measured as the company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging 
markets index. 
Consistent with extant research, industry dummies are incorporated into the study 
(Core et al., 1999; Murphy et al., 1999; Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Sapp, 2008).  As 
outlined earlier in the chapter, indicator variables for Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) industry sector are used to reflect Industry effects.   
In addition to economic determinants, other company characteristics are 
considered relevant to executive remuneration. These characteristics relate to board size, 
measures of board governance and CEO power.  CEO power is expected to increase in 
companies with larger boards (Jensen, 1993), boards evidencing lower proportion of 
non-executive or independent directors (Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Armstrong et al., 
2012), where the board chairperson is not independent (Core et al., 1999; Armstrong et 
al., 2012) and where the CEO is also the Chairperson of the Board (Core et al., 1999; 
Ryan and Wiggins, 2001; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Armstrong et al., 2012).  Large 
boards are also associated with being less effective monitors of CEO behaviour (Jensen, 
1993). Consequently larger boards can lead to increased executive remuneration levels 
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(Guest, 2010). Measures for board size, board governance and CEO entrenchment are 
incorporated into the analyses.   
Board Size is measured as the number of directors on the board (Lee, 2009; 
Heaney et al., 2010). Separate Board Chair is a dummy variable coded one (1) if the 
roles of the CEO and Chair are performed by different people and zero (0) otherwise. 
Board Independence is measured as the number of independent directors appointed to 
the board divided by the total number of directors appointed to the board.  Independent 
Board Chair is a dummy variable coded one (1) if the chairperson is an independent 
director and zero (0) otherwise. Finally CEO Entrenchment is a dichotomous variable 
coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has changed in the two years prior to the 2008 
financial report and zero (0) otherwise. This variable is similar to the variable used in 
the Anderson and Bizjak (2003) and Lee (2009) studies. 
Other company characteristics incorporated as control variables relate to the 
company’s ownership structure. Extant research suggests that governance quality is 
lower in companies that evidence high CEO power (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Sun and 
Cahan, 2009). Additionally it is argued that the need to ensure greater alignment 
between remuneration and shareholder outcomes decreases as CEO or insider 
shareholding increases (Ferri and Maber, 2009).  Large external shareholdings are 
expected to act as a substitute monitoring mechanism and can reduce CEO power (Core 
et al., 1999; Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Sun and Cahan, 2009). Insider shareholding and 
institutional shareholding are included in the analysis as control variables.    
Insider Shareholding is measured as the natural log of the percentage of issued 
ordinary equity owned by directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed 
to be insiders and their related parties. Institutional Shareholding is measured as the 
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percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from the top twenty 
shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report.  
Table 5-4 summarises the variables used in Model 3 and Model 4.  Model 3 
examines executive remuneration levels for the top five ranked executives.  Whilst 
Model 4 examines the pay for performance sensitivity in executive remuneration 
awarded to the top five ranked executives.    
Shareholder Dissent 
Consistent with existing research, control variables measuring company size, 
board characteristics, ownership concentration and company performance are 
incorporated into the shareholder dissent model (Carter and Zamora, 2009; Conyon and 
Sadler, 2010). Board characteristics include measures of board size and board 
independence. Company ownership characteristics include insider shareholding and 
institutional shareholding. Company performance measures include return on assets and 
total shareholder return. Industry effects are also incorporated into the model.  Company 
Size, Board Size, Board Independence, Insider Shareholding, Institutional 
Shareholding, ROA and TSR adopt the same definitions as outlined earlier in the 
chapter. 
Table 5-5 summarises the variables used in Model 5 examining the association 
between shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report, executive remuneration 
and adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations. 
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TABLE 5-3: REMUNERATION COMMITTEES AND EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION  
Independent Variable Measure 
ASX Adopter 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
adopted all three membership guidelines included in the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations regarding 
committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA Return on assets for 2008. 
TSR 
Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price 
for the year ended 30 June 2008. 
∆ROA The change in return on assets from 2007 to 2008. 
ROA*ASX Adopter Interaction variable, ROA*ASX Adopter. 
∆ROA*ASX Adopter Interaction variable, ∆ROA * ASX Adopter. 
Company Size Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Growth 
Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Risk 
Five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets 
index as at 30 June 2008. 
Institutional Shareholding 
Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual 
report as at 30 June 2008. 
Insider Shareholding 
Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned 
by directors, management, large individual shareholders 
deemed to be insiders and their related parties as at 30 June 
2008. 
Board Size Number of directors appointed to the board as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair 
Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and 
board chair are performed by different people, and zero (0) 
otherwise. 
Board Independence 
The number of independent directors appointed to the board 
divided by the total number of directors appointed to the 
board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Independent Board Chair 
Dummy variable coded one (1) if the board chairperson 
holding office at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and 
zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the 
company has changed in the two years prior to the 2008 
financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Industry 
Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) industry sector. Ten industry classifications are used to 
classify company industry. 
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TABLE 5-4: SHAREHOLDER DISSENT AND REMUNERATION COMMITTEE EFFICACY 
Independent Variable Measure 
ASX Adopter 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
adopted all three membership guidelines included in the ASX 
remuneration recommendations regarding committee 
composition, and zero (0) otherwise 
Cash Remuneration Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments to the top five ranked executives. 
Control Variables Measure 
Company Size Natural log of total assets. 
Board Size Number of directors appointed to the board. 
Board Independence The number of independent directors appointed to the board 
divided by the total number of directors appointed to the 
board. 
ROA Earnings from continuing operations divided by total average 
assets. 
TSR Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock 
price. 
Institutional Shareholding Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual 
report. 
Insider Shareholding Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned 
by directors, management, large individual shareholders 
deemed to be insiders and their related parties and their related 
parties. 
Industry Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) industry sector. Ten industry classifications are used to 
classify company industry. 
 
5.4 SAMPLE AND DATA 
The sample consists of Australian listed companies in 2008. The sample period of 
2008 was selected as it allows sufficient time for companies to have developed or 
modified their governance structure following the release of ASX Recommendations in 
2003 and their revision in 2007 (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2003 and 2007).  
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In addition, the sample period is before the worst of the international financial problems 
that commenced in the latter part of 2008. The sample period also predates the 
amendment to the ASX Listing Rules requiring companies included in the S&P 300 
Index to form a remuneration committee consisting solely of non-executive directors. 
An initial sample of 1,756 Australian public listed companies in 2008 with a 30 
June balance date was identified. Banks were excluded from the sample because of their 
different regulatory requirements.  Companies were also eliminated if they were listed 
trusts or stapled entities. These two groups are non-operating companies with special 
governance arrangements that are different to the majority of listed entities. Companies 
were also eliminated if they were dual-listed in the United States (US) because different 
regulation is applicable to their governance practices. Companies were excluded if they 
were dual-listed in other countries which did not require an annual shareholder vote on 
the company’s remuneration report.  Companies delisted during the sample period were 
also excluded because they had missing data.  For these companies, no annual general 
meeting was held during the year, or the 2008 financial report was not issued.  These 
exclusions reduced the sample to 1,504 companies.  
Finally, as multiple regression is sensitive to the inclusion of outliers, exploratory 
regression analysis was performed to identify outliers.  A review of the standardised 
residual values was performed. Whilst standardised scores higher than 2.5 to 3.3 are 
generally indicative of outliers (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001; Pallant, 2007), in large 
samples the cut-off point can be amended to up to 4 (Hair et al., 2010). Seven 
companies were identified as having standardised residual values in excess of positive 
or negative 4.  These companies were deleted from the sample as they were deemed to 
not be representative of the population (Pallant, 2007; Hair et al., 2010).  A review of 
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Cook’s Distance values was also performed to identify whether any other data points 
were exerting undue influence.  The Cook’s Distance values were all below 1, 
indicating that no other data points were unduly influencing the results (Pallant, 2007). 
The final sample includes 1,497 Australian listed companies. A summary of the sample 
selection process is presented in Table 5-6. 
TABLE 5-5: SAMPLE SELECTION 
Number of listed companies in 2008, with 30 June balance date 
Less: 
Companies identified as delisting during period 
Trusts & stapled companies 
Dual listed (US) companies 
Foreign domiciled companies 
Remaining banks 
2008 financial report not available 
Outliers 
1,756 
 
37 
122 
15 
66 
 5 
7 
7 
 
Final Sample 
 
    1,497 
 
A sub-sample of companies that had formed a remuneration committee was used 
in the analysis of committee composition. This sample was used to examine factors 
relevant to companies adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee size and independence.   
In the examination of executive remuneration, companies included in the full 
sample that pay remuneration are used in the analysis. The full sample is also used in 
the examination of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report. 
Data were sourced from commercial data bases and hand collected.  Company 
financial data were downloaded from FinAnalysis, Bloomberg and S&P Capital IQ 
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commercial databases.  Insider share ownership data and total cash remuneration 
awarded to the top five ranked executives were downloaded from the S&P Capital IQ 
database.  Segment data, governance data, including adoption of individual ASX 
Recommendations and adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations, 
and the details of institutional investors included in the top 20 shareholders as at 30 June 
2008 were hand collected from published 2008 annual reports. The proxy results for the 
annual non-binding shareholder vote on the remuneration report was hand collected 
from the 2008 annual general meeting voting results announcements lodged with the 
ASX. 
5.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the sample selection process, data collection methods 
and research design used to test hypotheses 1 to 7 outlined in Chapter 4. The models 
used to test the hypotheses are presented in detail. Dependent, independent and control 
variables used in each of the models presented are defined. Descriptive statistics and the 
results of the analyses performed are presented in the following two chapters.  The next 
chapter presents the descriptive statistics and results of the analysis performed to test 
Hypotheses 1 to 5 related to remuneration committee formation and composition. The 
chapter following thereafter presents the descriptive statistics and results of the analysis 
performed to test Hypotheses 6 and 7 related to remuneration committee practice.  
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6. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS – FORMATION AND 
COMPOSITION 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 This study examines: (1) the incentives for a company to voluntarily form a 
remuneration committee; (2) the incentives to adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations regarding committee composition, and (3) how adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations influences executive remuneration levels 
and linkage to company performance.  
Chapter 4 presented seven hypotheses based on an agency theoretical framework. 
Chapter 5 described the research methodology employed to test the hypotheses. This 
chapter presents the analysis of Hypotheses 1 to 5 related to remuneration committee 
formation and composition. Hypotheses 1 to 4 examine committee formation, while 
Hypothesis 5 examines committee composition. The hypotheses are directly related to 
research questions 1(a) and 1(b) regarding why companies form a remuneration 
committee and the factors that determine adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
composition recommendations.   
Hypothesis 1 examines the association between shareholding characteristics and 
demand for adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  
Hypothesis 2 examines the relation between CEO entrenchment and the demand for 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  Hypothesis 3 analyses 
the association between company complexity and the demand for adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations.  Hypothesis 4 examines the relation 
between other measures of agency costs and the demand for adoption of the ASX 
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remuneration committee recommendations.  Hypothesis 5 analyses the association 
between board capacity and adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations. 
This chapter presents the results of the logistic regression analyses which examine 
factors relevant to adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  
Section 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for the variables. 
Section 6.3 presents the main results of the logistic multivariate regression analysis of 
remuneration committee formation (Model 1) and composition (Model 2).  Section 6.4 
presents the results of additional analysis performed, with the results of robustness tests 
reported at section 6.5. The chapter concludes at section 6.6. 
6.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
6.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable used in the committee formation model (Model 1) which 
examines remuneration committee formation is a dichotomous variable reflecting 
whether the company has formed a remuneration committee.  The dependent variable 
used in the committee composition model (Model 2) which examines remuneration 
committee composition is also a dichotomous variable indicating full adoption or 
otherwise of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  Table 6-1 presents 
the descriptive statistics for the dependent variables.   
Of the 1,497 listed companies included in the sample, 796 companies (53 per cent) 
had formed a remuneration committee.  Of these companies, 33 (2 per cent) indicated in 
their annual report that although a formal remuneration committee had been formed, the 
committee members were the full board.  Additionally, 279 companies (19 per cent) 
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disclosed in their annual report that remuneration and nomination functions were 
combined into one committee.  The balance of 701 companies (47 per cent) had not 
formed a remuneration committee in the sample period. 
The ASX remuneration committee recommendations contain three membership 
guidelines which are that the committee should have at least three members, the 
majority of which should be independent, and an independent chairperson should be 
appointed to the committee.  The remuneration committee of 528 companies (66 per 
cent) had three or more members, 523 companies (66 per cent) had constituted a 
remuneration committee consisting of a majority of independent directors, and 590 
companies (74 per cent) had appointed an independent chairperson to the committee. Of 
the 796 companies that had formed a remuneration committee, 338 companies (43 per 
cent) met all three membership guidelines.  The balance of 458 companies (57 per cent) 
had formed a remuneration committee, however the composition did not fully adopt the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations. The descriptive statistics for the 
committee composition sample is also included in Table 6-1. 
TABLE 6-1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Committee Formation: Variable: Remuneration Committee 
 % N 
 No Remuneration Committee 
 Remuneration Committee Formed 
46.83 
53.17 
701 
796 
Committee Composition: Variable: ASX Adopter 
 % N 
 Committee has three or more members 
 Majority of members appointed are independent 
 Independent chairperson appointed to the committee 
 
 ASX Adopter  Remuneration Committee 
 Non Adopter Remuneration Committee 
66.33 
65.70 
74.12 
 
42.46 
57.54 
528 
523 
590 
 
338 
458 
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The few Australian studies that have considered remuneration committee structure 
have focused on large companies. To further facilitate comparison of the sample with 
the results from prior studies, a sub-sample of companies in the ASX 300 Index was 
considered. This sub-sample contains 154 companies, reflecting approximately 51 per 
cent of all companies included in the Index at 30 June 2008.  The sub-sample does not 
include all companies included in the ASX 300 Index as companies included in the 
Index were captured by categories outlined in Table 5-6 and excluded from the full 
sample.  Recall exclusion occurred if the company was a bank or listed trust, or was 
also listed in the US, or did not have a 30 June balance date, or was delisted during the 
period, or otherwise did not lodge an annual report or was not required to hold a 
shareholder vote on the annual remuneration report.  Key data for the ASX 300 sub-
sample and comparative data for the full sample are presented in Appendix 4.  Of this 
sub-sample, 96 per cent of these companies had formed a remuneration committee. It is 
noted that eighty-four per cent of the committees had a majority of independent 
members.  This reflects an increase in the number of companies forming a remuneration 
committee and in the proportion of independent committee members compared to 
earlier studies.  
Carson (2002) examined the 500 largest companies listed on the ASX in 1996, 
where 57 per cent of companies had formed a remuneration committee. Subsequently, 
Cotter and Silvester (2003) and Windsor and Cybinski (2009) analysed the largest 200 
and 300 ASX listed companies respectively in 1997 (Cotter and Silvester, 2003) and 
2001 (Windsor and Cybinski, 2009).  Cotter and Silvester (2003) found that 56 per cent 
of the remuneration committees were independent, and Windsor and Cybinski (2009) 
found that approximately 40 per cent of remuneration committees had 70 per cent or 
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more independent directors. Carson (2002), Cotter and Silvester (2003) and Windsor 
and Cybinski (2009) review data which pre-dates the introduction of the ASX 
Recommendations.   
In relation to adoption of the ASX Recommendations on committee composition, 
67 per cent of companies in the ASX 300 Index sub-sample met all three member 
guidelines. This adoption rate is higher than the adoption rate of 43 per cent for the full 
sample.  The remaining 51 (33 per cent) remuneration committees in this sub-sample 
had not adopted all three member guidelines. The analysis of the descriptive statistics 
identifies that in large companies the formation of independent remuneration 
committees is increasing over time.  The descriptive statistics for the ASX 300 sub-
sample are presented at Appendix 4. 
6.2.2 Independent and Control Variables 
Table 6-2 reports the descriptive statistics for the independent variables and 
control variables included in the full sample. The full sample (n = 1,497) is used in the 
analysis of committee formation (Model 1).  Agency costs are measured by the level of 
insider shareholding and institutional shareholding, CEO entrenchment, the number of 
business and geographical segments, growth, free cash flows and asset turnover.  On 
average insiders, including large individual shareholders, as reflected in the ownership 
structure variable, own 20 per cent of the issued shares.  Institutional shareholding is 18 
per cent.  Companies have an average of 1.6 business and 1.7 geographical segments. 
The average market to book ratio, a proxy for growth, is 2.6.  The average asset 
turnover equates to 54 per cent. In the full sample 78 companies evidenced a change in 
CEO, 61 (78 per cent) of these companies had also formed a remuneration committee.  
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Board size is used to proxy for board capacity. Companies in the full sample have a 
mean board size of 4.61 directors.  
TABLE 6-2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES FULL SAMPLE  
Panel A: Continuous Variables  (N = 1,497) 
Variable Measure Mean Std Dev Minimum Median  Maximum 
Ownership Structure Agency 19.85 19.40 0 14.08 100.00 
Institutional Shareholding  Agency 18.10 19.71 0 0.12 0.93 
Business Segments Agency 1.55 1.07 1 1.00 9 
Geo. Segments Agency 1.66 1.12 1 1.00 11 
Growth Agency 2.61 3.25 -3.03 1.56 18.76 
Free Cash Flow Agency 5029741 69448212 -221360444 -1777609 471032404 
Asset Turnover Agency 0.54 1.51 -0.91 0.93 49.44 
Board Size Capacity 4.61 1.49 3 4.00 13 
Leverage Control 0.07 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.66 
Governance Quality Control 3.10 1.69 0.00 3.00 6.00 
Company Size  Control 17.19 1.98 11.76 16.91 24.36 
Company Age Control 9.23 5.52 0 10.31 72 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variables 
Full 
Sample 
Committee 
Formed 
No Committee 
Variable Measure N  N % N % 
CEO Entrenchment Agency 78 61 78.21 17 21.79 
Big 4 Auditor Control 590 421 71.36 169 28.64 
Industry:       
- Energy Control 179 66 36.87 113 63.13 
- Telecom) Control 27 18 66.67 9 33.33 
- Utility Control 19 12 63.15 7 36.85 
- Materials Control 533 209 39.21 324 60.79 
- Industrial Control 159 124 77.99 35 22.01 
- Finance Control 182 91 50.00 91 50.00 
- Health Care Control 138 95 68.84 43 31.16 
- Consumer Discretionary Control 122 88 72.13 34 27.87 
- Information Control 96 65 67.71 31 32.29 
- Consumer Staples Control 42 28 66.67 26 33.33 
  1,497 796 53.17 701 46.83 
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Control variables included in the formation analysis are leverage, governance 
quality, company size, company age, the appointment of a big 4 auditor and industry 
effects. The average level of leverage was 7 per cent.  The mean governance quality 
score was 3.10. The average number of years companies had been listed was 9 years, 
and the mean natural log of company size is 17.19.  Of the 590 companies that had 
appointed a big 4 auditor, 421 (71 per cent) companies had also formed a remuneration 
committee.  Companies included in the energy sector had the lower instance of 
remuneration committee formation (37 per cent) versus the industrial sector which had 
the highest instance of companies forming a remuneration committee (78 per cent).  
Table 6-3 reports the descriptive statistics for the independent variables and 
control variables included in the sub-sample used in the analysis of committee 
composition (Model 2).  This sub-sample (n = 796) includes all companies that have 
formed a remuneration committee.  The same agency variables used in the formation 
analysis (Model 1) are also used in the committee composition analysis (Model 2).  On 
average insiders, including large individual shareholders, own 17 per cent of issued 
shares.  Institutional shareholding is 24 per cent.  Companies have an average of 1.8 
business and 1.8 geographical segments. The average market to book ratio is 2.5 and the 
average level of asset turnover is 69 per cent. Sixty-one companies evidenced a change 
in CEO.   
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Board size and board independence measure the board’s capacity to adopt the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  Boards have a mean size of 5.1 
directors.  The mean proportion of independent directors is 51 per cent.   
Control variables included in the composition analysis are the same variables as 
used in the committee formation analysis.  The mean level of leverage was 10 per cent. 
The average governance quality score is 3.51.  Company size as measured by the natural 
log of company assets is 17.94.  The average length of time listed on the ASX is 10 
years.  Of the 421 companies that had appointed a big 4 auditor, 220 (52 per cent) 
companies adopted all three membership guidelines of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations.  Companies included in the consumer staples (32 per cent) 
sector had the lowest instance of adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.  The finance sector (53 per cent) had the highest adoption rate. 
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TABLE 6-3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES FOR THE COMMITTEE COMPOSITION SUB 
SAMPLE  
Panel A: Continuous Variables  (N = 796) 
Variable Measure Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
Ownership Structure Agency 17.20 19.29 9.09 0 100 
Institutional Shareholding Agency 23.60 21.96 0.19 0 0.93 
Business Segments Agency 1.76 1.24 1.00 1 9 
Geo. Segments Agency 1.80 1.21 1.00 1 8 
Growth  Agency 2.51 3.00 1.54 -3.03 18.76 
Free Cash Flow Agency 12358569 9131822 -1275496 -221360444 471032404 
Asset Turnover Agency 0.69 0.88 0.414 -0.17 8.38 
Board Size Capacity 5.10 1.62 5.00 3 13 
Board Independence Capacity 0.51 0.24 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Leverage Control 0.10 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.66 
Governance Quality Control 3.51 1.15 4.00 0 5 
Company Size (Ln) Control 17.94 2.09 17.71 12.64 24.36 
Company Age Control 10.34 10.98 7.07 0 72 
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TABLE 6-3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – INDEPENDENT AND CONTROL VARIABLES FOR 
THE COMMITTEE COMPOSITION SUB-SAMPLE 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variables Sub-Sample ASX Adopter  Non Adopter  
Variable Measure N  N % N % 
CEO Entrenchment Agency 61 33 54.10 28 45.90 
Big 4 Auditor Control 421 220 52.26 201 47.74 
Industry:       
- Energy Control 66 30 45.45 36 54.55 
- Telecom Control 18 8 44.44 10 55.56 
- Utility Control 12 6 50.00 6 50.00 
- Materials Control 209 73 34.93 136 65.07 
- Industrial Control 124 60 48.39 64 51.61 
- Finance Control 91 48 52.75 43 47.25 
- Health Care Control 95 43 45.26 52 54.74 
- Consumer Discretionary  Control 88 38 43.18 50 56.82 
- Information Control 65 23 35.39 42 64.61 
- Consumer Staples Control 28 9 32.14 19 67.86 
  796 338 42.46 458 57.54 
 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 6-2 and Table 6-3 suggest that 
companies that form remuneration committees are on average, larger, more complex, 
have appointed a big 4 audit firm, have appointed a new CEO in the preceding two 
years, have higher levels of debt and have larger boards.  The descriptive statistics 
suggest that industry factors are also relevant to a company’s adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. 
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6.2.3 Tests of Normality 
Various statistical techniques, for example, regression analysis and independent t-
tests, require that continuous variables are normally distributed. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov statistic is used to assess normality of variable distribution.  Table 6-4 depicts 
the results of the normality tests. The results provide evidence that the continuous 
variables used in committee formation model (Model 1) and the committee composition 
model (Model 2) are not normally distributed. Logistic regression analysis is used to 
test Hypotheses 1 through 5.  Logistic regression is robust to non-normality in variables 
(Hair et al., 2010).  For other tests for which the assumption of normality is important, 
non-parametric techniques are also employed.   
TABLE 6-4: TESTS OF NORMALITY 
 Committee Formation Committee Composition 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic df Statistic df 
Ownership Structure 0.10 *** 1305 0.10 *** 796 
Institutional Shareholding 0.18 *** 1497 0.14 *** 796 
CEO Entrenchment  0.54 *** 1497 0.54 *** 796 
Business Segments 0.41 *** 1497 0.36 *** 796 
Geo. Segments 0.37 *** 1497 0.35 *** 796 
Growth  0.20 *** 1497 0.19 *** 796 
Free Cash Flow  0.34 *** 1481 0.32 *** 796 
Leverage 0.35 *** 1497 0.27 *** 796 
Asset Turnover  0.35 *** 1497 0.21 *** 796 
Board Size 0.20 *** 1497 0.20 *** 796 
Company Size 0.07 *** 1497 0.05 *** 796 
Governance Quality 0.13 *** 1497 0.17 *** 796 
Big 4 Auditor 0.40 *** 1497 0.36 *** 796 
Company Age 0.15 *** 1497 0.11 *** 796 
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TABLE 6-4: TESTS OF NORMALITY (CONT.) 
 Committee Formation Committee Composition 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
Variable Statistic  df Statistic  df 
Industry:       
- Energy 0.52 *** 1497 0.54 *** 796 
- Telecom 0.54 *** 1497 0.54 *** 796 
- Utility 0.53 *** 1497 0.54 *** 796 
- Materials 0.42 *** 1497 0.46 *** 796 
- Industrial 0.53 *** 1497 0.51 *** 796 
- Finance 0.52 *** 1497 0.53 *** 796 
Industry (Health Care) 0.53 *** 1497 0.52 *** 796 
Industry (Consumer Discretionary) 0.54 *** 1497 0.53 *** 796 
Industry (Information) 0.54 *** 1497 0.54 *** 796 
Industry (Consumer Staples) 0.54 *** 1497 0.54 *** 796 
*** denotes significance at p < 0.01 
 
6.2.4 Bivariate Correlations 
Table 6-5 reports the bivariate correlations between the independent variables 
for the full sample.  Spearman’s correlations are reported below the diagonal, with 
Pearson’s product-moment correlations reported above the diagonal.  As the data 
exhibit non-normal characteristics the discussion below reports the Spearman rank order 
correlations.  The highest correlation is between board size and company size at 0.54. 
The next highest correlation is between company age and institutional shareholding at 
0.53.  These correlations indicate that larger more established companies are more likely 
to have a greater number of directors and institutional shareholdings. This view is 
supported by the descriptive statistics for the ASX 300 sub-sample
3
, whereby the mean 
number of directors is 6.5 and the mean institutional shareholding is approximately 44 
per cent compared with 4.61 and 18 per cent respectively for the full sample. 
                                                 
3
  Untabulated 
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Table 6-6 reports the bivariate correlations between the independent variables 
for the committee composition sub-sample.  Spearman’s correlations are reported below 
the diagonal, with Pearson’s product moment correlations reported above the diagonal.  
The spearman correlations are discussed here.  Consistent with the full sample, the 
highest correlation is between board size and company size at 0.59. The next highest 
correlations are between company size and leverage at 0.54 and between governance 
quality and board independence at 0.52. The correlations indicate that companies 
adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations are more likely to be 
larger, have larger boards, greater proportion of independent directors, higher leverage 
and higher governance quality (measured by adoption of nominated ASX 
Recommendations). As these companies have a greater proportion of independent 
directors their ability to adopt the ASX Recommendations is greater when compared 
against the governance quality of companies evidencing less capacity.   
High correlations suggest problems with multicollinearity in the data (Pallant, 
2007; Hair et al., 2010).  In the full sample (Table 6-5), variables with correlations 
exceeding 0.40 are between governance quality and board size at 0.44, leverage and 
asset turnover at 0.47, company size and board size at 0.54, company size and big 4 
auditor at 0.42, company size and governance quality at 0.43, company size and 
leverage at 0.47, and company age and institutional shareholding at 0.53.  All other 
variables in the full sample report correlations below 0.40.  In the committee 
composition sub-sample (Table 6-6) correlations above 0.40 are between asset turnover 
and free cash flow at 0.41, governance quality and board independence at 0.52, 
company size and institutional shareholdings at 0.48, company size and board size at 
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0.59 and company size and big 4 auditor at 0.42 and company size and leverage at 0.54, 
and company age and institutional shareholding at 0.47.   
To examine whether the analyses are affected by multicollinearity, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) were determined for each variable.  The VIF for each variable is 
reported at Table 6-5 and Table 6-6.   The VIF values are below two for each variable 
except company size.  The VIF for company size is 2.50 in the full sample and 2.82 for 
the sub-sample of companies that formed a remuneration committee.  Overall, the VIF 
values are within the accepted guidelines of being less than 10, thereby indicating the 
efficacy of regression models are unlikely to be threatened by multicollinearity (Pallant, 
2007; Hair et al., 2010). 
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TABLE 6-5: CORRELATION MATRIX – FULL SAMPLE 
Model 1 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  VIF 
(1) Ownership Structure   -0.33 
** -0.14 
** -0.13 
** 0.02 -0.22 
** 0.05 -0.09 
** -0.20 
** -0.19 
** -0.22 
** -0.08 
** -0.32 
** -0.16 
** 1.21 
(2) Institutional Shareholding -0.27 
**   0.26 
** 0.24 
** 0.01  0.20 
** 0.05 
* 0.08 
** 0.34 
** 0.31 
** 0.30 
** 0.20 
** 0.50 
** 0.31 
** 1.48 
(3) Business Segments -0.05 0.25 
**  0.22 
** -0.11 
** 0.31 
** 0.10 
** 0.02 0.31 
** 0.19 
** 0.23 
** 0.29 
** 0.42 
** 0.19 
** 1.35 
(4) Geo.Segments -0.09 
** 0.22 
** 0.18 
**   -0.01  0.11 
** 0.03  0.04 0.20 
** 0.11 
** 0.13 
** 0.09 
** 0.23 
** 0.10 
** 1.11 
(5) Growth -0.02 0.02 -0.16 
** 0.07 
**   -0.03 -0.01  0.00 -0.02 -0.02  -0.04 -0.07 
** -0.18 
** -0.00 1.07 
(6) Free Cash Flow 0.09 
** 0.07 
** 0.24 
** 0.02  -0.12 
**  0.06 
* 0.06 
* 0.25 
** 0.16 
** 0.18 
** 0.14 
** 0.34 
** 0.14 
** 1.22 
(7) Asset Turnover 0.12 
** 0.24 
** 0.38 
** 0.12 
** -0.08 
** 0.36 
**   0.00 0.07 
** 0.06 
* 0.13 
** 0.09 
** 0.08 
** 0.05 1.03 
(8) CEO Entrenchment -0.06 
* 0.07 
* 0.05 0.05 
* 0.02  0.03 0.09 
**  0.11 
** 0.09 
** 0.12 
** 0.07 
* 0.09 
** -0.01 1.03 
(9) Board Size -0.08 
** 0.27 
** 0.22 
** 0.14 
** 0.03  0.06 
* 0.24 
** 0.13 
**   0.33 
** 0.43 
** 0.23 
** 0.61 
** 0.13 
** 1.72 
(10) Big 4 Auditor -0.16 
** 0.30 
** 0.18 
** 0.08 
** -0.01  0.08 
** 0.21 
** 0.09 
** 0.31 
**   0.32 
** 0.17 
** 0.43 
** 0.16 
** 1.28 
(11) Governance Quality -0.18 
** 0.26 
** 0.21 
** 0.11 
** -0.03  0.12 
** 0.30 
** 0.12 
** 0.44 
** 0.32 
**   0.24 
** 0.45 
** 0.07 1.41 
(12) Leverage 0.01 0.22 
** 0.38 
** 0.10 
** -0.12 
** 0.19 
** 0.47 
** 0.06 
* 0.29 
** 0.22 
** 0.27 
**  0.40 
** 0.11 
** 1.22 
(13) Company Size -0.20 
** 0.44 
** 0.35 
** 0.17 
** -0.16 
** 0.10 
** 0.36 
** 0.08 
** 0.54 
** 0.42 
** 0.43 
** 0.47 
**   0.24 
** 2.50 
(14) Company Age -0.19 
** 0.53 
** 0.25 
** 0.15 
** -0.01  0.11 
** 0.25 
** 0.02 0.11 
** 0.19 
** 0.10 
** 0.17 
** 0.27 
**   1.13 
The correlation presented for dichotomous variables is the eta statistic. The Spearman’s Correlation is reported below the diagonal and Pearson product-moment correlations 
above the diagonal. Industry correlations are not reported.  ** , * denotes 
 
significance at 1 and 5 per cent respectively.  
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TABLE 6-6: CORRELATION MATRIX – COMPOSITION SUB-SAMPLE 
Model 2 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)  VIF 
(1) Ownership Structure    -0.37 ** -0.20 ** -0.14 ** 0.02  -0.26 ** 0.11 ** -0.13 ** -0.25 ** -0.30 ** -0.24 ** -0.26 ** -0.16 ** -0.38 ** -0.22 ** 1.39 
(2) Institutional Shareholding -0.33 **   0.26 ** 0.25 ** 0.01  0.21 ** 0.06 0.06 0.32 ** 0.25 ** 0.30 ** 0.22 ** 0.18 ** 0.51 ** 0.30 ** 1.50 
(3) Business Segments -0.10 ** 0.24 **  0.25 ** -0.14 ** 0.34 ** 0.14 ** -0.01 0.31 ** 0.13 ** 0.21 ** 0.17 ** 0.27 ** 0.44 ** 0.17 ** 1.39 
(4) Geo.  Segments -0.10 * 0.23 ** 0.19 **  -0.01  0.20 ** 0.07 0.01 0.20 ** 0.11 ** 0.11 ** 0.12 ** 0.10 ** 0.24 ** 0.10 ** 1.13 
(5) Growth 0.00 0.02  -0.23 ** 0.04   -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 * -0.18 ** -0.01 1.09 
(6) Free Cash Flow 0.02 0.14 ** 0.27 ** 0.08 * -0.11 **  0.08 ** 0.05 0.26 ** 0.15 ** 0.16 ** 0.19 ** 0.15 ** 0.38 ** 0.15 ** 1.29 
(7) Asset Turnover 0.14 ** 0.15 ** 0.30 ** 0.12 ** -0.08 * 0.41 **  -0.02 0.11 ** 0.05 0.10 ** 0.14 ** 0.14 ** 0.15 ** 0.08 ** 1.11 
(8) CEO Entrenchment -0.09 * 0.06  0.01 0.00 -0.02  0.04 0.04  0.08 * 0.07 * 0.08 * 0.08 * 0.06 0.06 -0.02 1.03 
(9) Board Size -0.15 ** 0.30 ** 0.23 ** 0.13 ** 0.03  0.12 ** 0.17 ** 0.10 **  0.19 ** 0.33 ** 0.35 ** 0.23 ** 0.63 ** 0.15 ** 1.74 
(10) Board Independence -0.31 ** 0.25 ** 0.12 ** 0.12 ** 0.01  0.10 ** 0.07 0.07 * 0.18 **  0.20 ** 0.51 ** 0.13 ** 0.28 ** 0.11 ** 1.50 
(11) Big 4 Auditor  -0.23 ** 0.30 ** 0.20 ** 0.08 * -0.02  0.12 ** 0.15 ** 0.08 * 0.32 ** 0.20 **  0.24 ** 0.17 ** 0.42 ** 0.16 ** 1.26 
(12) Governance Quality -0.25 ** 0.23 ** 0.15 ** 0.10 ** -0.03  0.18 ** 0.17 ** 0.09 * 0.38 ** 0.52 ** 0.24 **  0.20 ** 0.39 ** 0.02 1.60 
(13) Leverage -0.09 * 0.21 ** 0.35 ** 0.12 ** -0.15 ** 0.22 ** 0.40 ** 0.05 0.28 ** 0.11 ** 0.21 ** 0.21 **  0.45 ** 0.07 1.26 
(14) Company Size -0.28 ** 0.48 ** 0.37 ** 0.17 ** -0.13 ** 0.24 ** 0.29 ** 0.05 0.59 ** 0.27 ** 0.42 ** 0.39 ** 0.54 **  0.25 ** 2.82 
(15) Company  Age -0.28 ** 0.47 ** 0.19 ** 0.14 ** -0.03  0.11 ** 0.16 ** 0.01 0.13 ** 0.14 ** 0.19 ** 0.03 0.12 ** 0.26 **   1.15 
The correlation presented for dichotomous variables is the eta statistic. The Spearman’s Correlation is reported below the diagonal and Pearson product-moment 
correlations above the diagonal. Industry correlations are not reported. ** , * denotes
  
significance at 1 and 5 per cent respectively.  
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6.2.5 Comparison of Groups 
6.2.5.1 Remuneration Committee Formation 
Independent t-tests were performed to compare the continuous independent 
variables for companies forming a remuneration committee and for those that had not 
formed a remuneration committee.  Table 6-7 presents the results of the t-tests.  
The results indicate that all continuous variables, excluding company growth 
have significant differences in the mean scores for the two groups.  The results suggest 
that company and shareholder characteristics are systematically different for companies 
that form a committee compared to those that do not. Consistent with hypotheses stated 
in Chapter 4, as agency costs increase, the demand for the formation of a remuneration 
committee increases.  Specifically as shareholder dispersion (H1a), institutional 
shareholding (H1c), company complexity (H3) and free cash flow (H4b) increase, the 
likelihood of formation of a remuneration committee also increases. Contrary to 
expectations, the results suggest that companies with higher insider shareholding (H1b) 
and growth opportunities (H4a) and lower asset turnover (H4c) are not more likely to 
form a remuneration committee.  Additionally as board size (H5a) increases companies 
are more likely to form a remuneration committee.  Other characteristics associated with 
committee formation are company size, leverage, and the length of time listed. These 
characteristics are incorporated into the study as control variables. 
As the sample exhibits non-normal distribution (see section 6.2.3 above) Mann-
Whitney U tests were performed to test the differences between the two groups.  
Consistent with the t-test results, non parametric tests revealed a significant difference 
for all continuous variables except ownership structure and company growth.     
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TABLE 6-7: t-TESTS AND MANN WHITNEY U TESTS - COMMITTEE FORMATION 
Variable Remuneration Committee No Remuneration Committee t-tests  
 
U tests 
 N Mean Std 
Deviation 
Median N Mean Std 
Deviation 
Median t U 
Ownership Structure (Ln) 719 2.23 1.57 2.60 586 2.44 1.33 2.68 2.61*** 199900 
Institutional Shareholding 796 23.59 21.96 18.53 701 11.89 14.48 7.58 -12.30*** 192000
*** 
Business Segments 796 1.76 1.24 1.00 701 1.31 0.77 1.00 -8.59*** 222214
*** 
Geo. Segments 796 1.80 1.21 1.00 701 1.51 0.98 1.00 -4.97*** 248150
*** 
Growth  796 2.51 3.00 1.54 701 2.72 3.51 1.59 1.21 278327 
Free Cash Flow 788 12,358,569 91,318,229 -1,275,496 693 -3,303,759 26,470,085 -2,045,455 -4.60*** 238573
*** 
Leverage 796 0.10 0.15 0.00 701 0.04 0.11 0.00 -8.76*** 199691
*** 
Asset Turnover  796 0.69 0.88 0.41 701 0.38 1.99 0.13 -3.98*** 166349
*** 
Board Size 796 5.10 1.62 3.00 701 4.06 1.08 2.00 -14.70*** 169479
*** 
Company Size (Ln) 796 17.94 2.09 17.71 701 16.33 1.42 16.21 -17.38*** 147140
*** 
Governance Quality 796 3.99 1.43 4.00 701 2.10 1.36 2.00 -26.10* 100833
*** 
Company Age  796 10.34 10.98 7.07 701 7.97 9.34 3.81 -4.51*** 232888
*** 
 ***,**,* denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively 
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6.2.5.2 Remuneration Committee Composition 
Independent t-tests were also performed to compare the continuous independent 
variables for companies that had adopted all three membership guidelines included in 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and those that had not. Companies 
included in the first group have formed a remuneration committee that has at least three 
members, the majority of which are independent and has an independent chairperson 
appointed.  Companies included in the second group have formed a remuneration 
committee, however, the committee has not adopted all three of the ASX remuneration 
committee composition recommendations.  This analysis uses the sub-sample of 
companies that have formed a remuneration committee. Of the 796 companies that had 
formed a remuneration committee, 338 companies had adopted all three of the 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations, 
the balance of 458 companies had not.  Table 6-8 presents the results of the t-tests. 
The results indicate that all continuous variables, except growth and company 
age, are significantly different between companies that have adopted the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations and those that have not adopted the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations.  Agency costs and board capacity are 
relevant to adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  As 
shareholding dispersion (H1a), institutional shareholding (H1c), company complexity 
(H3), growth opportunities (H4a), free cash flows (H4b), board size (H5a) and the 
proportion of independent directors (H5b) increase, the likelihood of companies 
adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations also increases. As insider 
shareholding increases (H1b), companies are less likely to adopt the ASX remuneration  
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TABLE 6-8: RESULTS OF INDEPENDENT t-TESTS AND MANN WHITNEY U TESTS - COMMITTEE COMPOSITION 
Variable ASX Adopter Remuneration Committee Non Adopter Remuneration Committee t-tests  
 
U tests 
 N Mean Std 
Deviation 
Median N Mean Std 
Deviation 
Median t U 
Ownership Structure (Ln) 310 1.85 1.80 2.21 409 2.51 1.31 2.74 5.43*** 50765
*** 
Institutional Shareholding 338 29.11 24.34 26.76 458 19.51 19.04 15.58 -6.02*** 61461
*** 
Business Segments 338 1.99 1.47 1.00 458 1.59 1.00 1.00 -4.28*** 68791
*** 
Geo. Segments 338 2.01 1.35 1.00 458 1.64 1.07 1.00 -4.19*** 66071
*** 
Growth 338 2.55 2.99 1.60 458 2.49 3.01 1.53 -0.28 75167 
Free Cash Flow   336 28,922,427 1.274E8 -472,724 452 45,612 4,621,803 -1,731,108 -3.97*** 67186
*** 
Leverage 338 0.13 0.16 0.04 458 0.08 0.13 0.00 -4.56*** 64455
*** 
Asset Turnover  338 0.79 0.99 0.53 458 0.62 0.78 0.32 -2.78*** 67192
*** 
Board Size 338 5.59 1.58 5.00 458 4.73 1.55 4.00 -7.687*** 51403
*** 
Board Independence  338 65.32 16.19 66.67 458 40.78 23.46 40.00 -17.45*** 30926
*** 
Company Size (Ln) 338 18.79 2.18 18.73 458 17.32 1.78 17.17 -10.15*** 45804
*** 
Governance Quality 338 4.12 0.93 4.00 458 3.06 1.09 3.00 -14.75*** 35685
*** 
Company Age  338 10.41 11.67 7.07 458 10.29 10.46 7.06 0.14 76399 
***,**,*  denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Sample size reduces due to missing data points with regarding to Ownership Structure and Free 
cash Flow variables. 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
152 
 
committee recommendations. This result is inconsistent with the expectation articulated 
in H1(b).    
Other company characteristics associated with adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations are company size, governance quality,  and 
leverage. 
As the sample exhibits non-normal distribution (see section 6.2.3 above) Mann-
Whitney U tests were performed to test the differences between the two groups.  
Consistent with the t-test results, non parametric tests revealed a significant difference 
for all continuous variables except company growth and the length of time listed on the 
ASX.  In all cases, companies adopting the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations evidenced higher concentration of the attributes of interest in this 
thesis, when compared to those companies with remuneration committees, which did 
not adopt the three membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations. These attributes are institutional shareholding, 
complexity, free cash flow, debt, asset turnover, board size and independence, company 
size and governance quality.  
6.3 MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSES  
Multivariate logistic regression was performed to analyse the relation between 
agency costs and board capacity on the decision to adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations (Models 1 and 2).  
Table 6-9 presents the results for the logistic multivariate regression analyses. 
Each model was run incorporating industry fixed effects.  The full sample is used in the 
committee formation model (Model 1).  The sample is reduced to 1,304 companies due 
to missing data. The committee formation model is statistically significant at p < 0.01 
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(Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 52 per cent).   The variables 
ownership structure (β = 0.17, Wald = 7.85) and institutional shareholdings (β = 0.01, 
Wald = 8.52) are statistically significant in the committee formation model at p < 0.01. 
The positive coefficients show that companies with greater levels of insider and 
institutional shareholding are more likely to have a remuneration committee.  
The results provide support for Hypotheses 1b and 1c.  Additionally CEO 
entrenchment (β = 0.64, Wald = 2.97) is marginally significant at p < 0.10. The positive 
coefficient means the company is more likely to form a remuneration committee if the 
CEO has changed. This result indicates that whilst CEO entrenchment is an indication 
of high agency costs, companies are less likely to address this issue by forming a 
remuneration committee. Consequently, whilst change in CEO is statistically 
significant, Hypothesis 2 is not supported. None of the other agency cost variables are 
statistically significant, therefore Hypothesis 1a (shareholder dispersion), Hypothesis 3 
(business and geographical segments), Hypotheses 4a (growth), 4b (free cash flow), and 
4c (asset turnover) are not supported. Hypothesis 5a (board size) is also not significant.  
Overall, the results of the committee formation model suggest that companies respond 
more to external agency demand influences related to shareholding characteristics rather 
than board capacity or other agency costs when deciding to voluntarily form a 
remuneration committee. 
Table 6-9 also presents the results for the logistic multivariate regression 
analysis for remuneration committee composition as presented in Model 2.  Companies 
that have formed a remuneration committee are used in Model 2. The sub-sample is 
reduced to 718 companies due to missing data. The committee composition model is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 
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47 per cent).  The variable board independence (β= 5.21, Wald = 71.75) is significant at 
p < 0.01 and the variable geographical segments (β = 0.15, Wald = 3.10) is marginally 
significant at p < 0.10.  The positive coefficients mean the remuneration committee is 
more likely to adopt all three membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations as the proportion of independent directors appointed to the 
board and the number of geographical segments increases.    
This provides support for Hypotheses 3 and 5b.  None of the other agency cost 
variables nor the remaining variable measuring board capacity are statistically 
significant.  Therefore in the remuneration committee composition model (Model 2), 
ownership structure reflecting Hypotheses 1a (shareholder dispersion), 1b (insider 
shareholdings), and 1c (institutional shareholding), Hypothesis 2 (CEO entrenchment), 
Hypotheses 4a (growth), 4b (free cash flow) and 4c (asset turnover), and Hypothesis 5a 
(board size) are not supported.  Overall, the results indicate that the availability of 
independent directors is the key predictor of the remuneration committee adopting all 
three guidelines included in ASX remuneration committee recommendations. This 
result is consistent with Cotter and Silvester (2003), although, this thesis uses a more 
comprehensive sample in the analysis. 
Several control variables are also statistically significant in relation to 
remuneration committee formation and composition.  In the committee formation model 
(Model 1) governance quality (β = 0.75, Wald = 166.24) and company size (β = 0.32, 
Wald = 25.24) are significant at p < 0.01, and big 4 auditor (β = 0.36, Wald = 4.87) is 
significant p < 0.05.  In the committee composition model (Model 2) governance quality 
(β = 0.44, Wald = 17.66) and company age (β = -0.03, Wald = 9.97) are significant at 
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TABLE 6-9: LOGISTIC REGRESSION RESULTS - FORMATION AND COMPOSITION 
 
 
Hypotheses 1 - 5 
Model 1 
(Formation): 
N=1,304 
Model 2 
(Composition): 
N = 718 
Variable Hypotheses 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient (Wald) Coefficient  (Wald) 
Agency Characteristics:     
Ownership Structure  H1a, b + 0.17  (7.85) 
***
 0.01  (0.02) 
Institutional Shareholding 1c + 0.01  (8.52) 
***
 0.00  (0.01) 
CEO Entrenchment
4
 H2 + 0.64  (2.97) 
*
 0.25  (0.48) 
Business Segments H3 + 0.01  (0.02) 0.03  (0.07) 
Geo. Segments H3 + 0.01  (0.02) 0.15  (3.10) 
*
 
Growth  H4a + 0.01  (0.37) 0.04  (1.43) 
Free Cash Flow H4b + 0.00  (0.07) 0.00  (0.08) 
Asset Turnover H4c - -0.02  (0.08) 0.14  (1.02) 
Board Capacity:      
Board Size H5a + 0.06  (0.75) 0.10  (1.59) 
Board Independence H5b + N/A 5.21  (71.75) 
***
 
Controls:     
Company Size (LN)  + 0.32  (25.24) 
***
 0.24  (8.14) 
**
 
Governance Quality
5
  + 0.75  (166.24) 
***
 0.44  (17.66) 
***
 
Leverage  +/- -0.00  (0.00)   -0.25  (0.12) 
Big 4 Auditor   + 0.36  (4.87) 
**
 0.15  (0.52) 
Company Age  +/- 0.00  (0.10) -0.03  (9.97) 
***
 
Nagelkerke R Square   0.52
***
 0.47
***
 
***,**,* denotes  significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. Industry effects not presented.   
Model 1 (Formation): 
Remuneration Committee = β0 + β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding + β3CEO Entrenchment 
+ β4Business Segments + β5Geo Segments +  β6Growth + β7Free Cash Flow +  β8Asset Turnover+ β9Board 
Size + β10Company Size +  β11Governance Quality + β12Leverage + β13Big4 Auditor + β14Company Age + 
β15Industry + ε 
 
Model 2(Composition)  
ASX Adopter = β0 + β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding+ β3CEO Entrenchment + β4Business 
Segments + β5Geo. Segments  β6Growth + β7Free Cash Flow + β8Asset Turnover +  β9Board Size +  β10Board 
Independence + β11Company Size +  β 12Governance Quality + β13Leverage + β14Big4 Auditor + β15Company 
Age +β16Industry +ε 
                                                 
4
   As a robustness test, Models 1 and 2 were re-performed with CEO tenure used as an alternative measure of 
CEO entrenchment. The amended models are robust to the inclusion of alternate measure of CEO 
entrenchment. 
5
  As a robustness test, Models 1 and 2 were re-performed with the individual governance components 
substituted for the governance quality composite score.  The amended models remained robust to the use of 
individual measures of company governance. 
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Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
Model 1 (Formation ): 
Remuneration Committee = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
formed a remuneration committee as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Model 2(Composition): 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent and Control Variables: 
Ownership Structure (shareholder dispersion and insider shareholding) = Natural log of the 
percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by directors, management, large individual 
shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related parties as at 30 June 2008. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Business Segments = Number of business segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Geo. Segments = Number of geographical segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity as at 30 June 2008, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Free Cash Flow = Difference between the gross cash flow from operations less gross 
investment as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Asset Turnover = Operating revenue divided by average total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the Board as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = Number of independent directors divided by the number of directors 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Governance Quality = Score determined by adding one point for adoption of nominated 
ASX governance recommendations as disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Leverage = Total assets divided by total liabilities as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per 
cent. 
Big 4 Auditor = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has engaged a Big 4 
audit firm as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Age = The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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p < 0.01 and company size (β = 0.24, Wald = 8.14) is significant at p < 0.05.  Leverage 
was not significant in either model, whilst big 4 auditor was statistically insignificant in 
the composition model, and company age was not significant in the committee 
formation model.  Governance quality has the highest explanatory power with regard to 
remuneration committee formation (Model 1) whilst the availability of independent 
directors has the highest explanatory power with regard to remuneration committee 
composition (Model 2).  
The results for the controls variables are consistent with expectations.  Larger 
and older companies have more capacity to implement governance best practice 
practices.  The adoption of other best practice governance practices, for example 
constituting other governance committees and appointing an independent chair, are a 
positive signal as to whether the company also chooses to adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations.   
Therefore in relation to the first research question (1a), the analysis has identified 
that responding to agency costs is significant to the decision to form a remuneration 
committee.  In particular, agency related demand associated with shareholder 
characteristics are associated with the formation of a remuneration committee.  Change 
in CEO is also marginally associated with the formation of a remuneration committee.   
Evidence is also presented regarding research question 1b.  Board capacity 
measured by the proportion of independent directors is highly significant to the decision 
to adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations regarding its composition. 
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6.4 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES 
6.4.1 Composition Analysis 
Further logistic regressions are performed to analyse the individual aspects of 
the ASX remuneration committee composition recommendations. A further three 
dichotomous variables were created to analyse committee composition in more detail. 
The first variable takes a value of one (1) if committee size is at least three directors, and 
zero (0) otherwise. The second variable committee independence is coded one (1) if the 
company has a majority of members that are independent directors, and zero (0) 
otherwise. The third variable indicates whether the committee has an independent chair, 
and is coded one (1) if the chairperson is an independent director and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent variables and control variables are the same as those used in Model 2.  
Table 6-10 reports the results. 
The model for the regression with the indicator for committee size is significant 
at p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 27 per cent).  Board 
size (β = 0.36, Wald = 19.68) is significant at p < 0.01. None of the agency cost 
variables (ownership structure, institutional shareholding, CEO entrenchment, business 
segments, geographical segments, growth, asset turnover or free cash flow) are 
statistically significant.  The other variable measuring board capacity, board 
independence, is not significant.  Of the control variables, governance quality (β = 0.39, 
Wald 16.53) and company size (β = 0.21, Wald = 6.94) are significant at p < 0.01.  The 
positive coefficient means that as board size, the number of ASX Recommendations 
adopted and company size increase, the likelihood the company also forms a 
remuneration committee with at least three members also increases. Leverage, big 4 
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auditor, and company age are statistically insignificant. Board capacity is the clear 
driver for the remuneration committee having at least three members. 
The model for adoption of the committee independence recommendation is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 
66 per cent). Board capacity and agency costs are significant.  Board capacity measured 
by board size (β = 0.29, Wald = 7.78) and board independence (β = 10.92,                
Wald = 132.83) are significant at p < 0.01.  Of the agency cost variables, business 
segments (β = 0.24, Wald = 3.61) and geographical segments (β = 0.18, Wald = 2.79) 
are marginally significant at p < 0.10.  The remaining agency cost variables, ownership 
structure, institutional shareholding, CEO entrenchment, growth, asset turnover and free 
cash flow are statistically insignificant.   
Of the control variables, company age (β = -0.02, Wald = 4.00) is significant at p 
< 0.05 and governance quality (β = 0.23, Wald = 3.48) is marginally significant at         
p < 0.10.  The positive coefficients mean as board size, the number of independent 
board members, and company complexity increase, the likelihood the company forms 
an independent remuneration committee also increases.  Additionally the results from 
the control variables indicate that as the number of ASX Recommendations adopted 
increases, the likelihood the company also forms an independent remuneration 
committee also increases. However, the negative coefficient for company age means 
that as the length of time listed on the ASX increases, the lower the likelihood that the 
company forms an independent remuneration committee. Overall, the analysis 
highlights that board capacity is the key determinant of committee independence. 
The final regression examines factors relevant to the appointment of an 
independent chair to the remuneration committee. The model is significant at p < 0.01 
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(Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 50 per cent).  Consistent with the 
preceding analysis, board independence representing the availability of independent 
directors (β = 5.95, Wald = 85.41) is significant at p < 0.01.  Whilst board size is 
marginally significant (β = -0.17, Wald = 3.40) at p < 0.10, the negative coefficient 
suggests that as board size increases the likelihood the company appoints an 
independent committee chairperson decreases.   
Of the agency variables, CEO entrenchment (β = 1.01, Wald = 4.04) is 
significant at p < 0.05. Recall that the CEO entrenchment variable measures whether a 
change in CEO has occurred. Therefore the positive coefficient suggests that where 
there has been a   change in CEO, the company is more likely to appoint an independent 
chair to the remuneration committee. The remaining agency cost variables, ownership 
structure, institutional shareholding, business segments, geographical segments, growth, 
asset turnover and free cash flows are not statistically significant. 
Governance quality (β =0.45, Wald = 14.77) is significant at p < 0.01.  The 
remaining control variables, big 4 auditor, leverage, company size and company age are 
not significant.  Overall, the results suggest that board capacity is the key driver to 
appointing an independent chairperson to the remuneration committee. 
The results presented in Table 6-10 suggest that the availability of independent 
board members is the key determinant of whether a company forms an independent 
remunerating committee and appoints an independent committee chairperson.  Board 
size is more relevant to the appointment of at least three members to the committee.  
The results support the findings presented in the main analysis at Section 6.3.  That is, 
board capacity is critical to adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations. 
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TABLE 6-10: DECOMPOSED REMUNERATION COMMITTEE COMPOSITION ANALYSIS 
Model 2 (Composition): Committee Size 
Committee 
Independence 
Independent Chair 
N = 718 Coefficient (Wald) Coefficient (Wald) Coefficient (Wald) 
 Ownership Structure  0.04  (0.26) 0.08  (0.75) -0.10  (1.26) 
Institutional Shareholding -0.00  (0.45) -0.01  (1.77) 0.01  (2.28) 
CEO Entrenchment -0.14  (0.17)   0.30  (0.38) 1.01  (4.04) 
** 
Business Segments 0.03  (0.07) 0.24  (3.61) * -0.18  (2.41) 
Geo. Segments 0.05  (0.36) 0.18  (2.79) * 0.17  (2.32) 
Growth  0.05  (2.05) -0.01  (0.03) 0.04  (1.05) 
Asset Turnover 0.11  (0.64) 0.26  (2.15) -0.05  (0.12) 
Free Cash Flow 0.00  (0.16) 0.00  (2.67) 0.00  (0.02) 
Board Size 0.36  (19.68) ***
 
0.29  (7.78) *** -0.17  (3.40) * 
Board Independence 0.25  (0.32) 10.92  (132.83) ***  5.95  (85.41) *** 
Company Size 0.21  (6.94) *** 0.09   (0.68) 0.13  (1.47) 
Governance  Quality 0.39  (16.53) *** 0.23  (3.48) * 0.45  (14.77) *** 
Leverage -0.32  (0.20) 0.38  (0.16) 1.33  (1.90) 
Big 4 Auditor -0.08  (0.16) 0.09  (0.12) -0.02  (0.01) 
Company Age -0.01  (1.85) -0.02  (4.00) ** -0.01  (1.37) 
 Nagelkerke R Square 0.27 
*** 0.66 *** 0.50 *** 
***,**,* denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented 
Model 2(Composition)  
DV1,2,3 = β0 +  β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding+ β3CEO Entrenchment + β4Business 
Segments + β5Geo. Segments  β6Growth + β7Free Cash Flow + β8Asset Turnover +  β9Board Size +  β10Board 
Independence + β11Company Size +  β 12Governance  Quality + β13Leverage + β14Big4 Auditor + β15Company 
Age +β16Industry +ε
 
 
Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
DV1= Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has formed a remuneration 
committee consisting of at least three members, and zero (0) otherwise. 
DV2= Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has formed a remuneration 
committee consisting of a majority of independent directors, and zero (0) otherwise. 
DV3= Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has appointed an independent 
chairperson to the remuneration committee, and zero (0) otherwise. 
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Independent and Control Variables: 
Ownership Structure (shareholder dispersion and insider shareholding) = Natural log of the 
percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by directors, management, large individual 
shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related parties as at 30 June 2008. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Business Segments = Number of business segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Geo. Segments = Number of geographical segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity as at 30 June 2008, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Free Cash Flow = Difference between the gross cash flow from operations less gross 
investment as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Asset Turnover = Operating revenue divided by average total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the Board as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = Number of independent directors divided by the number of directors 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Governance Quality = Score determined by adding one point for adoption of nominated 
ASX governance recommendations as disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Leverage = Total assets divided by total liabilities as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per 
cent. 
Big 4 Auditor = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has engaged a Big 4 
audit firm as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Age = The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
6.4.2 Company Size Analysis 
It is generally accepted in the literature that company size is a significant 
explanatory variable in governance and remuneration research.  The analysis in the 
preceding section also identified that company size is significant in Model 1 (committee 
formation), Model 2 (committee composition) and in the “committee size” analysis of 
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decomposed Model 2.  Therefore, further analysis based on company size is conducted. 
Three company size classifications are used.  Companies are categorized as large, small 
to mid-size or small, based on asset size.  Australian research has focused on samples 
based on the ASX 200, 300 and 500 indices.  Therefore, companies are classified as 
large if they are the largest 500 companies included in the sample. All companies 
excluding members of the ASX 300 Index are included in the small to mid-size 
company analysis. Finally, the small company analysis includes the five hundred 
smallest companies by asset size.  Due to the definitions of company size adopted, data 
sub-sets are overlapping and are treated as three distinct sub-samples in the analyses. 
Analysis of large companies is relevant not only from a research perspective, but 
also from a policy perspective. Revised ASX Listing Rule 12.8, effective from 1 July 
2011 requires companies included within the ASX 300 Index to form a remuneration 
committee consisting solely of non-executive directors. Whilst the revised listing rule 
does not mandate adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee size and independence, companies are still required on an if not, 
why not basis to explain non-adoption.  The review of the 2008 companies indicates that 
the majority of companies included in the sample analysed had adopted the 
requirements of the amended listing rule some three years prior to its implementation.  
Although the new rules only apply to the ASX 300, consideration as to whether this 
should be extended to the ASX 500 remains an open policy question.  Therefore the 
large company sub-sample focuses on the largest 500 companies included in the sample. 
A summary of the percentage of companies included in each category that had 
formed a remuneration committee and adopted the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations regarding composition is included at Table 6-11 below.  Adoption of 
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the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is highest for larger companies and 
decreases as company size decreases. The results suggest that larger companies either 
have greater capacity, higher demand for adoption of the ASX Recommendations, or 
both.  The Australian Productivity Commission (2010) and the ASX (2010) have 
identified that larger companies inherently have a greater capacity to facilitate adoption 
of the ASX Recommendations. Broadly, existing research in the US, UK and Australia 
has also identified that larger companies are associated with the presence of a 
remuneration committee. However, little examination of small and medium sized 
companies has been undertaken.   
TABLE 6-11: COMPANY SIZE SUMMARY- COMMITTEE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION 
Company Category Formation Composition 
Largest 500 Companies 79% 58% 
Small - Mid Size Companies 56% 36% 
Small Companies 33% 24% 
 
To facilitate comparison of data with the results from prior studies, a sub-sample 
of the largest five hundred companies included in the sample, measured by asset size is 
examined. This group had total assets ranging from $50,903,000 to $37,306,000,000. 
As depicted in Table 6-11 above, 79 per cent of these companies had formed a 
remuneration committee, 58 per cent of which satisfied all three membership guidelines 
included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.   
The results of the analyses of committee formation and composition are 
presented in Table 6-12.  Model 1 is discussed first and concerns remuneration 
committee formation.  The largest five hundred companies included in the full sample 
reduce to 471 companies due to missing data.   
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The large company committee formation model is significant at p < 0.01 
(Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 48 per cent).  The analysis of 
committee formation characteristics in the large company sample indicates agency costs 
related to ownership structure (β = 0.28, Wald = 7.81) and institutional shareholding    
(β = 0.02, Wald = 7.87) are significant at p < 0.01. The other agency costs, CEO 
entrenchment, business segments, geographical segments, growth, free cash flow and 
asset turnover are not statistically significant.  Board size (β = 0.20, Wald = 2.98) is 
marginally significant at p < 0.10.  The positive coefficients mean that as levels of 
insider shareholding and institutional shareholding increase, and as board size increases 
so does the likelihood of the company forming a remuneration committee. Of the 
control variables, governance quality (β = 0.77, Wald = 49.31) is significant at p < 0.01 
and company size (β = 0.40, Wald = 4.94) is significant at p < 0.05. The positive 
coefficients of the control variables mean that as adoption of the ASX 
Recommendations and company size increase, the likelihood the company forms a 
remuneration committee also increases.  Big 4 auditor, leverage and company age are 
statistically insignificant.  Therefore agency costs related to shareholder characteristics 
and board capacity are relevant to voluntary formation of a remuneration committee in 
large companies. 
In an earlier study of large Australian companies by Carson (2002), institutional 
shareholding and big six auditor were found to be relevant to the committee formation 
decision in large companies.  Whilst the results of the main analysis are consistent with 
Carson’s (2002) findings,  the presence of Big  4 auditor is not statistically significant in 
the large company sample. Carson (2002) also identified that board size, company size 
and leverage were associated with the presence of a remuneration committee.  The 
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results are largely consistent with Carson’s (2002) findings in this regard, however 
leverage is statistically insignificant. 
The small to mid-size company analysis includes all companies included in the full 
sample excluding members of the ASX 300 Index.  These companies had total assets 
ranging from $127,769 to $14,188,000,000.  The total number of companies included in 
this analysis was 1,343 companies, which reduced to 1,158 due to missing data.  The 
results of the committee formation analysis (Model 1) are presented in Table 6-12.  The 
model is significant at p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 46 
per cent).   
The agency variables ownership structure (β = 0.15, Wald = 5.60) and institutional 
shareholding (β = 0.01, Wald = 5.11) are significant at p < 0.05.  The other agency cost 
variables of CEO entrenchment, business segments, geographical segments, growth, 
free cash flow and asset turnover are not statistically significant.  The board capacity 
variable measured by board size is also not statistically significant. Control variables 
governance quality (β = 0.74, Wald = 156.31) and company size (β = 0.27,                
Wald = 16.42) are significant at p < 0.01, and the presence of a big 4 auditor (β = 0.32, 
Wald = 3.71) is significant at p < 0.10. Leverage and company age are statistically 
insignificant.   Consequently, after controlling for company characteristics, shareholder 
characteristics are incrementally relevant to the decision to form a remuneration 
committee. This result is consistent with the results achieved for the full sample as 
reported in section 6.3. 
The small company sample included the smallest 500 companies, based on total 
assets, was extracted from the full sample. The small companies group reported total 
assets ranging from $127,769 to $10,179,346. This sample reduced to 392 due to 
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missing data. Approximately one third of this sample (130 companies) had formed a 
remuneration committee.  The small company committee formation model (Model 1) is 
significant at p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 38 per cent).  
Asset turnover (β = -0.37, Wald = 3.33) is the only agency variable of interest that is 
significant at p < 0.10. Ownership structure, institutional shareholding, CEO 
entrenchment, business segments, geographical segments, growth and free cash flow are 
statistically insignificant.  Board capacity measured as board size, is also statistically 
insignificant in explaining the presence of a remuneration committee.  Control variables 
that are significant are governance quality (β = 0.81, Wald = 58.27) at p < 0.01, and 
company size (β = 0.52, Wald = 6.27) and company age (β = -0.00, Wald = 0.02) at      
p < 0.05.  Big 4 auditor and leverage are statistically insignificant. The results indicate 
that as overall agency costs increase, the company is more likely to form a remuneration 
committee.   
Model 2 relates to remuneration committee composition and the results of the 
analysis (refer to Table 6-12) follow.  Of the largest 500 companies, 392 companies had 
formed a remuneration committee, this sub-sample reduced to 368 companies due to 
missing data.   The large company committee composition model is significant at          
p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 45 per cent).  Board 
capacity represented by board independence (β = 5.71, Wald = 39.97) is significant at    
p < 0.01. The positive coefficient indicates that as the number of independent directors 
appointed to the board increases, the likelihood the company adopts the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations also increases.  The agency cost variables, 
ownership structure, institutional shareholding, CEO entrenchment, business segments, 
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geographical segments, growth, free cash flow and asset turnover are not significant. 
The second measure of board capacity, board size, is also statistically insignificant.   
Control variables, governance quality (β = 0.45, Wald = 9.13) and company age 
(β = -0.03, Wald = 8.29) are significant at p < 0.01, and company size (β = 0.30,      
Wald = 3.56) is significant at p < 0.10.  The positive coefficients indicate that as the 
adoption of other recommendations included in the ASX Recommendations and 
company size increase, the likelihood the company adopts all three guidelines included 
in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations also increases for large 
companies.  The negative coefficient suggests that as the length of time listed on the 
ASX increases, large companies are less likely to adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee composition guidelines. The remaining control variables, big 4 auditor and 
leverage are not statistically significant.  The association between board independence 
and committee independence of large companies is consistent with the results of the 
main analysis and with the results of extant research conducted in the US (Kesner, 
1988; Vafeas, 2000) and in Australia (Cotter and Silvester, 2003).   
Overall the results suggest that in large companies the availability of 
independent directors is the clear driver of the composition of the committee satisfying 
all three membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.   
Approximately 56 per cent (648 companies) of small to mid-size company group 
had formed a remuneration committee.  In the remuneration committee composition 
regression, the sub sample of 648 small to mid-size companies reduced to 576 due to 
missing data. Of the 576 companies, 36 per cent (210 companies) (see Table 6-11) 
adopted all three membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee 
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recommendations. The remaining 366 companies had formed a remuneration 
committee, the constitution of which was inconsistent with the three membership 
guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.   
The composition regression (Model 2) for small to mid-size companies is 
significant at p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 68 per cent).  
Of the variables of interest, board capacity measured by board size (β = 0.27,           
Wald = 10.32) and board independence (β = 5.17, Wald = 61.67) are significant at         
p < 0.01. The positive coefficients indicate that as board size and the number of 
independent directors appointed to the board increases in small mid-sized companies, 
the likelihood that the company adopts all three membership guidelines included in the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations increases. All agency variables, 
ownership structure, institutional shareholding, CEO entrenchment, business segments, 
geographical segments, growth, free cash flow and asset turnover are statistically 
insignificant.  Control variables governance quality (β = 0.38, Wald = 11.22) and 
company age (β = -0.03, Wald = 6.28) are statistically significant at p < 0.01. Big 4 
auditor, leverage and company size are statistically insignificant.    
As with other analysis investigating committee composition, board independence 
is the key explanatory variable. This result is also consistent with the analysis included 
at Section 6.3. 
Of the 130 small companies that had formed a remuneration committee, 24 per 
cent (31 companies) (see Table 6-11) adopted the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations regarding committee composition. The remaining 99 companies had 
formed a remuneration committee, the constitution of which was not consistent with the 
three membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee 
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recommendations.  The small company committee composition model (Model 2) is 
significant at p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R Square value for the model is 59 per cent).   
As reported in Table 6-12, of the agency variables, the only significant variable 
is ownership structure (β = -0.50, Wald = 3.58) at p = < 0.10.  This indicates that the 
higher the insider shareholding, the less likely small companies form a remuneration 
committee satisfying all three membership guidelines included in the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. Institutional shareholding, CEO 
entrenchment, business segments, geographical segments, growth, free cash flow and 
asset turnover are statistically insignificant. 
Board capacity, being board size (β = 1.15, Wald = 7.44) and board 
independence (β = 9.25, Wald = 15.48) are significant at p < 0.01.  As with the main 
analysis investigating committee composition, board independence is the key 
explanatory variable for small companies.  None of the control variables, big 4 auditor, 
leverage, governance quality, company size and company age are statistically 
significant.  Consequently as board size and the number of independent board members 
increase in small companies, so does the likelihood the remuneration committee adopts 
all three membership guidelines detailed in the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.   
In summary, the company size analysis suggests that determinants of adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations vary depending on company size. 
Governance quality, that is adoption of other recommendations included in the ASX 
Recommendations, is the largest signal as to whether companies voluntarily form a 
remuneration committee. This held true regardless of company size. Company size is 
the next highest contributor with regard to remuneration committee formation for small 
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and small to mid-size companies, however not for large companies. Board capacity, in 
particular board size, is the only measure of board capacity that is statistically 
significant in the committee formation analysis, and is only statistically significant in 
large companies.  Board capacity is not statistically significant in small and small to 
mid-size companies with regard to the decision to form a remuneration committee. 
Agency costs related to insider shareholding and institutional shareholding are 
statistically significant for large and mid-size companies. These characteristics are 
insignificant for the five hundred smallest listed companies. With regard to the 
composition of remuneration committees, the availability of independent directors 
represents the largest contribution to full adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations, regardless of company size.  
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TABLE 6-12: COMPANY SIZE FORMATION AND COMPOSITION ANALYSIS 
 Model 1 (Formation): Model 2 (Composition): 
 Large (N= 471) Small-Mid (N= 1,158) Small  (N = 392) Large (N = 368) Small-Mid (N = 576) Small  (N = 130) 
Variable Coefficient (Wald) Coefficient (Wald) Coefficient (Wald) Coefficient (Wald) Coefficient (Wald) Coefficient (Wald) 
Ownership Structure  0.28  (7.81)  
***
 0.15  (5.60)  
**
 0.02  (0.02)  0.00  (0.00) 0.07  (0.57) -0.50  (3.58) 
* 
Institutional Shareholding 0.02  (7.87)  
***
 0.01  (5.11) 
 
 
**
 0.00  (0.05)  -0.00  (0.09) -0.00  (0.07) 0.01  (0.27) 
CEO Entrenchment 1.64  (2.13) 0.50  (1.77) 0.34  (0.30)  -0.54  (1.07) 0.20  (0.41) 0.80  (0.69) 
Business  Segments 0.01  (0.00) 0.02  (0.05) -0.11  (0.24)  0.06  (0.28) 0.11  (0.99) 0.55  (1.05) 
Geo. Segments -0.00  (0.00) 0.02  (0.05) 0.01  (0.00)  0.13  (1.41) 0.04  (1.16) 0.23  (0.46) 
Growth  0.02  (0.12) 0.01  (0.28) 0.04  (1.98)  -0.00  (0.00) 0.04  (1.16) 0.04  (0.38) 
Free Cash flow 0.00  (0.01) 0.00  (1.41) 0.00  (1.66)  0.00  (0.04) 0.00  (0.03) 0.00  (0.01) 
Asset Turnover -0.10  (0.30) -0.05  (0.21) -0.37  (3.33) 
*
 0.06  (0.10) 0.14  (1.08) 0.48  (1.56) 
Board Size 0.20  (2.98)  
*
 0.06 (0.77) -0.23  (2.30)  0.03  (0.11) 0.27  (10.32)
  
 
***
 1.15  (7.44) 
*** 
Board Independence N/A N/A N/A  5.71 (39.97)  
***
 5.17  (61.67)
 
 
***
 9.25  (15.48) 
*** 
Company Size  0.40 (4.94) 
**
 0.27 (16.42) 
***
 0.52  (6.27) 
**
 0.30  (3.56)  
*
 0.04  (1.11) 0.34  (0.55) 
Governance Quality 0.77 (49.31)
 
 
***
 0.74  (156.31)
 
 
***
 0.81  (58.27) 
***
 0.45 (9.13)  
***
 0.38  (11.22)  
***
 0.13  (0.19) 
Leverage -0.33  (0.13) -0.13 (0.04) 0.95  (0.58)  -0.56  (0.38) -0.02  (0.00) 1.85  (0.74) 
Big 4 Auditor  0.24  (0.61) 0.32  (3.71) 
*
 -0.06  (0.03)  0.42  (1.20) 0.23    (1.13) 0.27  (0.15) 
Company Age 0.00  (0.05) 0.02  (0.08)  -0.00  (0.02) 
**
 -0.03  (8.29)  
***
 -0.03  (6.28)   
***
 -0.05  (1.04) 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.48 
***
 0.46 
*** 
0.38 
*** 
0.45 
*** 
0.68 
*** 
0.59 *** 
***,**,*  denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. Industry effects not reported.   
Model 1 (Formation): Remuneration Committee = β0 + β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding + β3CEO Entrenchment + β4Business Segments + β5Geo. Segments +  
β6Growth + β7Free Cash Flow +  β8Asset Turnover+ β9Board Size + β10Company Size +  β11Governance  Quality + β12Leverage + β13Big4 Auditor + β14Company Age + β15Industry + ε 
Model 2(Composition)   ASX Adopter = β0 +  β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding+ β3CEO Entrenchment + β4Business Segments + β5Geo. Segments  β6Growth + β7Free 
Cash Flow + β8Asset Turnover +  β9Board Size +  β10Board Independence + β11Company Size +  β 12Governance Quality + β13Leverage + β14Big4 Auditor + β15Company Age +β16Industry 
+ε 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
173 
 
Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
Model 1 (Formation ): 
Remuneration Committee = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
formed a remuneration committee as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Model 2(Composition): 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent and Control Variables: 
Ownership Structure (shareholder dispersion and insider shareholding) = Natural log of the 
percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by directors, management, large individual 
shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related parties as at 30 June 2008. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Business Segments = Number of business segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Geo. Segments = Number of geographical segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity as at 30 June 2008, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Free Cash Flow = Difference between the gross cash flow from operations less gross 
investment as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Asset Turnover = Operating revenue divided by average total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the Board as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = Number of independent directors divided by the number of directors 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Governance Quality = Score determined by adding one point for adoption of nominated 
ASX governance recommendations as disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Leverage = Total assets divided by total liabilities as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per 
cent. 
Big 4 Auditor = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has engaged a Big 4 
audit firm as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Age = The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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6.4.3 Shareholder Dissent  
Recall that under the Corporations Act (Cth) (2001), shareholders of Australian 
listed companies vote on the remuneration arrangements of key executive disclosed in 
the annual remuneration report.  Consequently, the analysis is extended using the 
shareholder vote as an extra control in the formation and composition models.  The 
variable, Shareholder Dissent, measured as the proportion of votes cast against the 
remuneration report, is introduced to determine if shareholder dissatisfaction of 
remuneration arrangements influences the formation and / or composition of the 
remuneration committee.  Data for the 2008 shareholder vote is used in the analysis as a 
measure of shareholder dissatisfaction with company remuneration policy.  Data 
limitations did not allow the use of the results of the shareholder non-binding vote in the 
prior period, however, the dissent vote in 2008 is indicative of cumulative 
dissatisfaction with remuneration arrangements.   
Refer to Table 6-13, the committee formation model (amended Model 1) is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R- squared value for the model is 
53 per cent).  Although the full sample is used in the analysis, the sample reduces to 
1206 companies due to missing data.  The variables of interest that are significant in the 
main model remained significant in the amended committee formation model, that is 
agency variables related to shareholder characteristics, in particular ownership structure 
(β = 0.22, Wald = 11.85), institutional shareholding (β = 0.02, Wald = 13.35) are 
significant at p < 0.01 and CEO entrenchment (β = 0.67, Wald = 3.03) is marginally 
significant at p < 0.10.  Board capacity, measured by board size, remained statistically 
insignificant.  Control variables related to governance quality (β = 0.75, Wald = 150.67) 
and company size (β = 0.34, Wald = 26.63) are significant at p < 0.01 and big 4 auditor 
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(β = 0.36, Wald = 4.29) is significant at p < 0.05.  The new control variable measuring 
shareholder dissent on the 2008 remuneration report (β = -0.65, Wald = 4.84) is 
significant at p < 0.05, however the coefficient is negative indicating that as shareholder 
dissent on the annual remuneration report increases companies are less likely to respond 
to the shareholder dissent by forming a remuneration committee.   
The amended committee composition model (amended Model 2) is statistically 
significant at p = < 0.01 (Nagelkerke pseudo R square value for the model is 47 per 
cent).  Although the sub-sample reflects all companies that have formed a remuneration 
committee, the sample reduces to 662 companies due to missing data.  The variables of 
interest that were significant in the main model remained significant.  Board 
independence (β = 5.25, Wald = 65.29) is significant at p < 0.01, indicating that the 
decision to adopt the ASX remuneration committee composition recommendations is 
still driven by the availability of independent directors. The agency cost variable 
geographical segments (β = 0.18, Wald = 3.96) is significant at p < 0.05.  Control 
variables related to governance quality (β = 0.44, Wald = 15.90), company size            
(β = 0.27, Wald = 8.85) and company age (β = -0.03, Wald = 8.70) are significant at      
p < 0.01. The new control variable measuring shareholder dissent on the 2008 annual 
remuneration report is statistically insignificant in the composition model.   
Therefore as companies are unlikely to respond to shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report by subsequently forming a remuneration committee, for those 
companies that have formed a remuneration committee, shareholder dissent on the 
annual remuneration report is unlikely to result in adoption of all three membership 
guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  
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Overall, the analysis indicates that the results presented in the main analysis at 
Section 6.3 are robust to controlling for the response by companies following 
shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report. 
TABLE 6-13: LOGISTIC REGRESSION – SHAREHOLDER DISSENT 
 Amended Model 1 
(Formation): 
N= 1206 
Amended Model 2 
(Composition): 
N = 662 
Variable Coefficient  (Wald)  Coefficient (Wald)  
Ownership Structure  0.22  (11.85) *** -0.01  (0.01) 
Institutional Shareholding 0.02  (13.35) *** 0.00  (0.00) 
CEO Entrenchment 0.67  (3.03) * 0.33  (0.74) 
Business Segments 0.03  (0.11) -0.00  (0.00) 
Geo. Segments 0.01  (0.04) 0.18  (3.96) ** 
Growth  0.02  (0.52) 0.05  (2.31) 
Free Cash Flows 0.00  (0.01) 0.00  (0.04) 
Asset Turnover 0.06  (0.22) 0.08  (0.31) 
Board Size 0.06  (0.72) 0.12  (2.21) 
Board Independence N/A 5.25  (65.29) *** 
Company Size  0.34  (26.63) *** 0.27  (8.85) *** 
Governance Quality 0.75  (150.67) *** 0.44  (15.90) *** 
Leverage -0.21  (0.10) -0.73  (0.86) 
Big 4 Auditor  0.36  (4.29) ** 0.02  (0.01) 
Company Age 0.01  (0.30) -0.03  (8.70) *** 
Shareholder Dissentt-1 -0.65  (4.84) 
** -0.17  (0.13) 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.53 *** 0.47 *** 
***,**,* denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
Amended Model 1 (Formation): Remuneration Committee = β0 + β1Ownership Structure + 
β2Institutional Shareholding + β3CEO Entrenchment + β4Business Segments + β5Geo. Segments +  
β6Growth + β7Free Cash Flow + β8Asset Turnover+ β9Board Size + β10Company Size +  
β11Governance Quality + β12Leverage + β13Big4 Auditor + β14Company Age + β15Shareholder 
Dissent + β16Industry + ε 
Amended Model 2(Composition)   ASX Adopter = β0 +  β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional 
Shareholding+ β3CEO Entrenchment + β4Business Segments + β5Geo. Segments  β6Growth + β7Free 
Cash Flow + β8Asset Turnover +  β9Board Size +  β10Board Independence + β11Company Size +  β 
12Governance  Quality + β13Leverage + β14Big4 Auditor + β15Company Age + β16Shareholder 
Dissent + β17Industry +ε 
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Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
Amended Model 1 (Formation ): 
Remuneration Committee = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
formed a remuneration committee as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Amended Model 2(Composition): 
ASX Adopter  = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent and Control Variables: 
Ownership Structure (shareholder dispersion and insider shareholding) = Natural log of the 
percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by directors, management, large individual 
shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related parties as at 30 June 2008. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
Business Segments = Number of business segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Geo. Segments = Number of geographical segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity as at 30 June 2008, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Free Cash Flow = Difference between the gross cash flow from operations less gross 
investment as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Asset Turnover = Operating revenue divided by average total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the Board as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = Number of independent directors divided by the number of directors 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Governance Quality = Score determined by adding one point for adoption of nominated 
ASX governance recommendations as disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Leverage = Total assets divided by total liabilities as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per 
cent. 
Big 4 Auditor = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has engaged a Big 4 
audit firm as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Age = The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
Shareholder Dissent = Total no votes cast / (no votes cast + yes votes cast) on the annual 
remuneration report. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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6.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
6.5.1 Endogeneity 
The decision to adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations may not 
be exogenous.  Adoption of the ASX Recommendations can influence board size and 
independence (Rainsbury et al., 2008). To determine the influence of endogeneity on 
the results a two stage regression is employed following the approach used by 
Rainsbury et al. (2008), Frankel, Kothari and Weber (2006) and Sun and Cahan (2009, 
2012). 
The variables included in the first stage ordinary least squares regression are those 
variables identified in extant research as being associated with the demand for an 
independent remuneration committee (Linck et al., 2008; Rainsbury et al., 2008; Sun 
and Cahan, 2009, 2012).  These variables relate to shareholding characteristics, in 
particular, insider shareholding and institutional shareholding, CEO influence, growth 
opportunities, company complexity, company age and company size.  
New variables Ownership Rank and Board Rank are included in the models as 
endogeneity is likely to affect the variation in Ownership Structure, in particular insider 
shareholding, and Board Size as opposed to the level of ownership structure and board 
size (Sun and Cahan, 2009, 2012). Ownership Rank and Board Rank are included in the 
first stage ordinary least squares regression model as extant research suggests that 
portfolio rank can be used as an instrumental variable (Frankel et al., 2006). 
Consequently, Ownership Rank and Board Rank are coded zero (0), one (1) or two (2) 
based on the portfolio rank of the variables Ownership Structure and Board Size.  The 
variables Ownership Structure and Board Size are sorted in order of their size and the 
portfolio rank is determined by size. 
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The first stage ordinary least squares regression models are presented below. 
First Stage Regression Model: 
Ownership Structure = β0 + β1Institutional Shareholding + B2Growth + 
β3Company Size + β4Ownership Rank + ε 
 
 
Board Size = β0 +  β1Institutional Shareholding +  β2CEO Entrenchment + 
β3Ownership Structure + β4Company Size + B5Growth + 
B6Complexity+  B7Company Age +  β8Board Rank + ε 
 
 
Where: 
Ownership Rank = portfolio rank based Insider, ranks are coded zero (0), one (1) or two (2). 
Board Rank = portfolio rank based Board Size, ranks are coded zero (0), one (1) or two (2). 
Ownership Structure = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties as at 30 June 2008. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Complexity = Number of business segments in which the company operates, as disclosed in 
the 2008 financial report & the number of geographical segments in which the company 
operates, as disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity as at 30 June 2008, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Age = The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
 
Models 1 and 2 outlined in the main analysis at section 6.3 are used in the second 
stage regression analyses, however the variable Ownership Structure and Board Size  
included in the second stage ordinary least squares regressions is the fitted value derived 
from the first stage ordinary least squares regressions. Table 6-14 presents the results of 
the second stage regression.  
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
180 
 
Overall the results are consistent with those reported in the main analysis. The 
committee formation (Model 1) remained statistically significant at p < 0.01 
(Nagelkerke pseudo R Square for the model is 52 per cent).  Shareholder characteristics 
related to ownership structure (β = 0.19, t = 8.27) and institutional shareholding            
(β = 0.01, t = 9.05) remaining significant at p < 0.01, and CEO entrenchment (β = 0.64, 
t = 2.97) remains significant at p < 0.10.  Agency costs related to company complexity, 
growth and other company characteristics remain statistically insignificant.  Board 
capacity represented by board size also remains statistically insignificant. The results of 
the control variables remain consistent with the results achieved in the main analysis.  
The results confirm the results reported in the main analysis, that is, companies respond 
to agency related shareholder characteristics as opposed to other agency costs or board 
capacity in the voluntary formation of a remuneration committee. 
The composition model (Model 2) remained statistically significant at p < 0.01 
(Nagelkerke pseudo R Square for the model is 56 per cent).  Of the variables of primary 
interest, the availability of independent directors (β = 3.83, t = 55.79) remains the key 
predictor of adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and is 
significant at p < 0.01. The other measure of board capacity, board size (β = 0.39,            
t = 10.62) becomes statistically significant at p < 0.01.  The results of the control 
variables remain consistent with the main analysis.  The results of the composition 
model provide further support for the conclusion drawn in the main analysis reported at 
section 6.3.  Board capacity is the key determinant of adoption of all three membership 
guidelines outlined in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.   
Overall the results are consistent the main analysis discussed at section 6.3.  
Agency costs are incrementally relevant to the formation decision, whereas board 
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capacity is incrementally relevant to full adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations, after controlling for other company characteristics related to 
company size governance quality, auditor appointment and leverage. 
TABLE 6-14: TWO STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS - FORMATION AND COMPOSITION 
Second Stage Regression Results Model 1 
(Formation): 
N=1,304 
Model 2 
(Composition):  
N = 718 
Variable Hypotheses Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Coefficient  
(t-statistic) 
Agency Characteristics:       
Ownership Structure  H1a, b + 0.19 (8.27) *** 0.12  (0.13)  
Institutional Shareholding 1c + 0.01 (9.05) *** 0.01  (1.84)  
CEO Entrenchment H2 + 0.64  (2.97) * 0.38  (1.25)  
Business Segments H3 + 0.01  (0.02) 0.00 (0.00)  
Geo. Segments H3 + 0.01  (0.03) 0.08  (1.17)  
Growth  H4a + 0.02  (0.48) 0.04  (1.90)  
Free Cash flows H4b + 0.00  (0.17) 0.00 (0.04)  
Asset Turnover H4c - -0.02  (0.12) 0.01  (0.04)  
Board Capacity:        
Board Size H5a + 0.01  (0.03)  0.39  (10.62) *** 
Board Independence H5b + N/A  3.83  (55.79) *** 
Controls:     
Company Size  0.34  (25.27) *** 0.25  (8.88) *** 
Governance Quality 0.76  (168.53) *** 0.82  (70.15) *** 
Leverage -0.04  (0.00) -0.14   (0.04) 
Big 4 Auditor  0.36  (4.78) ** 0.26  (1.80)  
Company Age 0.00  (0.07)  -0.02  (6.25) *** 
Nagelkerke R Square 0.52 *** 0.56 *** 
***,**,*  denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
Model 1 (Formation): Remuneration Committee = β0 + β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding + 
β3CEO Entrenchment + β4Business Segments + β5Geo. Segments +  β6Growth + β7Free Cash Flow +  β8Asset 
Turnover+ β9Board Size + β10Company Size +  β11Governance  Quality + β12Leverage + β13Big4 Auditor + 
β14Company Age + β15Industry + ε 
Model 2(Composition)   ASX Adopter = β0 +  β1Ownership Structure + β2Institutional Shareholding+ β3CEO 
Entrenchment + β4Business Segments + β5Geo. Segments  β6Growth + β7Free Cash Flow + β8Asset Turnover +  
β9Board Size +  β10Board Independence + β11Company Size +  β 12Governance Quality + β13Leverage + 
β14Big4 Auditor + β15Company Age +β16Industry +ε 
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Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
Model 1 (Formation ): 
Remuneration Committee = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
formed a remuneration committee as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Model 2(Composition): 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent and Control Variables: 
Ownership Structure (shareholder dispersion and insider shareholding) = Fitted Value of the 
Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by directors, management, 
large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related parties as at 30 June 
2008 derived from the first stage OLS model. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
Business Segments = Number of business segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Geo. Segments = Number of geographical segments in which the company operates, as 
disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity as at 30 June 2008, 
winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Free Cash Flow = Difference between the gross cash flow from operations less gross 
investment as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Asset Turnover = Operating revenue divided by average total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = The fitted value of the Number of directors appointed to the Board as at 30 
June 2008 derived from the first stage OLS model. 
Board Independence = Number of independent directors divided by the number of directors 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets, as at 30 June 2008. 
Governance Quality = Score determined by adding one point for adoption of nominated 
ASX governance recommendations as disclosed in the 2008 financial report. 
Leverage = Total assets divided by total liabilities as at 30 June 2008, winsorised at 1 per 
cent. 
Big 4 Auditor = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has engaged a Big 4 
audit firm as at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Age = The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
183 
 
6.6 SUMMARY 
The results presented in this chapter provide detailed analysis regarding the first 
research question.  Research question 1a is concerned with why companies form a 
remuneration committee. Research question 1b focuses on committee composition. In 
particular, what factors determine adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations regarding its composition.  The first five hypotheses specifically 
address research questions 1a and 1b, and are analysed in this chapter. 
This chapter presented the results of logistic regression analyses examining the 
relationship between agency costs, board capacity and the voluntary adoption of ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. The sample used in the analysis includes a 
diverse range of company sizes and ages.  The results indicate that agency costs and 
board capacity are incrementally relevant to the decision to adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations, after controlling for company size, governance quality, 
leverage, company age and the presence of a big four auditor.  Particularly, 
remuneration committee existence is significantly associated with insider share 
ownership, institutional shareholding and marginally related to a change in CEO.  
Composition of the committee is significantly explained by the availability of 
independent directors and marginally by complexity measured by geographical 
segments.   
Agency costs associated with insider shareholding and institutional shareholding 
are significant determinants of remuneration committee existence in all bar the smallest 
companies.  In small companies, addressing overall agency costs is marginally relevant 
to remuneration committee existence.  Company size is a significant determinant of 
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remuneration committee existence in small to medium sized companies, and not for 
large companies.  
As expected, adoption of all three membership guidelines outlined in the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is dependent on the availability of 
independent board members, regardless of company size.  In small and medium sized 
companies, board size is also a significant factor to full adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations.  
Consistent with expectations the higher the governance quality of the company, 
the more likely the company adopts the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.  This holds true regardless of company size.  The results provide 
further empirical evidence that larger companies have greater capacity and resources to 
facilitate adoption of the ASX Recommendations, therefore the compliance burden is 
greater for smaller companies with less capacity to adopt the ASX Recommendations. 
A summary of the key findings is included at Appendix 3.  The following chapter 
presents the analysis related to remuneration committee efficacy.     
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7. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS - COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The second part of this thesis examines the influence that adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations has on executive remuneration practice.    
This chapter presents the analysis related to Hypotheses 6 and 7.  Hypothesis 6 
addresses the second research question which is concerned with whether adoption of the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations influences the level of executive 
remuneration and the linkage to company performance in remuneration awarded to key 
executives.  Therefore, Hypothesis 6 is concerned with the relation between adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and (a) executive remuneration 
levels and (b) the link to company performance.  Hypothesis 6 is expressed as: 
H6a:  Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated 
with the level of cash remuneration awarded to key executives. 
H6b:  Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated 
with stronger pay for performance sensitivity in remuneration awarded to key 
executives. 
Hypothesis 7 addresses the final research question which considers whether 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is negatively associated 
with shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report.  Hypothesis 7 is therefore 
concerned with the relation between the remuneration committee and the level of 
dissent on the non-binding shareholder vote on the company remuneration report at the 
annual general meeting.  Hypothesis 7 is stated as: 
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H7: Companies adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations receive 
less shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report.   
This chapter is presented as follows.  Section 7.2 presents the descriptive and 
univariate statistics for the variables used in the analyses. Section 7.3 presents the 
results from the multivariate analyses. The results of sensitivity analysis performed are 
reported in section 7.4, with the results of robustness testing presented in section 7.5. 
The chapter concludes at section 7.6. 
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
7.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables presented in the analysis are (1) cash remuneration of the 
top five ranked executives (H6a), change in cash remuneration awarded to the top five 
ranked executives (H6b) and the level of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration 
report (H7).  Table 7-1 presents descriptive statistics for the total cash remuneration of 
the top five ranked executives. The natural log of cash remuneration and the change in 
the natural log of cash remuneration for the top five ranked executives are incorporated 
into the multivariate regression analyses as dependent variables.  The natural log of total 
cash remuneration is used in the analysis of remuneration levels, and the change in the 
natural log of total cash remuneration is used to examine whether changes in executive 
remuneration are linked to company performance.  
The data presented in Table 7-1 show that the average remuneration of the top 
five ranked executives for companies that have formed a remuneration committee is 
higher than those that have not formed a remuneration committee.  Additionally, the 
mean remuneration for the top five ranked executives is higher for those companies that 
choose to adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.   
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TABLE 7-1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - CASH REMUNERATION TOP FIVE EXECUTIVES 
Panel A: Full Sample (N=1,497) 
Variable Mean 
$ 
Std Dev Minimum 
$ 
Median 
$ 
Maximum 
$ 
Cash Remuneration  578,858 1,238,787 0 259,387 24,054,907 
Panel B: No Remuneration Committee Formed (N= 701) 
Variable Mean 
$ 
Std Dev Minimum 
$ 
Median 
$ 
Maximum 
$ 
Cash Remuneration  239,037 318,290 0 161,226 4,177,793 
Panel C: Remuneration Committee Formed (N=796  ) 
Variable Mean 
$ 
Std Dev Minimum 
$ 
Median 
$ 
Maximum 
$ 
Cash Remuneration  878,123 1,614,633 0 453,530 24,054,907 
Panel D: ASX Adopter Remuneration Committee (N=338) 
Variable Mean 
$ 
Std Dev Minimum 
$ 
Median 
$ 
Maximum 
$ 
Cash Remuneration  1,173,103 1,556,635 0 724,403 10,697,600 
 
Table 7-2 reports the descriptive statistics for the total cash remuneration paid to 
the top five ranked executives by industry. The maximum total cash remuneration paid 
to the top five ranked executive ranges from $2,102,136 to $24,054,907 across all 
industry sectors. Companies included within the materials industry report the lowest 
average cash remuneration of $345,404. The consumer discretionary industry reports 
the highest average cash remuneration at $1,305,018. The information reported in Table 
7-2 shows total cash remuneration paid to the top five ranked executives varies across 
industries. 
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TABLE 7-2:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  – CASH REMUNERATION BY INDUSTRY 
Industry N Mean 
$ 
Std Dev Minimum 
$ 
Median 
$ 
Maximum 
$ 
Information  96 565,886 518766 0 466,611 2,102,136 
Utility 19 674,085 1095179 0 282,125 4,622,064 
Telecom 27 631,170 1051751 0 310,650 5,285,226 
Health Care 138 596,707 1023200 0 286,000 6,831,301 
Materials 533 345,404 626560 0 204,841 7,039,339 
Energy 179 421,574 906595 0 209,999 7,896,214 
Industrial 159 899,705 1169145 0 562,599 9,050,944 
Finance 182 602,962 1072719 0 191,999 9,283,747 
Consumer Staples 42 677,738 1736134 0 263,628 10,697,600 
Consumer Discretionary 122 1,305,018 2957584 0 615,778 24,054,907 
 
For the analysis of shareholder dissent on the company remuneration report, the 
dependent variable is the level of shareholder dissent recorded in relation to the annual 
non-binding shareholder vote on the 2008 remuneration report. The dependent variable 
is calculated as the number of shareholder votes cast against the annual remuneration 
report divided by the sum of no and yes votes cast. Table 7-3 presents the descriptive 
statistics for shareholder dissent on the 2008 annual remuneration reports. 
The results reported in Table 7-3 show that companies that have formed a 
remuneration committee receive a higher level of shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report compared to companies that have not formed a remuneration 
committee. The mean level of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report for 
companies that had formed a remuneration committee is 7 per cent, whilst the mean 
level of shareholder dissent for companies that had not formed a remuneration 
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committee is 4 per cent.  Additionally, companies that have formed a remuneration 
committee and have adopted the ASX remuneration committee composition 
recommendations receive the highest level of shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report at 9 per cent. 
TABLE 7-3: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – SHAREHOLDER DISSENT ON THE ANNUAL 
REMUNERATION REPORT 
Variable Mean 
(%) 
Std 
Dev 
Minimum 
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Maximum 
(%) 
Level of Shareholder Dissent:      
No Remuneration Committee 3.68 8.19 0.00 0.67 63.00 
Remuneration Committee 7.43 11.97 0.00 2.36 78.00 
ASX Adopter Committee 9.31 12.34 0.00 4.04 77.00 
 
Table 7-4 reports the descriptive statistics for shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report broken down by industry. The average level of dissent across all 
industries ranged from 4 per cent to 7 per cent.  The materials sector recorded the 
highest instance of shareholder dissent (78 per cent) on the 2008 remuneration report, 
followed by the energy sector (77 per cent) with the lowest shareholder dissent recorded 
by the utility sector (30 per cent).  The average level of dissent was highest in the health 
care sector (7 per cent), followed by the information sector (7 per cent) with the lowest 
average level of shareholder dissent on the 2008 annual remuneration report being 
recorded in the consumer discretionary sector (4 per cent).  Although some companies 
did record high levels of shareholder dissent, as evidenced by the maximum level of 
shareholder dissent reported in Table 7-4, the average level of shareholder dissent was 
quite low in the 2008 year. 
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TABLE 7-4: SHAREHOLDER DISSENT ON THE REMUNERATION REPORT BY INDUSTRY 
Industry N Mean 
% 
Std Dev Minimum 
% 
Median 
% 
Maximum 
% 
Information  90 6.73 10.76 0.00 18.50 59.00 
Utility 19 5.90 9.00 0.00 17.70 30.00 
Telecom 26 4.92 9.52 0.00 15.00 46.00 
Health Care 134 7.41 10.95 0.00 22.80 50.00 
Materials 522 4.97 10.52 0.00 0.81 78.00 
Energy 173 5.04 10.22 0.00 13.90 77.00 
Industrial 154 7.23 11.17 0.00 21.40 59.00 
Finance 175 6.16 11.08 0.00 18.30 69.00 
Consumer Staples 41 5.15 12.01 0.00 1.27 51.00 
Consumer Discretionary 116 4.43 8.12 0.00 14.30 53.00 
 
The analysis reported in Table 7-1 has identified that companies adopting the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations on average pay higher executive 
remuneration compared to companies that do not adopt or that partially adopt the three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations. 
This result is expected as companies adopting the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations are generally larger and more complex and therefore more likely to 
pay higher remuneration to their key executives.  If shareholder dissent is related to 
remuneration levels, these companies are also more likely to attract higher levels of 
shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report. 
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7.2.2 Independent and Control Variables 
Some variables included in the analysis of remuneration levels, pay for 
performance sensitivity, and shareholder dissent are the same as the variables used in 
the formation and composition analysis discussed in Chapter 6. Therefore, the 
descriptive statistics for ownership structure (relating to insider shareholding), 
institutional shareholding, growth, board size, board independence, company size and 
CEO entrenchment are presented Table 6-2. Descriptive statistics regarding 
remuneration committee formation and composition are reported in Table 6-1.   
Independent t-tests were performed to compare the continuous independent 
variables scores for companies that have fully adopted the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations and those companies that have not.  The results are 
reported in Table 7-5. Of the full sample of 1,497 companies, 338 fully adopted the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  The balance of 1,159 companies have 
either not formed a remuneration committee or have a committee that does not meet the 
ASX remuneration committee composition recommendations. 
The results in Table 7-5 show that companies adopting the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations pay higher remuneration to the top five ranked executives. 
These companies have a smaller change in remuneration compared to companies that do 
not adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  Finally, companies that 
adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations receive on average higher 
levels of shareholder dissent regarding the annual remuneration report.  The results are 
consistent with the descriptive statistics presented in Table 7-1 and Table 7-3.   
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Companies that adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations have 
higher mean ROA, have on average lower insider shareholdings, larger institutional 
shareholdings, and experience lower risk when compared to companies that do not 
voluntarily adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations. 
Tests of differences between ASX adopter and non-adopter are reported in Table   
7-5.  The results show that the continuous variables, excluding change in operating 
performance, total shareholder return, change in remuneration, growth, and risk 
evidence significant difference in the mean scores between the two groups.  The results 
suggest that remuneration and company and shareholder characteristics are 
systematically different for companies that adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and those that do not. 
As the sample exhibits non-normal distribution (see section 6.3.1 in Chapter 6), 
Mann-Whitney U tests were performed to test the differences between the two groups. 
The non parametric tests revealed a significant difference in all continuous variables 
except total shareholder return and change in cash remuneration.  The Mann-Whitney U 
tests are consistent with the results of the parametric tests. 
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TABLE 7-5: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS - COMPARISON OF ASX ADOPTER REMUNERATION COMMITTEES AND NON ADOPTER 
REMUNERATION COMMITTEES 
Variable
6
 ASX Adopter Committee Non Adopter Committee t-tests U tests 
 N Mean Std 
Deviation 
Median N Mean Std 
Deviation 
Median t  U  
Shareholder Dissent 330 0.09 0.13 0.04 1120 0.05 0.09 0.01 -6.02 
***
 120964 
***
 
ROA 338 -0.15 1.04 0.49 1156 -0.34 1.57 -0.10 -2.09 
**
 120232 
***
 
∆ROA  338 -0.09 0.97 -0.00 1155 -0.09 1.75 -0.02 -0.03  175016 
***
 
TSR  337 14.90 256.34 -0.32 1152 0.63 16.83 -0.35 -1.02  186346  
Cash Remuneration  289 13.61 1.11 13.73 896 12.52 1.18 12.62 -13.71 
***
 60834 
***
 
Cash Remuneration t-1 291 12.31 3.79 13.40 903 10.23 4.74 12.20 -7.63 
***
 69761 
***
 
∆Cash Remuneration 266 0.37 0.67 0.22 744 0.42 0.75 0.23 1.10  95784  
Insider Shareholding 310 1.85 1.80 2.21 995 2.47 1.32 2.70 5.55 
***
 126323 
***
 
Institutional Shareholding 338 29.11 24.34 26.76 1159 14.90 16.85 10.11 -10.05 
***
 132497 
***
 
Company Size 338 18.79 2.18 18.73 1159 16.72 1.64 16.55 -16.16 
***
 85896 
***
 
Board Size 338 5.59 1.58 5.00 1159 4.33 1.33 4.00 -13.40 
***
 100889 
***
 
Board Independence 338 0.65 0.16 0.67 1159 0.40 0.27 0.40 -21.17 
***
 86505 
***
 
Growth 338 2.55 2.99 1.60 1159 2.63 3.32 1.55 0.40  192017 
***
 
Risk 334 0.99 0.95 0.84 1149 1.28 15.50 0.60 0.34  170824 
***
 
***, **, * denotes
 
significance at 1,5 and 10 per cent respectively
                                                 
6
 See Tables 5-3, 5-4 and 5-5 for definitions of variables. 
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7.2.3 Bivariate correlations 
Tables 7-6, 7-7 and 7-8 report the correlations between independent variables 
included in the models that analyse remuneration levels, pay for performance sensitivity 
and shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report. Spearman rank order 
correlations are presented below the diagonal and Pearson product-moment correlations 
are presented above the diagonal. As the data exhibit non-normal characteristics the 
following discussion reports the Spearman rank order correlations. 
Table 7-6 report correlations for the sample of companies included in remuneration 
levels analysis.  The highest correlations are between company size and ROA at 0.66, 
board independence and the appointment of an independent chairperson at 0.54, and 
company size and board size at 0.54. These correlations are consistent with larger 
companies having larger boards and more independent directors which increase the 
company’s capacity to appoint an independent chairperson.   
In the remuneration levels analysis variables correlated above 0.40 are 
ROA*ASX adopter and ROA at 0.47, company size and ASX adopter at 0.41, company 
size and ROA at 0.66, company size and institutional shareholding at 0.44, company 
size and board size at 0.54, board independence and ASX adopter at 0.41, board 
independence and independent board chair at 0.54, independent board chair and 
separate board chair at 0.46.   
Table 7-7 reports correlations for companies in the pay for performance sensitivity 
analysis.  The highest correlations are between board independence and the presence of 
an independent chairperson at 0.54 and company size and prior year remuneration at 
0.54.  This is consistent with larger companies having higher remuneration. As noted 
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above, the availability of independent directors is related to whether an independent 
chairperson can be appointed to the board.    
In the pay for performance sensitivity analysis variables correlated above 0.40 
are company size and ASX adopter at 0.41, company size and prior year cash 
remuneration at 0.54, company size and institutional shareholding at 0.44, company size 
and board size at 0.54, board independence and ASX adopter at 0.41, board 
independence and independent board chair at 0.54 and independent board chair and 
separate board chair at 0.46.  
Table 7-8 reports the correlations for the shareholder dissent model.  The highest 
correlations are between company size and ROA at 0.66 and company size and current 
year cash remuneration at 0.62. Again, these correlations show that larger companies 
have higher remuneration. 
In the shareholder dissent analysis variables correlated above 0.4 are ROA and 
cash remuneration at 0.48, company size and ASX adopter at 0.41, company size and 
cash remuneration at 0.62, company size and ROA at 0.66, company size and 
institutional shareholding at 0.44, company size and board size at 0.53 and board 
independence and ASX adopter at 0.41. 
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TABLE 7-6:  CORRELATION MATRIX – REMUNERATION LEVELS ANALYSIS 
Model 3 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) VIF 
(1) ASX Adopter    0.05 
* -0.12 
** 0.05 -0.18 
** 0.30 
** 0.44 
** 0.36 
** 0.39 
** 0.13 
** 0.28 
** 0.11 
** -0.01 -0.01 1.53 
(2) ROA 0.28 
**  0.33 
** 0.01 -0.02 0.06 
* 0.28 
** 0.11 
** 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.10 -0.21 
** 0.00 1.78 
(3) ROA*ASX Adopter 0.31 
** 0.47 
**  0.01 0.05 0.00 0.13 
** 0.06 
** -0.08 
** 0.01 -0.02 -0.10 
** 0.05 
** -0.00 1.57 
(4) TSR 0.03 0.21 
** 0.09 
**  0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 1.02 
(5) Insider Shareholding -0.13 
** 0.02 -0.01 -0.04  -0.33 
** -0.32 
** -0.20 
** -0.21 
** -0.08 
** -0.15 
** -0.09 
** 0.02 -0.03 1.33 
(6) Institutional Shareholding 0.24 
** 0.26 
** 0.18 
** 0.06 
* -0.27 
**  0.50 
** 0.34 
** 0.21 
** 0.04 0.13 
** 0.08 
** 0.01 0.02 1.47 
(7) Company Size 0.41 
** 0.66 
** 0.36 
** 0.16 
** -0.20 
** 0.44 
**  0.61 
** 0.23 
** 0.11 
** 0.14 
** 0.09 
** -0.18 
** 0.02 2.85 
(8) Board Size 0.36 
** 0.31 
** 0.23 
** 0.07 
* -0.08 
** 0.27 
** 0.54 
**  0.20 
** 0.19 
** 0.16 
** 0.11 
** -0.02 
** 0.04 1.75 
(9) Board Independence 0.41 
** 0.17 
** 0.12 
** 0.01 -0.22 
** 0.21 
** 0.20 
** 0.19 
**  0.15 
** 0.55 
** 0.07 
** 0.00 0.02 1.72 
(10) Separate Board Chair 0.13 
** 0.05 
* 0.05 
** 0.02 -0.06 
** 0.03 0.10 
** 0.22 
** 0.14 
**  0.46 
** 0.06 
** -0.03 0.01 1.36 
(11) Independent Board Chair 0.28 
** 0.04 0.08 
** 0.00 -0.15 
** 0.11 
** 0.13 
** 0.18 
** 0.54 
** 0.46 
**  0.02 -0.02 -0.02 1.88 
(12) CEO Entrenchment 0.11 
** 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.06 
* 0.07 
** 0.08 
** 0.13 
** 0.07 
** 0.06 
** 0.02  0.00 -0.00 1.07 
(13) Growth 0.01    -0.14 
** -0.01 
** 0.39 -0.02 
** 0.02 -0.16 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02  0.02 1.07 
(14) Risk 0.08 
** -0.02 -0.04 -0.13 
** -0.17 
** 0.38 
** 0.17 
** 0.07 
** 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.09  1.01 
The correlation presented for dichotomous variables is the eta statistic. The Spearman’s Correlation is reported below the diagonal and Pearson 
product-moment correlations above the diagonal. Industry correlations are not presented.  **, * denotes
 
significance at 1 and 5 per cent respectively. 
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TABLE 7-7: CORRELATION MATRIX – PAY FOR PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Model 4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) VIF 
(1) ASX Adopter   0.00 -0.01
**
 0.05 0.20
**
 -0.18
**
 0.30
**
 0.44
**
 0.36
**
 0.39
**
 0.13
**
 0.28
**
 0.11
**
 -0.01 -0.01 1.54 
(2) ∆ROA 0.08
**
  0.29
**
 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.11
**
 0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11
**
 0.00 1.59 
(3) ∆ROA*ASX Adopter -0.08
**
 0.33
**
  0.00 -0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.07
*
 0.04 -0.05
*
 -0.00 -0.02 -0.09
**
 -0.04 -0.00 1.58 
(4) TSR 0.03 0.14
**
 0.06
*
  0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.00 1.02 
(5) Cash Remuneration t-1 0.35
**
 0.18
**
 0.06
**
 0.06  -0.01 0.23
**
 0.31
**
 0.23
**
 0.10
**
 0.03 0.09
**
 0.02 -0.00 0.02 1.70 
(6) Insider Shareholding -0.13
**
 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.04  -0.33
**
 -0.32
**
 -0.20
**
 -0.21
**
 -0.08
**
 -0.15
**
 -0.09
**
 0.02 -0.03 1.37 
(7) Institutional Shareholding 0.24
**
 0.15
**
 0.01 0.06
*
 0.38
**
 -0.27
**
  0.51
**
 0.34
**
 0.21
**
 0.04 0.13
**
 0.08
**
 0.01 0.02 1.52 
(8) Company Size 0.41
**
 0.22
**
 0.03 0.16
**
 0.54
**
 -0.20
**
 0.44
**
  0.61
*
 0.23
**
 0.11
**
 0.14
**
 0.09
**
 -0.18
**
 0.02 2.90 
(9) Board Size 0.36
**
 0.08
**
 0.03 0.07
*
 0.38
**
 -0.08
**
 0.27
**
 0.54
**
  0.20
**
 0.19
**
 0.16
**
 0.11
**
 -0.02
**
 0.04 1.77 
(10) Board Independence 0.41
**
 0.06
*
 -0.02 0.01 0.20
**
 -0.22
**
 0.21
**
 0.20
**
 0.19
**
  0.15
**
 0.55
**
 0.08
**
 0.00 0.02 1.75 
(11) Separate Board Chair 0.13
**
 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.06
*
 0.03 0.10
**
 0.22
**
 0.14
**
  0.46
**
 0.06
*
 -0.03 0.01 1.41 
(12) Independent Board Chair 0.28
**
 0.02 -0.06
*
 0.00 0.14
*
 -0.15
**
 0.11
**
 0.13
**
 0.18
**
 0.54
**
 0.46
**
  0.02 -0.02 0.03 1.92 
(13) CEO Entrenchment 0.11
**
 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.06
*
 0.07
*
 0.07
**
 0.13
**
 0.07
**
 0.06
**
 0.02  0.00 -0.00 1.07 
(14) Growth 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.39
**
 0.04 -0.02 0.02 -0.16
**
 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02  0.02 1.07 
(15) Risk 0.08
**
 0.10
**
 -0.06
*
 -0.13
**
 0.13
**
 -0.17
**
 0.38
**
 0.17
**
 0.07
**
 0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.09
**
  1.02 
The correlation presented for dichotomous variables is the eta statistic. The Spearman’s Correlation is reported below the diagonal and Pearson product-moment 
correlations above the diagonal. Industry correlations are not reported.  **, * denotes
 
significance at 1 and 5 per cent respectively. 
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TABLE 7-8: CORRELATION MATRIX - SHAREHOLDER DISSENT ANALYSIS 
Model 5 (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8)  (9) VIF 
(1) ASX Adopter   0.37 ** 0.05 * 0.05 -0.18 ** 0.30 ** 0.44 ** 0.36 ** 0.39 ** 1.52 
(2) Cash Remuneration  0.39 
**  0.16 ** -0.02 -0.16 ** 0.37 ** 0.60 ** 0.47 ** 0.20 ** 1.75 
(3) ROA 0.28 
** 0.48 **  0.00 -0.02  0.06 * 0.28 ** 0.11 ** 0.02  1.23 
(4) TSR 0.03 0.09 ** 0.21 **  0.03  0.01 -0.01 0.01  0.02  1.02 
(5) Insider Shareholding -0.13 
** -0.08 ** 0.02 -0.04   -0.33 ** -0.32 ** -0.20 ** -0.21 ** 1.36 
(6) Institutional Shareholding 0.24 
** 0.38 ** 0.26 ** 0.06 ** -0.27 **  0.50 ** 0.34 ** 0.21 ** 1.48 
(7) Company Size 0.41 
** 0.62 ** 0.66 ** 0.15 ** -0.20 ** 0.44 **  0.61 ** 0.23 ** 3.22 
(8) Board Size 0.36 
** 0.44 ** 0.31 ** 0.07 ** -0.08 ** 0.27 ** 0.53 **   0.20 ** 1.72 
(9) Board Independence 0.41 
** 0.22 ** 0.11 ** 0.01 -0.22 ** 0.21 ** 0.20 ** 0.19 **  1.27 
The correlation presented for dichotomous variables is the eta statistic. The Spearman’s Correlation is reported below the diagonal 
and Pearson product-moment correlations above the diagonal. Industry correlations are not presented.   
**,*  denotes
 
significance at 1 and 5 per cent respectively. 
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To examine whether the analyses are affected by multicollinearity, variance 
inflation factors (VIF) were determined for each variable.  The VIF for each variable is 
reported at Table 7-6, Table 7-7 and Table 7-8.   The VIF values are below two for each 
variable except company size.   The VIF for company size is 2.85 in the remuneration 
levels model (Model 3), and 2.90 in the pay for performance analysis (Model 4), and 
3.22 in the shareholder dissent model (Model 5).  Overall, the VIF values are within the 
accepted guidelines of being less than 10, thereby indicating the efficacy of regression 
models are unlikely to be threatened by multicollinearity (Pallant, 2007; Hair et al., 
2010). 
7.3 MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
7.3.1 Remuneration Levels 
This section examines the relation between remuneration committees adopting the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations, remuneration levels and company 
performance. The first multivariate regression analysis addresses Hypotheses 6a and 6b, 
which states: 
H6a:  Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated 
with the level of remuneration awarded to key executives. 
H6b:  Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated 
with stronger pay for performance sensitivity in remuneration awarded to key 
executives. 
Model 3, which is shown below, tests the relation between adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations, company performance and the levels of 
executive remuneration.   
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Model 3 (Remuneration Levels): 
Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2ROA + β3 ASX Adopter* ROA + β4TSR + 
β5Insider Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding +  β7Company Size + β8Board Size + 
β9Board Independence + β10Separate Board Chair + β11Independent Board Chair + β12CEO 
Entrenchment +  β13Growth + β14Risk + β15Industry + ε 
Where: 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives. 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA = Return on Assets for 2008. 
ASX Adopter*ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ROA. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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A review of the regression normal probability plot, standardised residuals and 
scatter plot for Model 3 indicate the assumptions regarding normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity are not violated.  A White’s Test suggests no heteroskedasticity of 
residuals.  Table 7-9 below presents the results for regression analysis.  Whilst the 
sample is drawn from the full sample only those companies that pay remuneration are 
included in the analysis.  The final sub-sample has 1,067 companies.    
Model 3 is statistically significant at p < 0.01 level.  The adjusted R-squared is 43 
per cent.  The results indicate a positive and significant relationship between the 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations (β = 0.22, t = 2.71) and 
cash remuneration at p < 0.01. That is, the presence of a remuneration committee with 
three or more members, the majority of which are independent and chaired by an 
independent director is associated with higher levels of remuneration for the top five 
ranked executives.  As the results identify an association between adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations and executive remuneration levels, 
Hypothesis 6a is supported. 
Accounting based company performance measured by current year ROA          
(β = -0.06, t= -1.39, p = 0.17) is not statistically significant at conventional levels of      
p < 0.10, nor is the interaction variable, ROA * ASX Adopter (β = 0.02, t = 0.27, p = 
0.79).  Therefore the results do not indicate a statistically significant relation between 
company performance and the remuneration of the top five ranked executives.  This 
relation is not influenced by adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations regarding committee composition.  Total shareholder return (β = 0.00, 
t = -0.81, p = 0.42) is also statistically insignificant, which is consistent with there being 
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no association between the remuneration level of the top five ranked executives and 
company performance, using either accounting or market measures.  
A number of control variables are also found to be statistically significant. 
Insider shareholding (β= 0.08, t = 3.29) and institutional shareholding (β = 0.01,             
t = 3.08) are statistically significant at p < 0.01. Company financial characteristics of 
company size (β = 0.31, t = 12.55) is statistically significant at p < 0.01 and growth      
(β = 0.02, t = 2.12) is statistically significant at p < 0.05. Finally, of the governance 
control variables, board size (β = 0.10, t = 4.14) and separation of the role of CEO and 
board chairperson (β = -0.31, t = -3.35) are statistically significant at p < 0.01.   The 
remaining control variables, board independence, the appointment of an independent 
chairperson, CEO entrenchment and company risk are not statistically significant. 
Consistent with extant research (Conyon and He, 2004; Guest, 2010; Heaney et 
al., 2010; Geiler and Renneboog, 2011; Van Essen et al., 2012) the results of the 
controls suggest that as companies become larger and appoint larger boards, total cash 
remuneration is higher.  Additionally, companies experiencing high growth, with higher 
insider shareholding and higher levels of institutional shareholding are also more likely 
to award higher remuneration.   
Where the roles of the CEO and board chairperson are separated, the company is 
more likely to award lower levels of remuneration to the top five ranked executives.  
This suggests that board governance can have a moderating effect on executive 
remuneration. However, the other board governance variables used in the analysis are 
statistically non-significant. Therefore, in relation to board governance, it is the 
separation of the role of the CEO and board chairperson and not adoption of the ASX 
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remuneration committee recommendations that moderates the remuneration awarded to 
the top five ranked executives.   
Whilst theory suggests that independent remuneration committees should 
moderate the level of remuneration awarded to executives, prior research finds no 
consistent evidence that independent remuneration committees are effective moderators 
of the level of remuneration awarded to the key executive.  In his review of studies 
examining executive remuneration and remuneration committees, Conyon (2011) notes 
that on a cross sectional basis, prior research demonstrates that companies that form a 
remuneration committee pay higher remuneration to their executives and that the 
composition of the remuneration committee is not associated with the remuneration of 
the CEO.  Longitudinal studies provide mixed evidence as to whether independent 
remuneration committees are effective moderators of executive remuneration.  Recall 
that a significant proportion of prior literature is limited to large companies and the 
CEO, and generalisability and comparison with the results presented above is limited.   
The results confirm the expectation that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with the level of remuneration awarded to 
key executives. In particular, the results indicate that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with higher levels of remuneration awarded 
to the top five ranked executives.  However, higher levels of remuneration in itself does 
not provide conclusive evidence that these committees are associated with excessive 
levels of remuneration.   
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TABLE 7-9: ANALYSIS OF REMUNERATION LEVELS 
Model 3 (Hypothesis 6a,b) 
N = 1,067 
Expected 
Sign 
Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter7,8 -/+ 0.22  2.71 *** 
ROA9 + -0.06  -1.39 
ROA *ASX Adopter + 0.02  0.27 
TSR + 0.00  -0.81 
Insider Shareholding + 0.08  3.29 *** 
Institutional Shareholding - 0.01  3.08 *** 
Company Size + 0.31  12.55 *** 
Board Size + 0.10  4.14 *** 
Board Independence - 0.04  0.26 
Separate Board Chair - -0.31  -3.35 *** 
Independent Board Chair - 0.10  1.28 
CEO Entrenchment - -0.03  -0.20 
Growth + 0.02  2.12 ** 
Risk + 0.00  0.59 
Constant  6.64  16.63 *** 
R-squared 0.66 
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 
F statistic 34.29*** 
***, **, * denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not 
presented 
Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2ROA + β3 ASX Adopter* ROA + β4TSR 
+ β5Insider Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding +  β7Company Size + β8Board 
Size + β9Board Independence + β10Separate Board Chair + β11Independent Board Chair 
+ β12CEO Entrenchment + β13Growth + β14Risk +  β15Industry + ε 
 
 
                                                 
7
  As a robustness test, Model 3 was re-performed with the presence of a remuneration committee replacing 
ASX Adopter.  The variable was dichotomous and took the value of (1) if the company had formed a 
remuneration committee, and (0) otherwise.  The amended model was robust to the inclusion of the 
presence of a remuneration committee. 
8
  Some studies exclude finance companies on the basis they are subject to different regulation.  Model 3 was 
re-run using the full sample excluding finance companies (GISC 40).  The model was robust to the 
exclusion of finance companies.  
9
  The model was re-performed substituting ROA with industry adjusted ROA and the interaction between 
industry adjusted ROA and ASX Adopter substituted for the interaction variable (ROA*ASX Adopter).  
The results of the amended model were substantively similar to the results presented in Table 7-9. 
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Where: 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives. 
Independent and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA = Return on Assets for 2008. 
ASX Adopter*ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ROA. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
The results also provide some evidence that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is not associated with stronger linkage between cash 
remuneration and company performance.  Therefore across a broad range of companies, 
the results do not provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 6b.  Tosi et al. (2000) in 
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their meta analysis of empirical research find that performance accounts for less than 
five per cent of the variance of CEO remuneration.  Australian evidence with regard to 
the link between CEO remuneration and performance is mixed.  Whilst this study 
extends beyond the CEO, the results imply that the cash remuneration of the top five 
ranked executives is determined without regard to performance measured by ROA and 
TSR.  This result provides evidence that is inconsistent with the underlying premise of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  
Overall, the analyses suggest that in setting remuneration contracts for the top 
five ranked executives, independent remuneration committees are associated with 
higher, not lower remuneration.  The results are consistent with Sapp (2008) who also 
finds that independent remuneration committees are associated with higher levels of 
remuneration.  Sapp (2008) is one of the few studies examining the relation between the 
remuneration committee and remuneration of key executives, however the focus is large 
Canadian companies.  Moreover, the existence of an independent remuneration 
committee did not influence the relation between remuneration of the top five ranked 
executives and company performance measured by ROA.  Therefore, Hypothesis 6a is 
supported.  However, contrary to predictions, no support is found for Hypothesis 6b. 
Remuneration Levels - Performing vs. Non-Performing Companies 
The analysis in the preceding section indicates that adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is associated with higher remuneration levels 
awarded to the top five ranked executives.  Moreover, contrary to expectations, the 
relation between performance and remuneration was not significant. It was expected 
that better performing companies would have higher remuneration and that adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations would moderate this relation 
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(Windsor and Cybinski, 2009).  Extant research has shown that the moderating effect of 
an independent remuneration committee differs depending on whether the performance 
of the company is good or poor (Newman and Wright, 1995).  To further test the 
relationship between the variables of interest, the sample is split based on whether the 
company had positive or negative operating performance.  The results of this analysis is 
presented in Table 7-10. The descriptive statistics for both sub samples is presented at 
Appendix 5. 
Model 3 is statistically significant in the analysis of companies with positive 
operating performance at p < 0.01 level.  The adjusted R-squared is 45 per cent.  The 
results indicate a positive and significant relationship between the adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations (β = 0.38, t = 2.88) and executive 
remuneration levels at p < 0.01. That is, the presence of a remuneration committee with 
three or more members, the majority of which are independent and chaired by an 
independent director is associated with higher levels of remuneration for the top five 
ranked executives when company operating performance is positive.  This result 
provides support for Hypothesis 6a in companies experiencing positive operating 
performance, measured by ROA. 
Accounting based company performance as measured by ROA (β = 1.35,            
t = 2.51) is significant at p < 0.05 and the interaction variable, ROA * ASX Adopter,     
(β = -1.61, t = -2.08) is also significant at p < 0.05 in companies with positive operating 
performance.  Total shareholder return (β = 0.00, t =-1.12, p = 0.26) is not significant.  
Therefore, the results indicate a statistically significant relation between company 
performance and the remuneration of the top five ranked executives when operating 
performance is positive.  However, as the coefficient on the interaction variable is 
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negative, this means that remuneration committees adopting the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations are not associated with stronger linkage between 
remuneration levels for the top five ranked executives and operating performance.  
Therefore Hypothesis 6b is not supported in companies with positive operating 
performance, measured by ROA. 
In companies experiencing positive operating performance, insider shareholding        
(β = 0.09, t = 2.85), institutional shareholding (β = 0.01, t = 3.53), company size           
(β = 0.26, t = 6.73), board size (β = 0.12, t stat = 3.52) and growth (β = 0.05, t = 2.61) 
are statistically significant at p < 0.01, and the separation of the roles of board chair and 
CEO (β = -0.34, t = -2.23) is statistically significant at p < 0.05.  The remaining control 
variables of board independence, CEO entrenchment and company risk remain non-
significant.  Therefore, in companies with positive operating performance, higher 
remuneration levels are associated with higher levels of insider and institutional 
shareholding, larger companies, companies with larger boards and experiencing higher 
growth.  This association is moderated in companies that have separated the roles of 
CEO and board chairperson. 
In companies with negative operating performance, measured by ROA, Model 3 
is statistically significant at p < 0.01 level.  The adjusted R-squared is 21 per cent. The 
results presented in table 7-10 indicate adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations does not significantly influence remuneration levels in companies 
experiencing negative performance  (β = 0.14, t = 0.97, p = 0.33).  Therefore in these 
companies, no support for Hypothesis 6a or Hypothesis 6b is found. 
Accounting based company performance (β = -0.11, t = -2.31) is significant at    
p < 0.05. As the sub-sample in this analysis is companies with negative operating 
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performance, the negative coefficient means that in these companies, increases in 
remuneration levels still occur when operating performance is negative. However, the 
increases are at a lower rate.  The interaction variable, ROA * ASX Adopter (β = 0.02,   
t = 0.28, p = 0.78) is statistically not significant.  Therefore, in companies with negative 
operating performance, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
is not associated with stronger linkage between remuneration levels and operating 
performance. 
In companies experiencing negative operating performance, company size         
(β = 0.32, t = 8.21) remains significant at p < 0.01, and the explanatory power of board 
size (β = 0.08, t = 2.03) reduced to p < 0.05 in comparison to the positive ROA sub 
sample.  The separation of the role of CEO and board chairperson remains negative        
(β = -0.30, t = -2.49) and its significance increases to p < 0.01.  Company growth 
becomes non-significant.  The remaining control variables of board independence, CEO 
entrenchment and company risk also remain insignificant.   
Overall, the results of the control variables are largely consistent in performing 
and non performing companies.  That is, company size and board size are positively 
associated with the level of remuneration awarded to the key executive team.  The 
separation of the role of CEO and board chairperson moderates the level of 
remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives.  Differences arise in the 
relation between shareholder characteristics and company growth, and remuneration 
levels awarded to the top five ranked executives. 
The results suggest that the association between adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations and executive remuneration levels varies 
depending on whether the company is experiencing positive or negative operating 
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performance. The relation between company performance and executive remuneration 
levels also varies depending on whether the operating performance is positive or 
negative.  One explanation could be that in performing companies, the remuneration 
committee chooses to support recommendations made by management regarding 
increments to the remuneration arrangements of the key executives.  However, in non-
performing companies, the results suggest companies adopting the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations are not effective at moderating the level of remuneration 
awarded to executives.   
TABLE 7-10: REGRESSION RESULTS REMUNERATION LEVELS, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE 
PERFORMANCE 
Model 3 (Hypothesis 6a,b) Positive ROA 
(N = 444) 
Negative ROA 
(N = 623) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter 0.38 2.88 *** 0.14 0.97  
ROA 1.35 2.51 ** -0.11 -2.31 ** 
ROA *ASX Adopter -1.61 -2.08 
** 0.02 0.28  
TSR 0.00 -1.12 0.00 0.18  
Insider Shareholding 0.09 2.85 *** 0.06 1.59  
Institutional Shareholding 0.01 3.53 *** 0.00 0.70  
Company Size 0.26 6.73 *** 0.32 8.21 *** 
Board Size 0.12 3.52 *** 0.08 2.03 ** 
Board Independence 0.30 1.30 -0.08 -0.41  
Separate Board Chair -0.34 -2.23 ** -0.30 -2.49 *** 
Independent Board Chair 0.04 0.39 0.18 1.60  
CEO Entrenchment -0.21 -1.24 0.11 0.56  
Growth 0.05 2.61 *** 0.01 0.61  
Risk 0.01 2.61 0.00 0.611  
Constant 7.36 11.22 *** 6.75 10.58 *** 
R-squared 0.67 0.45 
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.21 
F statistic 15.16 *** 6.85*** 
***, **, * denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
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Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2ROA + β3 ASX Adopter* ROA + β4TSR + β5Insider 
Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding +  β7Company Size + β8Board Size + β9Board Independence 
+ β10Separate Board Chair + β11Independent Board Chair + β12CEO Entrenchment +  β13Growth + 
β14Risk +  β15Industry + ε 
 
Where: 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives. 
Independent and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA = Return on Assets for 2008. 
ASX Adopter*ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ROA. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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Remuneration Levels - Excessive Remuneration Companies 
As the preceding analysis identified that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendation is associated with higher levels of executive remuneration, 
further testing is conducted.  The additional test examines whether remuneration 
committees adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations are associated 
with excessive levels of remuneration.  The approach suggested by Core et al. (1999), 
Ferri and Maber (2009) and Conyon and Sadler (2010) to determine excessive executive 
remuneration is adopted for this analysis.  This approach involves ranking the residuals 
from the main analysis and assuming companies in the top quartile of residual values 
pay excessive remuneration to the top five ranked executives. The rationale is that the 
higher the residual, the further the company is from the predicted remuneration level for 
that company which indicates the remuneration is excessive (Conyon and Sadler, 2010). 
Model 3 is then estimated for the companies identified using this method as having 
excessive remuneration.   
Table 7.11 summarises the key data for the companies identified as paying 
excessive remuneration to their key executives, and presents comparative data for the 
full sample. Interestingly, the two samples have similar characteristics. Twenty three per 
cent of companies in the excessive remuneration sub sample adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations.  This adoption rate is consistent with the 
adoption rate for the full sample of 23 per cent.  Statistics regarding change in CEO, 
dual CEO and Chair and the appointment of an independent chairperson are also 
consistent with the statistics for the full sample. The average level of insider 
shareholding, institutional shareholding, return on assets, company size, board size, and 
growth are also consistent.     
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
213 
 
TABLE 7-11: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS EXCESS PAY COMPANIES VERSUS FULL SAMPLE. 
Panel A: Dichotomous Variables 
 
 
Excessive Remuneration 
% 
Full Sample 
% 
ASX Adopter 22.5 22.6 
Change in CEO  4.9 5.2 
Dual CEO and Board Chair 12.7 15.5 
Independent Board Chair 52.1 54.8 
Panel B: Continuous Variables 
 Excessive Payers Full Sample 
 Min Mean Max Min Mean Max 
ROA -16.72% -0.27% 0.66% -37.20% -0.29% 9.02% 
TSR -0.95% -0.24% 2.14% -1.00% 3.86% 4689% 
Insider Shareholding 0.00% 19.91% 100.00% 0.00% 19.85 100.00% 
Institutional Shareholding 0.00% 18.92% 79.00% 0.00% 18.11% 93.00 
Company Size (Ln) 11.7580 17.39 24.34 11.76 17.19 24.36 
Board Size 3 4.73 12 3 4.61 13.00 
Board Independence 0.00% 46.00% 100.00% 0.00% 46.09% 100.00% 
Growth -3.03% 2.62% 18.76% -3.03% 2.61% 18.76% 
Risk -51.70 7.96 0.81 -51.70 522.08 1.21 
 
Table 7-12 presents the results of the regression analysis of the excessive 
remuneration sub-sample.  The results produced an adjusted R-squared of 90 per cent. 
As the high r-squared can indicate over-fitting in the model, additional testing is 
performed.  The original sample of companies identified as excess payers is used. 
However, the sample is expanded to include an equal number of companies that are 
identified as not paying excessive levels of remuneration. These companies produced 
residuals close to zero in the main analysis.  The results of the analysis is presented at 
Table 7-12.  Whilst the explanatory power decreases in the model with the matched 
sample, the overall results are substantively the same as the results achieved using 
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excessive pay companies only. Therefore, the discussion below focuses on the results of 
the excessive pay company analysis. 
The model for excessive remuneration companies is statistically significant at    
p < 0.01.  The presence of a remuneration committee adopting the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is positive and statistically significant (β = 0.20, t = 4.54) 
at p <0.01.  The results suggest that companies that adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations are associated with higher levels of remuneration awarded 
to executives in companies identified as paying excessive remuneration.    
ROA is statistically significant (β = -0.07, t = -6.90) at p <0.01 in companies 
identified as paying excessive executive remuneration.  The results indicate that 
operating performance is negatively associated with remuneration levels. The 
interaction between the adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
and accounting return (β = 0.04, t = 1.59) is positive and marginally significant at           
p < 0.10.  Total shareholder return remained statistically insignificant (β = 0.03, t = 
0.04, p = 0.75).  This result infers that in companies paying excessive remuneration to 
the top five ranked executives, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations are associated with stronger linkage between remuneration and 
company performance.  The influence of the remuneration committee in this regard is 
marginal at best. Overall the results do not provide strong evidence that adoption of the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated with stronger linkage 
between remuneration and company performance.   
Company size (β = 0.29, t = 18.61), with other control variables of insider 
shareholding (β = 0.08, t = 6.68), institutional shareholding (β = 0.01, t = 4.51), board 
size (β = 0.10, t = 4.70), the separation of the roles of chair and CEO (β = -0.32,             
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t = -4.88) and company risk (β = 0.01, t = 5.30) are significant at p < 0.01. Growth       
(β = 0.02, t = 2.36) is also significant at p < 0.05.  Overall, the results of the control 
variables are substantively similar to the results achieved in the main analysis at section 
7.3.1  
Therefore higher levels of excessive executive remuneration are associated with 
larger companies, companies with higher insider shareholdings, companies with higher 
institutional shareholding, companies with larger boards and companies evidencing 
greater risk.  The effect of larger board size is somewhat moderated in companies where 
the roles of the CEO and chairperson are performed by different people. These results 
are consistent with the results of the main analysis. 
Overall, the results provide some support for H6a and limited support for H6b. 
Companies that adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations are 
associated with higher levels of remuneration in companies identified as paying 
excessive remuneration to their executives.  Therefore H6a is supported as there is a 
relation between adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and 
the level of executive remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives.  
Marginal support was found for H6b, suggesting the companies that adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations are associated with stronger linkage between 
remuneration and company performance in companies that pay excessive levels of 
remuneration to their executives. 
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TABLE 7-12: EXCESSIVE REMUNERATION COMPANIES - REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Model 3 (Hypothesis 6a,b) Excessive Remuneration 
Sample 
N = 267 
Matched Sample
10
 
N=534 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter 0.20 4.54 *** 0.15 2.40 ** 
ROA -0.07 -6.90 *** -0.09 -5.43 *** 
ROA *ASX Adopter 0.04 1.59 
* 0.09 3.95 *** 
TSR 0.03 0.04 -0.00 -13.18 *** 
Insider Shareholding 0.08 6.68 *** 0.03 1.93 * 
Institutional Shareholding 0.01 4.51 *** 0.01 3.30 *** 
Company Size 0.29 18.61 *** 0.30 14.32 *** 
Board Size 0.10 4.70 *** 0.09 3.97 *** 
Board Independence 0.02 0.17 0.18 1.63 * 
Separate Board Chair -0.32 -4.88 *** -0.07 -1.14  
Independent Board Chair 0.06 1.41 -0.03 -0.59  
CEO Entrenchment -0.08 -1.26 -0.11 -1.35 
Growth 0.02 2.36 ** 0.03 2.93 *** 
Risk 0.01 5.30 *** 0.00 2.37 ** 
Constant 7.83 35.24 *** 7.28 22.85  
R-squared 0.91 0.72 
Adjusted R-squared 0.90 0.70 
F statistic 107.22
*** 55.82*** 
Whites Adjusted OLS.  ***, **, * denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively .  Industry 
effects not presented.  
Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2ROA + β3 ASX Adopter* ROA + β4TSR + β5Insider 
Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding +  β7Company Size + β8Board Size + β9Board 
Independence + β10Separate Board Chair + β11Independent Board Chair +  β12CEO Entrenchment +  
β13Growth + β14Risk +  β15Industry + ε 
 
                                                 
10
  Model 3 was re-performed with the presence of a remuneration committee replacing ASX adopter.  The 
variable was dichotomous and took the value of (1) if the company had formed a remuneration committee, 
and (0) otherwise.  The results of the amended model are consistent with the results presented above.   
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Where: 
Dependent Variable: 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives. 
Independent and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA = Return on Assets for 2008. 
ASX Adopter*ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ROA. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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Remuneration Levels - Summary 
The analysis is this section provides support for H6a which states that adoption 
of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated with the level of 
remuneration awarded to key executives. The initial analysis suggests that in setting 
remuneration contracts for the top five ranked executives, adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is associated with higher, not lower levels of 
remuneration.  Moreover, these committees are not associated with a stronger relation 
between remuneration of the top five ranked executives and company performance.  
When the sample is partitioned into companies with positive and negative 
performance, measured by ROA, the analysis provides limited support for H6a. In 
particular, the results suggest that the association between executive remuneration and 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations varies depending on 
whether the company is experiencing positive or negative operating performance.  
Overall the results of the analysis indicate that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with higher levels of remuneration in 
companies with positive operating performance. However, in companies with negative 
operating performance adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
is insignificant.  Therefore support for Hypothesis 6a is found in relation to companies 
with positive return on assets, however no in relation is found in companies with 
negative return on assets. 
In the analysis of companies with positive and negative operating performance, 
no support was found for H6b.  In particular, in companies with positive operating 
performance adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is 
significant, however the coefficient is negative.  Thereby, suggesting that adoption of 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
219 
 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendation is not associated with stronger pay 
for performance sensitivity in executive remuneration levels.  In companies with 
negative operating performance, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is insignificant. 
Finally, a sub-sample of companies deemed to pay excessive remuneration to 
their executives was analysed.  The analysis suggests companies that adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations are associated with higher levels of 
remuneration in companies identified as paying excessive remuneration to their 
executives.  The analysis also suggests that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with stronger links between remuneration 
and company performance in these companies.  Consequently in the excessive 
remuneration sample, support is found for H6a, and marginal support is found for H6b. 
Overall, only limited support at best is found regarding the proposition that 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations ensures that executive 
remuneration is linked to company performance.  Further testing regarding adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and the link between remuneration 
and company performance is analysed in the next section. 
7.3.2 Pay for Performance Sensitivity in Executive Remuneration 
Recall Hypothesis 6 expects that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with remuneration levels (H6a) and is associated with 
stronger pay for performance links in the remuneration awarded to the key executive 
team (H6b).  The preceding analyses provide limited evidence at best that in certain 
circumstances adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is 
associated with stronger linkage between executive remuneration and performance.  
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
220 
 
This section examines the association between adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations, changes in operating performance and changes in 
remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives.   
The analysis adopts the model frequently used in extant research to examine the 
pay for performance relation in executive remuneration.  Ordinary least square 
regression is used to test the association between adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations and the pay for performance sensitivity in executive 
remuneration for the top five ranked executives.  The model employed to test the pay 
for performance sensitivity is expressed as Model 4 below. The dependent variable (∆ 
Ln Cash Remuneration) used in Model 4, is the change in the natural log of the total 
cash remuneration for the top five ranked executives.  Model 4 specifically tests the 
elasticity of executive remuneration, that is, whether changes in remuneration are 
associated with changes in operating performance.    
Model 4 (Pay for Performance Sensitivity) 
∆ Ln  Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2∆ROA + β3ASX Adopter*∆ROA + 
β4TSR + β5Ln_Cash_Remunerationt-1 +β6Insider_Shareholding + β7Institutional 
Shareholding + β8Company Size + β9Board Size + β10Board Independence + β11Separate 
Board Chair + β12Independent Board Chair + β13CEO Entrenchment +  β14Growth + 
β15Risk +  β16Industry + ε 
Where: 
∆ Ln Cash Remuneration = One year change in the natural log of cash remuneration for the 
top five ranked executives between 2007 and 2008. 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
∆ROA = the change in return on assets. 
ASX Adopter * ∆ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ∆ROA. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
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Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives in the prior year. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1 per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
 
Model 4 is statistically significant at p < 0.01.  The adjusted R-squared is 36 per 
cent.  Whilst drawn from the full sample, the sample used in the analysis includes only 
those companies that pay remuneration.  The sub sample reduced to 951 due to missing 
data. The results of the analysis are included in Table 7-13.    
ASX adopter (β = 0.08, t = 1.52, p = 0.13) is not significant in Model 4.  The result 
suggests that remuneration committees with at least three members, majority of which 
are independent and with an independent chairperson, is not associated with changes to 
remuneration arrangements awarded to the top five ranked executives. 
Change in operating performance measured as change in ROA (β = -0.06, t = -2.19) 
is significant at p < 0.05. As change in return on assets is either positive or negative, the 
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results suggest that contrary to expectation, where the change in accounting based return 
is negative, the change in remuneration is higher and when the change in accounting 
return is positive, the change in remuneration is lower.  Total shareholder return           
(β = -0.00, t = -0.95, p = 0.34) is statistically insignificant. The interaction variable, 
ASX Adopter *∆ ROA (β = 0.05, t = 1.09, p = 0.28) whilst positive as predicted, is 
insignificant.   
The results regarding company performance infer that changes in accounting return 
are associated with changes in the cash remuneration awarded to the top five ranked 
executives.  However, shareholder return is not.  Further, adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with the pay for 
performance sensitivity of changes in executive remuneration. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 6b is not supported. 
Prior year remuneration (β = -0.42, t = -22.62) is significant at p < 0.01.  The 
negative coefficient means the higher the previous year’s remuneration the smaller the 
change in cash remuneration in the following year for the top five ranked executives.  
Of the control variables, company size (β = 0.12, t = 7.62) and board size (β = 0.04,         
t = 2.72) are significant at p < 0.01. Company growth (β = 0.01, t = 2.00) is significant 
at p < 0.05. Board governance control variables of board independence, separate CEO 
and board chair, independent board chair are statistically insignificant, as is CEO 
entrenchment and company risk.   
Agency theory suggests that strong governance should be associated with the 
alignment of the interests of shareholders and managers.  Extant research also infers that 
strong corporate governance is effective at reducing managerial opportunism and results 
in stronger pay for performance sensitivity (Geiler and Renneboog, 2011).  The results 
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of the analysis suggest that typical measures of board governance, for example higher 
levels of board independence, separation of the board chairperson and CEO, 
appointment of an independent chairperson, are not significant to the sensitivity in 
executive remuneration pay. This result is consistent with the findings of Tian and 
Twite (2010) who examined the effect of good governance on CEO remuneration in 
Australian companies between 2001 and 2005.   
The finding that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations, 
that is forming a remuneration committee that has three members, is independent and 
has an independent chairperson, is not associated with stronger pay for performance 
sensitivity in changes in remuneration is consistent with Capezio et al. (2011).  
Although the Capezio et al. (2011) study only examines CEO remuneration in 
Australian companies, this study extends these findings to suggest that independent 
remuneration committees do not ensure alignment between remuneration and company 
performance for the top ranking executives.  Therefore, the results suggest that the top 
five executives are remunerated regardless of company performance, measured by 
return on assets and total shareholder return.  
The result regarding prior year remuneration is consistent with prior studies focused 
on US companies (Daily et al., 1998; Sun and Cahan, 2009). Further, studies on UK 
companies have identified that prior year remuneration is a significant determinant of 
future remuneration (Gregory-Smith, 2009).  The analysis presented suggests that this is 
also the case with regard to Australian companies. 
Recall that Hypothesis 6b predicts that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations strengthens the link to company performance. Limited 
support was found in the preceding section for Hypothesis 6b, in certain circumstances. 
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The discussion in this section suggests that the presence of a remuneration committee 
adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with 
stronger pay for performance sensitivity in remuneration contracts related to the top five 
ranked executives. Consequently these findings do not provide support for Hypothesis 
6b. 
TABLE 7-13: REGRESSION RESULTS - PAY FOR PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
Model 4 (Hypothesis 6b) 
N = 951 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter
11
 +/- 0.08 1.52 
∆ROA +/- -0.06 -2.19 ** 
ASX Adopter* ∆ ROA + 0.05 1.09 
TSR + 0.00 -0.95 
Ln Cash  Remunerationt-1 + -0.42 -22.62 
*** 
Insider Shareholding - 0.02 1.19 
Institutional Shareholding + 0.00 1.71 * 
Company Size + 0.12 7.62 *** 
Board Size - 0.04 2.72 *** 
Board Independence - 0.04 0.45 
Separate Board Chair - 0.06 -0.93 
Independent Board Chair - -0.00 -0.02 
CEO Entrenchment + 0.03 0.33 
Growth + 0.01 2.00 ** 
Risk  0.00 -0.06 
Constant  3.23 12.11 *** 
R-squared 0.38 
Adjusted R-squared 0.36 
F statistic 23.24
***
 
***, **, * denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
∆ Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2∆ROA + β3ASX Adopter*∆ROA + β4TSR + β5Ln Cash 
Remunerationt-1 +β6InsiderShareholding + β7Institutional Shareholding +  β8Company Size + β9Board Size + 
β10Board Independence + β11Separate Board Chair + β12Independent Board Chair + β13CEO Entrenchment +  
β14Growth + β15Risk +  β16Industry + ε 
                                                 
11
  Some studies exclude finance companies on the basis they are subject to different regulation.  Model 4 was 
re-run using the full sample excluding finance companies (GISC = 40).  The model was robust to the 
exclusion of finance companies.  
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Where: 
Dependent Variable: 
∆ Ln Cash Remuneration =  One year change in the natural log of cash remuneration for the 
top five ranked executives between 2007 and 2008 
Independent and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
∆ROA = the change in return on assets. 
ASX Adopter*∆ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ∆ROA 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives in the prior year. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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7.3.3 Shareholder Dissent 
The following analysis section examines remuneration committee performance 
from the shareholders’ perspective.  Model 5 tests Hypothesis 7 which states that 
companies adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations receive lower 
levels of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report.  The dependent variable 
is measured as the proportion of negative votes cast against the annual remuneration 
report (Carter and Zamora, 2009; Clarkson et al., 2011). A significant level of 
shareholder dissent on remuneration arrangements indicates a failure by the board and 
its remuneration committee to satisfy shareholders that remuneration contracts are 
appropriately aligned with the interests of shareholders. Consistent with extant research, 
the dependent variable is a non-transformed variable (Conyon and Sadler, 2010).  
Model 5 (Shareholder Dissent) 
Shareholder Dissent = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2Ln Cash Remuneration + β3ROA + β4TSR + 
β5Insider Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding + β7Company Size + β8Board Size + 
β9Board Independence +  β10Industry + ε 
Where  
Shareholder Dissent = The number of negative votes cast on the 2008 annual remuneration 
report / (number of votes cast for + number of votes cast against the 2008 annual 
remuneration report). 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments to the top five ranked executives. 
ROA = Earnings from continuing operations divided by total average assets. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties and their related parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
227 
 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
The results of the analysis of Model 5 are included in Table 7-14.  Model 5 is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01.  The adjusted R-squared is 10 per cent.  Whilst 
drawn from the full sample, the sample reduced to 1,039 companies due to missing data.  
The results presented in Table 7-14 indicate that the presence of a remuneration 
committee adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations (β = 0.01,        
t = 1.21, p = 0.23) is not statistically significant. The expectation was that if 
shareholders perceive that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations to be associated with more effective remuneration practice, the 
coefficient would be negative and significant. This result suggests that the presence of a 
remuneration committee with at least three members, the majority of which is 
independent and has an independent chair person is not significantly associated with 
shareholder dissent regarding the annual remuneration report.  This provides no support 
for H7, which predicted that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations would be associated with low levels of shareholder dissent on the 
annual remuneration report. 
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TABLE 7-14: SHAREHOLDER DISSENT AND ASX ADOPTERS 
Model 5 (Hypothesis 7) 
(N = 1,039) 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter
12
 - 0.01 1.21 
Ln Cash Remuneration + 0.00 1.08 
ROA
13
 - -0.01 -1.61 
* 
TSR - -0.00 -0.65 
Insider Shareholding - -0.00 -0.47 
Institutional Shareholding +/- 0.00 2.07 ** 
Company Size +/- 0.01 3.89 *** 
Board Size +/- 0.00 0.51 
Board Independence +/- 0.02 1.86 * 
Constant  -0.19 -4.16 *** 
R-squared 0.12 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 
F statistic 7.36
***
 
***, **, * denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
Shareholder Dissent = β0 + β1ASXAdopter + β2Ln Cash Remuneration + β3ROA + β4TSR + β5Insider 
Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding +  β7Company Size + β8Board Size + β9Board Independence +  
β10Industry + ε 
 
Where 
Dependent Variable: 
Shareholder Dissent = The number of negative votes cast on the 2008 annual remuneration 
report / (number of votes cast for + number of votes cast against the 2008 annual 
remuneration report). 
Independent and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendation 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments to the top five ranked executives. 
ROA = Earnings from continuing operations divided by total average assets. 
                                                 
12
  The model was also run incorporating an interaction variable (ASX Adopter*Ln Cash Remuneration) 
to analyse the interaction between remuneration and adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.  The interaction variable was statistically insignificant at conventional levels.  
The results of the amended model remained substantively similar to the results presented above. 
13
  The model was re-performed substituting ROA with industry adjusted ROA.  The results of the amended 
model were substantively similar to the results presented in Table 7-14. 
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TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties and their related parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
Although the coefficient is positive, remuneration of the top five ranked executives        
(β = 0.00, t = 1.08, p = 0.28) is not significant. This result is contrary to expectations.  
The shareholder vote on the annual remuneration report is intended to reflect 
shareholder satisfaction regarding the remuneration practices of the company.  This 
result suggests that factors other than the cash remuneration of the top five ranked 
executives of the company are associated with shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report.  
Company performance measured by return on assets (β = -0.01, t = -1.61, p = 0.11) 
is marginally significant at best, whilst total shareholder return (β = -0.00, t = -0.65,      
p = 0.52) is not statistically significant.  Therefore, the result regarding return on assets 
provides weak evidence higher operating performance is associated with lower the 
levels of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report.  
Of the control variables, company size (β = 0.01, t = 3.89) is significant at p < 0.01, 
institutional shareholding (β = 0.00, t = 2.07) is significant at p < 0.05 and board 
independence (β = 0.02, t = 1.86) is marginally significant at p < 0.10.  The controls 
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infer that shareholder dissent is higher in larger companies, companies with higher 
institutional ownership, and greater board independence.   
The results regarding remuneration are inconsistent with research conducted in the 
UK (Carter and Zamora, 2009; Conyon and Sadler, 2010), which found that CEO 
remuneration was statistically significant. Extant research suggests that as remuneration 
increases the likelihood of the company receiving a higher level of shareholder dissent 
on the remuneration report also increases.  However, it should be noted that extant 
research has examined the remuneration of the CEO only.  This thesis considers the 
remuneration of the top five ranked executives which includes the CEO but is not 
limited to the CEO. One explanation is that shareholders could take a different view 
when focused solely on the remuneration awarded to the CEO, versus the remuneration 
arrangements of the top five ranked executives. 
The results regarding company size and board independence are consistent with 
extant research (Carter and Zamora, 2009; Conyon and Sadler, 2010). However, 
contrary to the results presented, Conyon and Sadler find that in UK companies 
shareholder dissent is less where the company has higher institutional ownership.  The 
difference in institutional shareholder behaviour in Australian companies and UK 
companies could reflect differences in the institutional setting between the UK and 
Australia. Consistent with extant research, the higher the company performance as 
measured by accounting return the less shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration 
report (Carter and Zamora, 2009; Conyon and Sadler, 2010).  
  Recall hypotheses 6a and 6b expects that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with executive remuneration levels and 
strengthens the link to company performance. Therefore, Hypothesis 7 expects that 
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these companies are associated with lower levels of shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report.  The results outlined above find that the adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with the level of 
shareholder dissent regarding the remuneration report.  That is, an adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations does not significantly influence shareholder 
voting behaviour on the annual remuneration report. Consequently Hypothesis 7 is not 
supported. 
Excessive Remuneration Companies and Shareholder Dissent  
Consistent with the analysis regarding executive remuneration practice, the 
shareholder dissent analysis is extended to analyse those companies identified as paying 
excessive remuneration to the top five ranked executives. The analysis of executive 
remuneration levels identified that companies adopting the ASX remuneration 
committee requirements are associated with excessive remuneration levels for the top 
five ranked executives.  In this section the analysis is extended to determine whether 
these companies are also associated with higher levels of shareholder dissent on the 
annual remuneration report.  The results of the analysis are included in Table 7-15.    
The model is statistically significant at p < 0.01.  The adjusted R-squared is 21 per 
cent.  The sample used is the same sample used in the analysis of excessive 
remuneration levels, although the sample reduced to 257 companies due to missing 
data.  
Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations (ASX Adopter              
β = -0.04, t = -2.12) is statistically significant at p < 0.05. The negative coefficient 
suggests that in companies identified as paying excessive remuneration to the top five 
ranked executives, companies that adopt the ASX remunerating committee 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
232 
 
recommendations are associated with lower levels of shareholder dissent.  This provides 
some support for Hypothesis 7. The preceding section identified that adoption of the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with the level of 
shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report.  Therefore the support for 
Hypothesis 7 identified in this analysis is limited to those companies identified as 
paying excessive remuneration to their key executives. 
The level of remuneration (β = 0.03, t = 1.44, p = 0.15) in these companies is not 
significant.  Company performance measured by accounting return (β = -0.00, t = -0.10,   
p = 0.92), and total shareholder return (β = -0.01, t = -0.64, p = 0.52) are also not 
significant.  The lack of statistical significance infers that shareholder dissent on the 
annual remuneration report is not related to the level of cash remuneration awarded to 
the top five ranked executives nor is it related to company performance in companies 
identified as paying excessive levels of remuneration. 
Board independence (β = 0.07, t = 2.92) is significant at p < 0.01 and insider 
shareholding (β = -0.01, t = -2.16) is significant at p < 0.05.  The remaining control 
variables, institutional shareholding, company size and board size are not significant.  
Overall the results of the control variables suggest that company with higher insider 
shareholding are associated with lower shareholder dissent and greater board 
independence is associated with higher levels of shareholder dissent in companies 
paying excessive remuneration to the top five ranked executives.  
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TABLE 7-15: SHAREHOLDER DISSENT – EXCESSIVE REMUNERATION COMPANIES 
Model 5 (Hypothesis 7) (N = 257) Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter
14
 -0.04 -2.14 ** 
Ln Cash Remuneration 0.03 1.44 
ROA -0.00 -0.10 
TSR -0.01 -0.64 
Insider Shareholding -0.01 -2.16 ** 
Institutional Shareholding 0.00 1.20 
Company Size 0.01 1.52 
Board Size 0.00 0.19 
Board Independence 0.07 2.92 *** 
Constant -0.46 -2.93 *** 
R-squared 0.26 
Adjusted R-squared 0.21 
F statistic  4.75*** 
Whites Adjusted OL S results presented.
 
*** , **, * denotes
 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent 
respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
Shareholder Dissent = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2Ln Cash Remuneration + β3ROA + β4TSR + 
β5Insider Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding + β7Company Size + β8Board Size + 
β9Board Independence +  β10Industry + ε 
 
Where 
Dependent Variable: 
Shareholder Dissent = The number of negative votes cast on the 2008 annual remuneration 
report / (number of votes cast for + number of votes cast against the 2008 annual 
remuneration report). 
Independent and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendation 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments to the top five ranked executives. 
ROA = Earnings from continuing operations divided by total average assets. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price 
                                                 
14
 The model was also run incorporating an interaction variable (ASX Adopter*Ln Cash Remuneration) to 
analyse the interaction between remuneration and adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.  The interaction variable was statistically insignificant at conventional levels.   
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Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties and their related parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
Shareholder Dissent - Summary 
The results of the shareholder dissent analysis provides evidence that adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with shareholder 
dissent regarding the annual remuneration report, unless the company pays excessive 
remuneration. In companies identified as paying excessive remuneration to the top five 
ranked executives, the presence of a remuneration committee adopting all three 
guidelines outlined in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated 
with lower levels of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report.  Overall, the 
findings provide only limited support for Hypothesis 7. 
7.4 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
7.4.1 Company Size Analysis 
As company size is considered a significant factor relevant to executive 
remuneration, the analysis is re-performed based on company size (Tosi et al., 2000). 
Windsor and Cybinski (2009) found that the efficacy of the remuneration committee is 
affected by company size.  Although Windsor and Cybinski (2009) partitioned their 
sample into three groups based on size, the sample used was large companies.  The 
sample used in this thesis is a larger and more comprehensive sample of all company 
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sizes.  The analysis examines three groups of companies reflecting large, mid-size and 
small companies. The large company analysis examines companies included in the 
sample which are also included in the ASX 300 Index. The small company analysis 
examines the smallest five hundred companies included in the sample based on asset 
size.  The remaining companies are included in the mid-size company analysis.  
Remuneration levels, pay for performance sensitivity and shareholder dissent models 
are analysed for each company size.  The results of the analyses are presented in Table 
7-16. 
Remuneration Levels & Pay for Performance Sensitivity 
This section examines the relation between adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations and company size.  Remuneration levels (Model 3) and 
pay for performance sensitivity of remuneration (Model 4) awarded to the executives is 
examined for each group of companies. Larger companies are associated with paying 
higher salaries, having more complex operations and therefore more complex 
remuneration practices.  The companies included in the large company analysis are the 
154 companies included in full sample who are also members of the ASX 300 Index.  
This sub-sample reduces to 135 companies due to missing data.    
The model examining remuneration levels (Model 3) is statistically significant at     
p < 0.01.  The adjusted R-squared is 49 per cent.  The key variables of interest are 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and the interaction 
between adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and operating 
performance measured by return on assets.  ASX adopter (β = -0.06, t = -0.37, p = 0.71) 
is statistically insignificant.  This suggests that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
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committee recommendations is not associated with executive remuneration levels in 
large companies. 
Return on assets (β = 1.92, t = 2.52) is significant at p < 0.01. The interaction 
variable (β = -2.46, t = -2.66) is significant at p < 0.01, however the negative coefficient 
means that the remuneration committee is not associated with stronger linkage between 
cash remuneration and operating performance.  Total shareholder return (β = -0.30,        
t = -2.45) is significant at p < 0.05, suggesting that in large companies increases in 
shareholder wealth are associated with lower remuneration awarded to the executives.  
Consequently, in large companies, whilst increases in operating return as associated 
with higher remuneration, the opposite occurs when shareholder wealth increases. 
Company size (β = 0.34, t = 5.63) is statistically significant at p < 0.01 and the 
appointment of an independent board chair (β = 0.35, t = 1.80) and company growth              
(β = 0.04, t = 1.77) are marginally significant at p < 0.10. The results of the control 
variables indicate that higher remuneration is associated with larger companies, 
company growth and companies that have appointed an independent board chairperson.  
The other control variables, board size, board independence, separation of the roles of 
CEO and board chairperson, CEO entrenchment and company risk are insignificant to 
remuneration awarded to the executives in large companies.   
The mid-size company analysis (N = 620) includes all companies included in the 
full sample that are not included in the large or small company sub-samples. The model 
analysing remuneration levels (Model 3) is statistically significant at p < 0.01.  The 
adjusted R-squared is 22 per cent. Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations (β = 0.27, t = 2.62) is significant at p < 0.01. The positive coefficient 
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means that companies adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations are 
associated with higher levels of remuneration in mid-size companies. 
Accounting return, ROA, (β = -0.08, t = -1.29, p = 0.20) and total shareholder 
return (β = 0.00, t = -1.07, p = 0.29) are not significant. The interaction variable           
(β = 0.03, t = 0.16, p =0.87) is also not significant.  This indicates that in mid-sized 
companies, operating performance and shareholder return are not associated with 
executive remuneration levels.  Further, the adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is not associated with stronger linkage between 
remuneration and company performance in these companies. 
Shareholder characteristics related to insider shareholdings (β = 0.09, t = 2.97) 
and institutional shareholdings (β = 0.01, t = 3.48) are statistically significant at             
p < 0.01.  Company size (β = 0.24, t = 5.69) and board size (β = 0.10, t = 2.99) are also 
significant at p < 0.01, whilst company growth (β = 0.03, t = 1.66) is marginally 
significant at p <0.10.  The remaining control variables are not significant. 
Consequently higher remuneration is associated with higher insider shareholding, 
higher institutional shareholding, larger companies, companies with larger boards and 
companies experiencing higher growth. CEO entrenchment is not associated with 
remuneration levels. Board governance related to board independence, the appointment 
of an independent board chair, and the separation of the roles of CEO and board chair 
are also not significant.   
The small company sub-sample (N = 312) includes the five hundred smallest 
companies by asset size.  The sub-sample reduced to include only those companies that 
pay remuneration.  Missing data also reduces the sub-sample.  The model examining 
remuneration levels (Model 3) is statistically significant at p = 0.01.  The adjusted R-
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squared is 6 per cent.  The presence of a remuneration committee adopting the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations (β = 0.29, t = 1.12, p = 0.27) is statistically 
insignificant.  This result indicates that these committees are not associated with the 
level of remuneration awarded to executives in small companies. 
Accounting return, ROA, (β = -0.09, t = -0.96, p = 0.34) and total shareholder 
return (β = -0.03, t = -0.32, p = 0.75) are statistically insignificant, as is the interaction 
between accounting return and ASX adopter (β = 0.03, t = 0.26, p = 0.80).  Therefore 
company performance is not associated with the level of remuneration awarded to the 
top five ranked executives.  Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations does not influence the link between remuneration and operating 
performance in these companies. 
Company size (β = 0.40, t = 3.76) and the separation of the roles of CEO and board 
chair (β = -0.47, t = -2.75) are significant at p < 0.01, whilst the appointment of an 
independent board chair (β = 0.30, t = 1.81) is significant at p < 0.10. Shareholder 
characteristics related to insider shareholding and institutional shareholding are 
statistically insignificant.  Board size, board independence, CEO entrenchment, 
company growth and risk are also not significant.  Therefore companies at the larger 
end of the small company group and companies with an independent board chairperson 
pay higher salaries to their key executives. This effect is moderated if the roles of CEO 
and board chairperson are separated. 
The model analysing pay for performance sensitivity of remuneration in large 
companies (Model 4) is statistically significant at p < 0.01 (N = 127). The sample is 
reduced due to missing data points.  The adjusted R-squared is 30 per cent. Adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations (β = -0.08, t = -0.79, p =0.43) is not 
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associated with the pay for performance sensitivity of executive remuneration in large 
companies. 
 Change in return on assets (β = 1.22, t = 3.57) is significant at p < 0.01.  The 
interaction between ASX adopter and return on assets (β = -2.41, t = -3.40) is also 
significant at p < 0.01.  Total shareholder return (β = -0.20, t = -2.53) is significant at    
p = 0.01. The results suggest that changes to remuneration are associated with operating 
performance and shareholder wealth. Whilst operating performance is likely to increase 
remuneration, an increase in shareholder wealth results in a smaller change to 
remuneration.  The negative coefficient on the interaction variable means that adoption 
of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is likely to weaken the pay for 
performance sensitivity in the remuneration awarded to the executives. 
Prior year cash remuneration (β = -0.28, t = -5.75) is significant at p < 0.01, 
indicating that prior year remuneration is a significant determinant of future 
remuneration.  Of the control variables board size (β = 0.08, t = 2.82) is significant at    
p < 0.01, board independence (β = 0.68, t = 2.52) is significant at p = 0.01 and company 
growth (β = 0.03, t = 1.93) at p < 0.10. The positive coefficients mean that higher 
remuneration is associated with companies with larger and more independent boards 
and companies with higher growth.  The other control variables, company size, insider 
shareholder, institutional shareholding, separation of the roles of CEO and board chair, 
the appointment of an independent board chair, CEO entrenchment and company risk 
are not significant. 
The results suggest that in large companies, remuneration committees adopting the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations are not associated with cash 
remuneration or stronger linkage between remuneration and company performance. 
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This result is inconsistent with the results of the main analysis using the full sample 
which found that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations was 
associated with higher remuneration levels. Therefore in relation to large companies, 
Hypothesis 6a is not supported.  However, the results are consistent with the main 
analysis regarding pay for performance sensitivity.  The large company results are 
consistent with the findings of Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) study, however 
inconsistent with the Capezio et al. (2011) study.  These two studies examined large 
Australian companies.   
Of particular interest is that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with weaker pay for performance sensitivity of 
remuneration awarded to executives in large companies.  The result is contrary to 
theoretical expectations and the prediction in Hypothesis 6b.   
The pay for performance sensitivity model (Model 4) is statistically significant 
at p < 0.01 for mid-size companies (N = 554).  The sample is reduced due to missing 
data points. The adjusted R-squared is 21 per cent.  ASX Adopter (β = 0.10, t = 1.79) is 
marginally significant at p < 0.10, suggesting that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with larger changes in executive 
remuneration. 
Change in accounting return, ROA, (β = -0.04, t = -1.69) is marginally 
significant at p < 0.10, whilst total shareholder return (β = -0.00, t = -4.80) is significant 
at p < 0.01. The interaction between change in operating performance and ASX 
complaint (β = -0.34, t = -2.30) is significant at p < 0.05. The results suggest that change 
in operating performance and shareholder wealth affect changes in remuneration 
awarded to the executives.  However, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
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recommendations is likely to weaken the pay for performance sensitivity in changes in 
executive remuneration.  
Prior year cash remuneration (β = -0.37, t = -8.03) and company size (β = 0.11,            
t = 4.00) are significant at p < 0.01. Institutional shareholding (β = 0.00, t = 2.47) and 
board size (β = 0.04, t = 2.19) are significant at p < 0.05.  Other controls related to 
insider shareholding, board independence, separate board chair, independent board 
chair, growth and risk are not significant.  Consequently prior year remuneration is a 
significant determinant of changes in remuneration in the next year, as is company size. 
Board size is also positively related to change in remuneration.  
Overall the results infer that in mid-sized companies’ adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is associated with executive remuneration 
levels, providing support for Hypothesis 6a.  In particular, adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is associated with higher levels of 
remuneration.  Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is also 
marginally associated with changes to executive remuneration of the top five ranked 
executives.  However, adoption of the ASX remuneration recommendations is 
associated with weaker, not stronger, pay for performance sensitivity in the 
remuneration awarded to key executives. Therefore, in mid-sized companies, 
Hypothesis 6b is not supported. 
The pay for performance sensitivity model (Model 4) is statistically significant at   
p < 0.01 for small companies (N = 226).  The sample is reduced due to missing data 
points. The adjusted R-squared is 43 per cent.  ASX adopter (β = 0.17, t = 1.29,              
p = 0.20) is statistically insignificant.  Therefore in small companies adoption of the 
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ASX remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with changes in 
remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives.   
Change in accounting return (ROA) (β = -0.08, t = -2.05) is significant at p < 0.05.  
The interaction between change in accounting return (ROA) and ASX adopter (β = 0.10, 
t = 2.36) is marginally significant at p < 0.10. Total shareholder return is statistically 
insignificant (β = 0.04, t = 0.60, p = 0.55).  Therefore changes in operating performance 
as opposed to shareholder wealth are associated with changes in executive 
remuneration. Additionally, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations strengthens the link between operating performance and remuneration 
in small companies. 
Prior year cash remuneration (β = -0.51, t = -10.45) and company size (β = 0.18,     
t = 2.69) are significant at p < 0.01.  The remaining control variables are not significant. 
Therefore, prior year remuneration and company size are a key determinant of change in 
executive remuneration in small companies. 
Extant research regarding the influence of performance on executive remuneration 
tends to focus on CEO remuneration and samples of large companies.  Research to date 
has yielded largely mixed results.  A number of the extant studies on Australian 
companies which have yielded mixed results are longitudinal studies (Clarkson et al., 
2006; Merhebi et al., 2006; Arthur and O'Neill, 2010; Tian and Twite, 2010; Capezio et 
al., 2011). When considered collectively, these studies examine the CEO remuneration 
practices in large Australian companies for the period 1990 to 2008. The findings in 
these studies do not suggest that the pay for performance link has consistently increased 
over time.    
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The results of the analysis discussed in this section provide evidence that operating 
performance is associated with executive remuneration levels in large companies but 
not small companies. Further, operating performance is associated with change in 
executive remuneration across all companies regardless of size, however the association 
is more pronounced in larger companies.  Total shareholder return is also associated 
with executive remuneration in large and mid-sized companies, however not small 
companies. Therefore this study provides evidence as to the effect of performance on 
executive remuneration across varying company sizes. 
Of interest in this thesis is the role of the remuneration committee, in particular 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  The results provide 
evidence that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is 
associated with higher remuneration levels in mid-sized companies.  These committees 
are not associated with remuneration levels in large and small companies.  The findings 
also suggest that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is 
associated with weaker pay for performance sensitivity in large and mid-sized 
companies, but not small companies.  
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TABLE 7-16: COMPANY SIZE ANALYSIS – REMUNERATION COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS 
Panel A Model 3 (Remuneration Levels) 
 Large  (N = 135) Mid  (N = 620) Small  (N = 312) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter -0.06 -0.37 0.27 2.62 *** 0.29 1.12  
ROA  1.92 2.52 *** -0.08 -1.29 -0.09 -0.96  
ROA *ASX Adopter   -2.46 -2.66 
*** 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.26  
TSR -0.30 -2.45 ** 0.00 -1.07 -0.03 -0.32  
Cash Remunerationt-1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A  
Insider Shareholding 0.07 1.61 * 0.09 2.97 *** 0.05 0.80  
Institutional Shareholding 0.00 1.35 0.01 3.48 *** -0.01 -1.02  
Company Size 0.34 5.63 *** 0.24 5.69 *** 0.40 3.76 *** 
Board Size 0.06 1.48 0.10 2.99 *** 0.06 0.99 
Board Independence 0.57 1.38 0.02 0.11 -0.13 -0.49 
Separate Board Chair -0.27 -1.12 -0.20 -1.59 -0.47 -2.75 *** 
Independent Board Chair 0.35 1.80 * -0.01 -0.01 0.30 1.81 * 
CEO Entrenchment -0.09 -0.47 -0.11 -0.59 0.19 0.65 
Growth 0.04 1.77 * 0.03 1.66 * 0.01 0.96  
Risk 0.00 0.41 -0.01 -0.80 -0.00 -0.03 
Constant 6.07 5.27 *** 7.61 10.58 *** 5.72 3.41 *** 
R-squared 0.58 0.25 0.13 
Adjusted R-squared 0.49 0.22 0.06 
F statistic 6.64*** 8.39*** 1.83*** 
*** , **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
Model 3 (Ln Cash Remuneration) = β0 + β1ASX_Adopter + β2ROA + β3 ASX Adopter* ROA + β4TSR + β5Insider Shareholding + 
β6Institutional Shareholding +  β7Company Size + β8Board Size + β9Board Independence + β10Separate Board Chair + β11Independent 
Board Chair +  β12CEO Entrenchment +  β13Growth + β14Risk +  β15Industry + ε 
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TABLE 7-16: COMPANY SIZE ANALYSIS – REMUNERATION COMMITTEE EFFECTIVENESS (CONT.) 
Panel B Model 4 (Pay for Performance Sensitivity) 
 Large  (N = 127) Mid^  (N = 554) Small^ (N = 266) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter -0.08 -0.79 0.10 1.79 * 0.17 1.29  
∆ROA 1.22 3.57 *** -0.04 -1.69 * -0.08 -2.05 ** 
∆ ROA*ASX Adopter -2.41 -3.40 *** -0.34 -2.30 ** 0.10 2.36 * 
TSR -0.20 -2.53 *** -0.00 -4.80 *** 0.04 0.60  
Cash Remunerationt-1 -0.28 -5.75 
*** -0.37 -8.03 *** -0.51 -10.45 *** 
Insider Shareholding 0.02 0.87 0.17 1.00 -0.06 -0.98  
Institutional Shareholding -0.00 -0.60 0.00 2.47 ** -0.00 -0.49  
Company Size 0.06 1.29 0.11 4.00 *** 0.18 2.69 *** 
Board Size 0.08 2.82 *** 0.04 2.19 ** -0.01 -0.17  
Board Independence 0.68 2.52 *** -0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.30  
Separate Board Chair -0.01 -0.08 -0.10 -1.49 0.04 0.36  
Independent Board Chair -0.10 -0.78 0.03 0.45 -0.05 -0.34  
CEO Entrenchment 0.15 1.12 0.07 0.59 -0.08 -0.45  
Growth 0.03 1.93 * 0.01 1.07 0.01 1.143  
Risk -0.00 -1.44 -0.01 -1.16 -0.00 -0.02  
Constant 2.37 3.07 *** 1.03 5.10 *** 3.81 3.46 *** 
R-squared 0.44 0.25 0.48 
Adjusted R-squared 0.30 0.21 0.43 
F statistic 3.29*** 6.94*** 9.29*** 
^ White’s Adjusted OLS presented.  ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
Model 4(∆ Ln  Cash Remuneration) = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2∆ROA + β3ASX Adopter*∆ROA + β4TSR + β5Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 +β6Insider 
Shareholding + β7Institutional Shareholding +  β8Company Size + β9Board Size + β10Board Independence + β11Separate Board Chair + 
β12Independent Board Chair +  β13CEO Entrenchment +  β14Growth + β15Risk +  β16Industry + ε 
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Where: 
Dependent Variable: 
Model 3 (Ln Cash Remuneration) = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits 
and cash bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives. 
Model 4 (∆ Ln Cash Remuneration) =  One year change in the natural log of cash 
remuneration for the top five ranked executives between 2007 and 2008 
Independent and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA = Return on Assets for 2008.  
∆ROA =The change in return on assets. 
ASX Adopter*ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ROA. 
ASX Adopter*∆ROA = Interaction variable, ASX Adopter * ∆ROA 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Growth = Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, winsorised at 1per cent. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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7.4.2 Shareholder Dissent on the Annual Remuneration Report 
The analysis is extended to examine whether shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report is affected by company size.  The results of the analyses are 
presented in Table 7-17. 
The large company shareholder dissent model failed to reach statistical 
significance.  The adjusted R-squared is 5 per cent.  ASX adopter is statistically 
insignificant (β = 0.03, t = 0.76, p = 0.45), suggesting that adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with shareholder dissent on 
the annual remuneration report. 
The key contributors to shareholder dissent relate to remuneration levels and 
company performance.  Cash remuneration (β = 0.04, t = 1.68) is marginally significant 
at p < 0.10, suggesting that shareholder dissent increases as executive remuneration 
levels for the top five ranked executives’ increases. Return on assets (β = -0.37,              
t = -0.11) is significant at p < 0.01.  The negative coefficient means that as company 
operating performance increases, the company is less likely to receive high levels of 
shareholder dissent in relation to the annual remuneration report.  None of the control 
variables are statistically significant.  
If shareholder dissent on the remuneration report is solely based on the 
company’s executive remuneration practices, the results achieved in the large company 
sample are consistent with theoretical expectations. That is, ceterus paribus, shareholder 
dissent is positively associated with high remuneration levels and lower in performing 
companies. This result is consistent with results of extant research conducted on UK 
companies, although the prior literature focuses solely on the remuneration of the CEO.  
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Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations does not significantly 
influence this relation.  
The model analysing shareholder dissent in mid-sized companies is statistically 
significant at p < 0.01.  The adjusted R-squared is 4 per cent.  The presence of a 
remuneration committee adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
is statistically insignificant (β = 0.11, t = 1.50, p = 0.13).  Consequently, as is the case 
with large companies, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
does not significantly influence shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report in 
medium sized companies. 
Cash remuneration is also statistically insignificant (β = 0.00, t = 0.09, p = 0.93).  
Accounting return, ROA, (β = -0.00, t = -0.56, p = 0.58) and shareholder return            
(β = -0.00, t = -0.61, p = 0.54) are also statistically insignificant. Of the control variables 
company size (β = 0.01, t = 2.28) is significant at p < 0.05 and institutional 
shareholding (β = 0.00, t = 1.90) is significant at p < 0.10.  None of the other control 
variables are statistically significant.  Larger companies in the mid-sized category are 
associated with higher levels of dissent.  Additionally as a company’s institutional 
shareholding increases, so too does the level of shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report.  
Institutional shareholders are encouraged to be proactive and therefore act as 
substitute monitoring mechanisms.  Consequently institutions respond to a combination 
of company characteristics, including governance factors such as adoption of the ASX 
Recommendations, when lodging their annual vote on the remuneration report.  The 
results presented in Table 7-17 infer that shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration 
report in mid-sized companies is not a response to executive remuneration practice or its 
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oversight, but rather associated with company size and the level of institutional 
shareholding. 
The model for small companies is statistically significant at p < 0.01.  The 
adjusted R-squared is 8 per cent.  ASX adopter (β = -0.00, t = -0.03, p = 0.98) is 
statistically insignificant.  This result is consistent with the results achieved in the large 
company and medium sized company analyses.  
Cash remuneration is also statistically insignificant (β = 0.00, t = 0.95, p = 0.34) 
in small companies.  Return on assets (β = -0.00, t = -2.35) is significant at p < 0.05, and 
total shareholder return is significant at (β = -0.01, t = -1.87) at p < 0.10.  Therefore 
shareholders in small companies are more focused on company performance as opposed 
to remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives.  As operating performance 
and shareholder wealth increases, levels of shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report are lower. 
 Company characteristics that are statistically significant are company size and 
board independence.  Company size (β = 0.02, t = 2.26) is significant at p < 0.05 and 
board independence (β = 0.02, t = 1.86) is significant at p < 0.10.  Therefore as 
company size increases and the number of independent directors appointed to the board 
increases the level of shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report also 
increases.  Overall in small companies, shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration 
report is associated with company performance and other company characteristics as 
opposed to the remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives or adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations. 
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TABLE 7-17: REMUNERATION COMMITTEES, SHAREHOLDER DISSENT AND COMPANY SIZE ANALYSIS 
Model 5 (Shareholder Dissent) Large Companies (N = 134) Mid-Size Companies (N = 603) Small Companies (N = 245) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter 0.03 0.76 0.11 1.50 -0.00 -0.03 
Cash Remuneration 0.04 1.68 * 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.95 
ROA -0.37 -0.11 *** -0.00 -0.56 -0.01 -2.35 ** 
TSR -0.01 -0.28 -0.00 -0.61 -0.01 -1.87 * 
Insider Shareholding 0.01 1.03 -0.01 -1.54 0.00 0.59 
Institutional Shareholding 0.00 0.67 0.00 1.90 * 0.00 0.46 
Company Size -0.01 -0.92 0.01 2.28 ** 0.02 2.26 ** 
Board Size 0.01 0.91 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.84 
Board Independence -0.04 -0.47 0.02 1.28 0.02 1.86 * 
Constant -0.16 -0.28 -0.13 -1.65 -0.28 -2.70 *** 
R-squared 0.18 0.07 0.13 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.08 
F statistic 1.397 2.28
***
 2.40
***
 
*** , **, *  denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
Shareholder Dissent = β0 + β1ASX Adopter + β2Ln Cash Remuneration + β3ROA + β4TSR + β5Insider Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding +  
β7Company Size + β8Board Size + β9Board Independence +  β10Industry + ε 
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Where 
Dependent Variable: 
Shareholder Dissent = The number of negative votes cast on the 2008 annual remuneration 
report / (number of votes cast for + number of votes cast against the 2008 annual 
remuneration report). 
Independent and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
membership guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendation 
regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments to the top five ranked executives. 
ROA = Earnings from continuing operations divided by total average assets. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties and their related parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
7.4.3 Company Size Analysis Summary 
The company size analysis suggests that company performance is more relevant 
to executive remuneration to the top five ranked executive in large companies when 
compared to mid-sized or small companies.  The largest predictor of future 
remuneration across all company sizes is prior year remuneration.  Additionally, 
remuneration committees adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
are not associated with moderating remuneration levels or stronger linkage between 
remuneration and company performance in either large or mid-size companies.  
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However, these committees are associated with a stronger link between company 
performance and the remuneration of the top five ranked executives in small companies.  
Further, remuneration committees adopting the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations are not associated with more effective remuneration practices when 
viewed from the shareholder perspective.  Had shareholders perceived the adoption of 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations as being associated with more 
effective remuneration practices, the coefficient would be negative and significant.  
However, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is 
statistically insignificant regardless of company size. 
Whilst higher levels of remuneration are associated with higher levels of 
shareholder dissent in large companies, executive remuneration levels are statistically 
insignificant in small and mid-size companies.  As operating performance measured by 
accounting return (ROA) increased, shareholder dissent in small and large companies 
decreased. Increases in shareholder wealth is also associated with lower levels of 
shareholder dissent in small companies.  Consequently the analysis indicates that 
company characteristics other than the formal governance mechanism employed to 
oversee executive remuneration statistically influence shareholder voting patterns on the 
annual remuneration report.  This conclusion holds true, regardless of company size. 
7.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
7.5.1 Endogeneity 
The decision to adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations may not 
be exogenous as the decision can be influenced by executive remuneration practices of 
the company and its association with company performance  (Sun and Cahan, 2009).  
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Consequently following Frankel, Kothari and Weber (2006) and Sun and Cahan (2009), 
a two stage ordinary least squares regression is employed. 
As the ASX adopter variable is dichotomous, in the first stage regression, a 
measure of remuneration committee quality is substituted for the dichotomous variable 
dependent variable.  The substitution is employed on the basis that ordinary least 
squares cannot facilitate a dependent variable that is dichotomous.  The variable Rem 
Score is a composite score which measures remuneration committee quality in the same 
way as ASX Adopter, however it is a continuous variable rather than a dichotomous 
variable. One point is awarded for each ASX remuneration committee recommendation 
adopted. The minimum score is zero and the maximum score is four.  Table 7-18 
summarises the recommendations included in Rem Score. 
TABLE 7-18: REMUNERATION SCORE COMPONENTS 
Recommendations  Score 
The company should form a remuneration 
committee 
+ 1 if remuneration committee 
formed 
The remuneration committees consists of: 
 at least three members 
 the majority of which are independent 
 an independent chairperson is appointed 
 
+1 if adopted  
+1 if adopted  
+1 if adopted  
Maximum Score 4 
 
The variables included in the first stage ordinary least squares regression are those 
variables identified in Chapter 6 as driving the demand for adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. These variables relate to shareholding 
characteristics, in particular insider shareholding and institutional shareholding, CEO 
influence and company size. The inclusion of these variables is also consistent with 
variables identified in extant research as being relevant to the demand for remuneration 
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committees (Sun and Cahan, 2009). A new variable (Rem Comm Rank) is included in 
the first stage ordinary least squares regression model as extant research suggests that 
portfolio rank can be used as an instrumental variable (Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; 
Sun and Cahan, 2009). Consequently, Rem Comm Rank is coded zero (0), one (1) or 
two (2) based on the portfolio rank of the variable Rem  Score.  The variable Rem Score 
is sorted in order of size. The portfolio rank is allocated based on size.  The lower scores 
are awarded a rank of 0, the mid-level scores awarded a rank of 1, and the higher scores 
are awarded a rank of 2. 
The second stage regression reflects Models 3 and 4 as detailed earlier in the 
chapter. However, the variable Rem Score included in the second stage ordinary least 
squares regression is the fitted value derived from the first stage ordinary least squares 
regression.  The two stage ordinary least squares regression models are presented below. 
First Stage Regression Model: 
Rem Score = β0 + β1Insider Shareholding + β2Institutional Shareholding +  β3CEO 
Entrenchment + β4Company Size + β5Rem Comm Rank + ε 
Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
Rem Score = composite score determined by adding one point for each ASX remuneration 
committee recommendation adopted, maximum possible score of four. 
Independent Variables and Control Variables: 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
CEO Entrenchment = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the company has 
changed in the two years prior to the 2008 financial report, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Rem Comm Rank = portfolio rank based Rem_Score, ranks are coded zero (0), one (1) or two 
(2). 
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Second Stage Regression Model: 
Remuneration Levels: 
Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1Rem Score + β2ROA + β3 Rem Score* ROA + β4TSR + 
β5Insider Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding +  β7CEO Entrenchment + β8Board 
Size + β9Board Independence + β10Separate Board Chair + β11Independent Board Chair  + 
β12Company Size+  β13Risk +  β14Industry + ε 
Pay for Performance Sensitivity: 
Ln ∆ Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1Rem Score + β2∆ROA + β3Rem Score*∆ROA + β4TSR + 
β5Ln Cash Remuneraitont-1 + β6Insider Shareholding + β7Institutional Shareholding +  
β8CEO Entrenchment + β9Board Size + β10Board Independence + β11Separate Board Chair 
+ β12Independent Board Chair + β13Company Size+  β14Risk +  β15Industry + ε 
Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives. 
∆ Ln Cash Remuneration = the change in the natural log of the total cash remuneration for 
the top five ranked executives. 
 
Independent Variables and Control Variables: 
Rem Score = The fitted value of the composite score determined by adding one point for 
each ASX remuneration committee recommendation adopted, maximum possible score of 
four derived from the first stage OLS model. 
Rem Score* ROA = interaction variable where Rem Score is multiplied by ROA. 
Rem Score*∆ROA = interaction variable where Rem Score is multiplied by Change in 
ROA. 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
guidelines included in the ASX remuneration committee recommendations regarding 
committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA = Return on Assets for 2008. 
∆ROA = the change in return on assets. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
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Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives for the prior year. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
Table 7-19 presents the second stage regression results. The model examining 
remuneration levels is significant at p < 0.01.  The adjusted R-squared is 38 per cent.  
Rem Score (β = 0.11, t = 4.66) is significant at p < 0.01, suggesting that remuneration 
committees adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations are associated 
with higher executive remuneration.  
Return on assets (β = -0.09, t = -1.88) is significant at p < 0.10. However, the 
interaction between Rem Score and ROA (β = 0.02, t = 1.06, p = 0.29) is statistically 
insignificant.  Total shareholder return (β = -0.00, t = -0.77, p = 0.44) is also statistically 
insignificant. Therefore adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
does not result in a greater association between executive remuneration and company 
performance.   
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Of the control variables, shareholder characteristics and company characteristics 
are significant. In particular, insider shareholding (β = 0.07, t = 2.86), institutional 
shareholdings (β = 0.01, t = 3.05), company size (β = 0.29, t = 11.42), board size           
(β = 0.10, t = 3.76) and the separation of the roles of CEO and board chair (β = -0.34,            
t = -3.64) are significant at p < 0.01 and growth (β = 0.02, t = 2.30) is significant at p < 
0.05.   
Therefore remuneration is positively associated with insider shareholding, 
institutional shareholding, company size, board size and growth, and moderated by the 
separation of the roles of board chair and CEO.  Consistent with the main analysis 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations does not result in more 
effective remuneration practice. 
The pay for performance model is statistically significant at p < 0.01.  The 
adjusted R-squared is 37 per cent. Rem score (β = 0.05, t = 3.25) is significant at           
p < 0.01, suggesting that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with increased remuneration.  
Return on assets (β = -0.07, t = -2.62) and total shareholder return (β = -0.00,       
t = -6.76) are also significant at p < 0.01, however the interaction between rem score 
and change in operating performance (β = 0.02, t = 0.93, p = 0.35) is statistically 
insignificant.  Therefore whilst change in operating performance and shareholder wealth 
are associated with changes in executive remuneration, adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is not associated with stronger linkage 
between company performance and changes in remuneration awarded to the top five 
ranked executives. 
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TABLE 7-19: TWO STAGE OLS RESULTS: REMUNERATION COMMITTEE 
EFFECTIVENESS 
Second Stage OLS Model Remuneration Levels 
(N=1044) 
Pay for Performance^   
(N = 951) 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Rem Score  0.11 4.66 *** 0.05 3.25 *** 
ROA /  
∆ ROA 
-0.09 -1.88 *  
-0.07 
 
-2.62 *** 
Rem Score *ROA /  
Rem Score * ∆ ROA 
0.02 1.06  
0.02 
 
0.93 
TSR -0.00 -0.77  -0.00 -6.76 *** 
Cash Remunerationt-1 N/A N/A -0.43 -13.22 
*** 
Insider Shareholding 0.07 2.86 *** 0.01 0.97 
Institutional Shareholding 0.01 3.05 *** 0.00 1.62 * 
Company Size 0.29 11.42 *** 0.12 6.49 *** 
Board Size 0.10 3.76 *** 0.04 2.51 *** 
Board Independence -0.01 -0.08 0.02 0.16 
Separate Chair -0.34 -3.64 *** -0.08 -1.32 
Independent Chair 0.10 1.19 -0.00 -0.01 
CEO Entrenchment -0.23 -.018 0.01 0.14 
Growth 0.02 2.30 ** 0.01 1.94 ** 
Risk 0.00 0.33 -0.00 -1.51  
Constant 6.98 16.99 *** 3.49 10.49 *** 
R-squared 0.43 0.42 
Adjusted R-squared 0.38 0.37 
F statistic 33.86*** 23.75*** 
^White’s Adjusted OLS results presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent 
respectively. Industry effects not presented. 
Ln Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1Rem Score + β2ROA + β3 Rem Score* ROA + β4TSR + β5Insider 
Shareholding + β6Institutional Shareholding +  β7CEO Entrenchment + β8Board Size + β9Board 
Independence + β10Separate Board Chair + β11Independent Board Chair + + β12Company Size+  
β13Risk +  β14Industry + ε 
Ln ∆ Cash Remuneration = β0 + β1Rem Score + β2∆ROA + β3Rem Score*∆ROA + β4TSR + β5Ln Cash 
Remuneraitont-1 + β6Insider Shareholding + β7Institutional Shareholding +  β8CEO Entrenchment + 
β9Board Size + β10Board Independence + β11Separate Board Chair + β12Independent Board Chair + + 
β13Company Size+ β14Risk +  β15Industry + ε 
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Where: 
Dependent Variables: 
Ln Cash Remuneration = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives. 
∆ Ln Cash Remuneration = the change in the natural log of the total cash remuneration for 
the top five ranked executives. 
Independent Variables and Control Variables: 
Rem Score = The fitted value of the composite score determined by adding one point for 
each ASX remuneration committee recommendation adopted, maximum possible score of 
four, derived from the first stage OLS model. 
Rem Score* ROA = interaction variable where Rem Score is multiplied by ROA. 
Rem Score*∆ROA = interaction variable where Rem Score is multiplied by ∆ROA. 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
guidelines included in the  ASX remuneration committee recommendations regarding 
committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
ROA = Return on Assets for 2008. 
∆ROA = the change in return on assets. 
TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives for the prior year. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
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Prior year remuneration (β = -0.43, t = 13.22) is significant at p < 0.01, and 
remains a key determinant of changes in executive remuneration. Company size           
(β = 0.12, t = 6.49) and board size (β = 0.04, t = 2.51) are significant at p < 0.01, growth 
(β = 0.01, t = 1.94) is significant at p < 0.05, and institutional shareholding (β = 0.00,       
t = 1.62) is marginally significant at p < 0.10. The remaining control variables are 
statistically insignificant.   
Overall, after controlling for engodgeneity, the results confirm the conclusion 
drawn in the main analysis. 
 
7.5.2 Committee Effectiveness - Alternate Dependent Variable 
Extant literature identifies alternate base models which can be used to examine 
executive remuneration. Whilst the main analysis uses a single continuous variable 
(change in total cash remuneration), a scaled variable is also used.  Consistent with 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Clarkson et al. (2011), a scaled variable is incorporated 
as the dependent variable to assess the association between the remuneration committee 
and the pay for performance sensitivity for the top five ranked executives. The scaled 
dependent variable is measured as change in cash remuneration divided by market 
capitalisation.  This allows for the sensitivity in the change in remuneration for the top 
five ranked executives to be examined against changes in shareholder wealth (Clarkson 
et al., 2011). The independent variables incorporated into the scaled models are the 
same as the independent variables used in Model 5.  
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The scaled model examines the remuneration committee’s efficacy related to pay 
for performance sensitivity of the top five ranked executives. The full results are 
included at Table 7-20. The amended pay for performance sensitivity model is 
statistically significant at p < 0.01.  The adjusted R-squared is 8 per cent.  
The presence of a remuneration committee adopting the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations (β = -68.42, t = -0.07, p = 0.94) is statistically 
insignificant, as is the interaction between these committees and company performance 
(β = -308.25, t = -0.16, p = 0.76). Prior year remuneration (β = -801.31, t = -3.78) is the 
only significant variable in the model at p < 0.01. 
The results suggest that the presence of a remuneration committee that adopts the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations does not result in stronger pay for 
performance sensitivity for the top five ranked executives.  This result is consistent with 
the results achieved in the main analysis at 7.3.2. 
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TABLE 7-20: PAY FOR PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY MODEL – SCALED DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Model 4 (Pay for Performance)  
N = 989 
Expected Sign Coefficient t-statistic 
ASX Adopter +/- -68.42 -0.07  
∆ROA +/- 1949.44 1.08  
ASX Adopter* ∆ ROA + -308.25 -0.16  
Ln Cash  Remunerationt-1 + -801.31 -3.78 
*** 
TSR + -0.06 -0.10  
Insider Shareholding - 16.04 0.06  
Institutional Shareholding + -38.43 -1.47  
Company Size + -522.05 -1.29  
Board Size - -37.58 -0.11  
Board Independence - -357.77 -0.13  
Separate Board Chair - 2396.06 1.34  
Independent Board Chair - -691.51 -0.73  
CEO Entrenchment + -1253.51 -1.27  
Growth + 288.68 0.82  
Risk  -2.49 -0.50  
Constant  20962.64 2.88 *** 
R-squared 0.10 
Adjusted R-squared 0.08 
F statistic 4.41*** 
*** , **, * denotes significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively.  Industry effects not presented. 
∆ Cash Remuneration2 = β0 + β1Rem Score + β2∆ROA + β3Rem Score*∆ROA + β4TSR + β5Ln 
Cash_Remuneraitont-1 + β6Insider Shareholding + β7Institutional Shareholding +  β8CEO Entrenchment + 
β9Board Size + β10Board Independence + β11Separate Board Chair + β12Independent Board Chair +  β13Company 
Size+  β14Risk +  β15Industry + ε 
 
Where 
Dependent Variables: 
∆ Cash Remuneration2 = change in cash remuneration divided by market capitalisation. 
Independent Variables and Control Variables: 
ASX Adopter = Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has adopted all three 
guidelines included in the ASX Adopter*∆ ROA = interaction variable where ASX Adopter 
is multiplied by ∆ROA. 
ASX Recommendations regarding committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
∆ROA = the change in return on assets. 
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TSR = Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price for the year ended 30 
June 2008. 
Ln Cash Remunerationt-1 = Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefits and cash 
bonuses paid to the top five ranked executives for the prior year. 
Insider Shareholding = Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to be insiders and their related 
parties. 
Institutional Shareholding = Percentage of shareholding by institutional entities identified 
from the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the 2008 annual report as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Size = Number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Board Independence = The number of independent directors appointed to the board divided 
by the total number of directors appointed to the board, as at 30 June 2008. 
Separate Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Board 
chairperson are performed by different people, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Independent Board Chair = Dummy variable coded one (1) if the Board chairperson holding 
office as at 30 June 2008 is an independent director, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Company Size = Natural log of total assets as at 30 June 2008. 
Risk = The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI emerging markets index, 
as at 30 June 2008. 
Industry = Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) industry 
sector. 
 
7.6 SUMMARY 
This chapter presents evidence regarding the efficacy of remuneration committees 
adopting the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  The analysis presented 
in this chapter address the second and third research questions. The second research 
question focused on whether adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations influences the level of remuneration and linkage to company 
performance in remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives.  The third 
research question considers whether adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is negatively associated with shareholder dissent on the annual 
remuneration report. 
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Hypothesis 6a and 6b operationalise the second research question.  The findings in 
relation to the full sample suggest that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with the level of remuneration awarded to the top five 
ranked executives in 2008. In particular, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with higher levels of remuneration. Consequently, as 
Hypothesis 6(a) does not predict the direction of the association support for Hypothesis 
6a is found in the analysis of the full sample.  Hypothesis 6b examined whether 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated with 
stronger linkage between remuneration and company performance.  No support was 
found for Hypothesis 6b in the full sample. 
Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is associated 
with higher levels of remuneration in companies identified as paying excessive 
remuneration to their executives.  However, remuneration committees in these 
companies are also associated with stronger linkage between remuneration and 
company performance in companies that pay excessive levels of remuneration to their 
executives.  Therefore support for Hypothesis 6a is found, and some support for 
Hypothesis 6b is found.  However, the support for Hypothesis 6b is limited to 
companies that pay excessive levels of remuneration to the top five ranked executives. 
The results also suggest that the association between executive remuneration of 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations varies depending on 
whether the company is experiencing positive or negative operating performance. In 
companies with positive return on assets, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with higher levels of remuneration and weaker pay for 
performance sensitivity in remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives. 
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Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is not significantly 
associated with either remuneration levels or pay for performance sensitivity in 
companies with negative return on assets.  Therefore support is found for 6a in 
companies with positive return on assets, however no support is found for Hypothesis 
6b.  In companies with negative return on assets no support is found for either 
Hypothesis 6a or 6b. 
The company size analysis suggests that remuneration committees adopting the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations do not result in more effective 
remuneration practices in either large or mid-size companies, however do result in a 
greater link between company performance and the remuneration of the top five ranked 
executives in small companies. Again, limited support for Hypothesis 6b is found. 
Overall, only limited support at best is found regarding the proposition that 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations ensure the company 
implements appropriate remuneration arrangements.  This conclusion is consistent with 
Clarkson et al. (2011), who report that strengthening of the company’s governance 
structure, measured by factors including board independence and the presence of a 
remuneration committee, plays a limited or insignificant role in the oversight of 
executive remuneration.  Further research is required to determine whether the findings 
of this study remain persistent over time.  
The final research question considers whether adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with lower levels of shareholder dissent on 
the annual remuneration report.  Hypothesis 7 operationalises the final research 
question.  The results of the shareholder dissent analysis provides evidence that the 
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presence of a remuneration committee adopting the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is not statistically significant to shareholder dissent, unless the 
company pays excessive remuneration. In companies identified as paying excessive 
remuneration to the top five ranked executives, adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with lower levels of shareholder dissent on 
the annual remuneration report.  Overall, the findings provide only limited support for 
Hypothesis 7. 
A summary of the findings is included at Appendix 3.  The following chapter 
summarises the main points of the thesis, identifies limitations related to the analyses, 
explores opportunities for future research and concludes the thesis. 
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8. Discussion and Conclusion 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a summary of the thesis, recognises the limitations of the 
study, discusses the implications of the study’s findings and explores opportunities for 
future research. The chapter is presented as follows.  Section 8.2 outlines the 
motivation, research question and contribution of the study. Section 8.3 summarises the 
results of the hypotheses testing, with the implications of the results discussed in 
Section 8.4. Section 8.5 outlines the limitations of the study.  The chapter concludes in 
Section 8.6, which explores opportunities for future research. 
8.2 SUMMARY OF THE MOTIVATION, RESEARCH QUESTION AND CONTRIBUTION 
The effective oversight of executive remuneration has been the subject of 
regulatory policy debate for decades. Whilst the board of directors is ultimately 
responsible for the oversight of executive remuneration, the remuneration committee is 
seen as an appropriate and efficient mechanism to assist the board in ensuring effective 
and responsible remuneration practices (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007).  
The ASX remuneration committee recommendations suggest companies should form a 
remuneration committee of at least three members, the majority of members should be 
independent directors, and the committee should have an independent chairperson 
appointed (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007).  
The revised version of the ASX Recommendations, released in 2010 (Australian 
Corporate Governance Council, 2010), strengthens the independence recommendation 
related to the remuneration committee by suggesting that executive directors should not 
be appointed to the committee unless necessary. Further, the ASX Recommendations 
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suggest that companies should ensure that the remunerating policy adopted “motivate 
senior executives to pursue the long term growth and success of the company and 
demonstrate a clear relationship between senior executive performance and 
remuneration” (ASX Corporate Governance Council, 2007, p. 35).  The ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations promote investor confidence by encouraging 
corporate behaviour that limits the ability for executives acting opportunistically with 
regard to their remuneration and by promoting remuneration arrangements that ensure 
the interest of shareholder and managers are aligned.   
This thesis identifies factors associated with the decision to form a remuneration 
committee and to adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations. Further, 
the thesis examines whether adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations achieves their purpose.  As the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations are grounded in agency theory, an agency theoretical framework is 
used to examine factors influencing the decision to voluntarily adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations.  The thesis also analyses the association 
between adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and executive 
remuneration practices for the top five ranked executives. Shareholder perceptions 
regarding adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations and 
executive remuneration is also examined. 
The research questions posed by this thesis examine (1) the adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations regarding (a) formation and (b) composition 
of the remuneration committee, (2) how adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations influences remuneration levels and pay for performance sensitivity in 
executive remuneration, and (3) whether adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
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recommendations are negatively associated with shareholder dissent regarding 
remuneration practices.  
This study is motivated by a number of factors. First researchers, investors and 
regulators continue to question the effectiveness of existing regulation of executive 
remuneration and its oversight (Windsor and Cybinski, 2009; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 
2010; Australian Productivity Commission, 2010). Regulatory intervention for 
remuneration reporting has occurred partly because of public dissatisfaction with 
perceived excessive executive remuneration, particularly where company performance 
is low. Despite the important role of the remuneration committee in the governance of 
executive remuneration, research into its operation in Australia has been limited.  The 
existing body of literature is insufficient to make broad generalisations regarding the 
overall efficacy of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations in a voluntary 
setting. Further research is required to enable a detailed understanding of the 
determinants, quality, operation and efficacy of remuneration committees. 
Consequently, testing whether remuneration committees are effective at aligning the 
interest of shareholders and executives remains an open and important research goal 
(Conyon, 2011).  
This study contributes to the existing literature in a number of ways.  A 
comprehensive examination is undertaken of the factors influencing the decision to 
voluntarily form a remuneration committee in the Australian setting.  The analysis is 
extended to examine the structure of the remuneration committee consistent with the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations regarding size and independence.  
Much of prior theoretical and empirical studies have been conducted in the United 
States (Kang et al., 2007; Guest, 2008; Sapp, 2008; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2010), 
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which mandates the formation and structure of a remuneration committee. Conducting 
analysis in the Australian voluntary compliance setting enriches the current research by 
providing an insight as to how governance choices are made and whether the choices 
are the related to appropriate executive remuneration practices.  
The thesis informs the policy discussion and development by examining the 
efficacy of allowing companies choice in adopting governance practices. In addition, 
the study provides insight into the role of the remuneration committee in ensuring 
executive remuneration practices is acceptable to shareholders. 
Additionally, the thesis provides detailed descriptive material on the level of 
adoption of voluntary recommendations relating to the remuneration committee for all 
listed companies. The diverse sample used in this study provides an incremental 
contribution to the current literature. Prior research has focused on smaller samples of 
larger, more established companies (Conyon and Peck, 1998; Daily et al., 1998; 
Anderson and Bizjak, 2003). A broad sample of listed Australian companies is used, 
reflecting a range of company sizes and ages. 
A significant component of the existing research into executive remuneration 
focuses solely on CEO remuneration practices (Frydman and Saks, 2010). Another 
contribution of this research is that it examines remuneration for a wider group of 
executives. The remuneration committee monitors and advises the board of directors on 
overall remuneration practice, not only for the CEO. Additionally, the annual 
shareholder advisory vote is on the company’s remuneration report, which incorporates 
disclosures regarding remuneration practices of the remuneration practices for key 
senior executives, which incorporates the directors, CEO and other identified senior 
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executives. Therefore, it is relevant to consider the remuneration of a broader group of 
senior executives in assessing the performance of the remuneration committee.  
This thesis also contributes to the existing literature in its approach to examining 
executive remuneration.  Prior studies have examined the levels of remuneration and the 
link between pay and performance. This approach is followed in this thesis; however, 
the outcome of the non-binding shareholder vote on the annual remuneration report is 
also used as means of measuring the appropriateness of remuneration.  This annual non-
binding vote represents an opportunity for shareholders to express their satisfaction or 
otherwise with company remuneration practice. By extension, the vote is an indicator of 
how effectively the board and the remuneration committee have been in mitigating 
agency problems. Research regarding the company’s response and the effect of the non-
binding vote is scarce in Australia, but is also of interest to other jurisdictions for 
example, the US and UK. 
Finally, prior Australian studies were conducted prior to, or immediately after, the 
introduction of the ASX Recommendations in 2003. Consequently the studies were 
conducted when the ASX Recommendations did not exist or were arguably in the early 
stages of implementation.  The sample used is drawn from a period in which the ASX 
Recommendations have had sufficient time to be assessed and embedded in companies’ 
overall governance framework and practice. 
8.3 SUMMARY OF KEY RESULTS 
Regulatory policy related to executive remuneration is focused on minimising 
opportunistic behaviour of executives regarding their remuneration and aligning the 
interests of shareholders and executives.  Therefore, an agency framework is used to 
address the research questions posed by the study.  Seven hypotheses are developed to 
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test the research questions. The study uses a sample of 1,497 companies listed on the 
Australian stock exchange as at 30 June 2008. 
Logistic and linear multivariate regression analyses are used to examine the data.  
Logistic regression is used in examining factors associated with adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations (formation and composition). Ordinary least 
squares regression is used to examine whether adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations moderates remuneration levels and strengthens the link to 
company performance.  Ordinary least squares regression is also used to analyse the 
relation between agency costs, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and remuneration practice. 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 consider the impact of agency costs on adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. Hypothesis 5 considers the impact of board 
capacity on adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  The 
dependent variable in the formation analysis is a dichotomous variable identifying 
whether companies have formed a remuneration committee.  The dependent variables in 
the composition analysis is also a dichotomous variable, however it identifies whether 
the company has adopted all three of the ASX remuneration committee composition 
recommendations.  In the formation analysis the full sample is used, the composition 
analysis includes only those companies that have formed a remuneration committee.  
In the formation analysis, support is found for Hypotheses 1b and 1c.  Companies 
respond to agency demand related to shareholder characteristics, in particular insider 
shareholding and institutional shareholding, by forming a remuneration committee.  
Contrary to theoretical predictions, companies do not form a remuneration committee in 
response to agency costs associated with shareholder dispersion (H1a), CEO 
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entrenchment (H2), company complexity (H3), growth (H4a) free cash flows (H4b) and 
asset turnover (H4c). Also contrary to predictions, board capacity related to board size 
(H5a) is not significant to the decision to form a remuneration committee. However, 
board capacity related to the availability of independent directors (H5b), rather than 
board size (H5a) or agency costs (H1 to 4), is highly significant to the decision to adopt 
the ASX remuneration committee composition recommendations.   
The results suggest that agency costs and board capacity are incrementally relevant 
to adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations, after controlling for 
company characteristics related to size, governance quality, the appointment of a big 4 
auditor and leverage.  The results also indicate that companies are less likely to form a 
remuneration committee and are less likely to adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations in response to shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report. 
The analysis then considers the efficacy of the remuneration committee. Ordinary 
least squares regression is used in the analysis of Hypothesis 6 and 7. The full sample is 
used in the analysis.  In the analysis of Hypotheses 6 and 7, only those companies 
included in the full sample that pay remuneration are included in the analysis. Two 
dependent variables are incorporated to test Hypothesis 6.  The first dependent variable 
is the natural logarithm of total cash remuneration paid to the top five ranked executives 
and the second dependent variable is the change in the total cash remuneration paid to 
the top five ranked executives.  Contrary to theoretical predications, in the full sample 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations does not lead to more 
effective remuneration practices.  Particularly, adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with higher levels of remuneration and in 
some cases with excessive levels of remuneration.  As an association between the level 
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of remuneration awarded to the top five ranked executives and adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations is found, Hypothesis 6a is supported. 
However, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is not 
generally associated with a stronger alignment between executives’ remuneration and 
company performance for the top five ranked executives.  Therefore no support for 
Hypothesis 6b is found in the full sample. 
Partial support for Hypothesis 6b is found in relation to companies identified as 
paying excessive remuneration and small companies.  These companies are associated 
with stronger linkage between remuneration and company performance.   
The results provide evidence that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with higher remuneration levels in mid-sized companies 
(H6a).  These committees are not associated with remuneration levels in large and small 
companies (H6a).  The findings also suggest that adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations is associated with weaker pay for performance sensitivity 
in large and mid-sized companies, but not small companies (H6b).  
When the sample is partitioned into companies with positive and negative return 
on assets, the analysis provides limited support for Hypothesis 6a. In particular, the 
results of the analysis indicate that adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with higher levels of remuneration in companies with 
positive return on assets. However, in companies with negative return on assets 
adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is insignificant.  
Therefore support for Hypothesis 6a is found in relation to companies with positive 
return on assets, however no in relation is found in companies with negative return on 
assets.  No support was found for Hypothesis 6b. 
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Hypothesis 7 examined remuneration committee efficacy from the shareholders’ 
perspective. The full sample was used in the analysis.  Hypothesis 7 is not supported.  In 
particular, adoption of the ASX remuneration committee recommendations is not 
negatively associated with shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report. 
Interestingly, company characteristics other than executive remuneration and its 
oversight were associated with shareholder dissent on the annual remuneration report. 
The results suggest that agency costs and capacity are relevant to adoption of the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  However, these committees are not 
universally associated with more effective remuneration practice.   
8.4 IMPLICATIONS  
The analysis of the individual composition components highlights that whilst the 
number of directors serving on the board is relevant, availability of independent 
directors is the key determinant to adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
composition recommendations. Consequently, the ability of companies to adopt the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations regarding committee formation and 
composition is likely to result in increased costs for those companies that need to 
increase the number of independent directors serving on their board in order to adopt the 
recommendations.   
Larger companies have an increasingly higher adoption rate. Adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations reduces as company size decreases.  The 
higher adoption rate is also attributable to the fact that larger companies have the 
capacity to adopt the ASX remuneration committee recommendations.  Adoption of the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations for smaller companies is likely to 
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result in increased costs for these companies. Therefore the burden is greater for smaller 
companies.   
Board capacity is the key predictor of adoption of all ASX remuneration committee 
composition recommendations, regardless of company size. Consequently policy focus 
in relation to small to mid-sized companies should focus on quality board appointments 
which would then enhance the oversight of executive remuneration in those companies 
where the additional cost of increasing either the board size or the number of 
independent directors is not considered beneficial to the company. This would increase 
the effectiveness of executive remuneration oversight, without necessarily increasing 
the burden for companies with less capacity to adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.   
The findings also provide evidence that the vast majority of the largest companies 
had formed independent remuneration committees some three years prior to the 
implementation of the mandated rules affected in 2011.  The new rules are deliberately 
targeted at the largest three hundred companies on the basis that these companies are the 
focus of community concern regarding excessive remuneration and account for some 
ninety-six per cent of the total market capitalisation of all companies listed on the ASX 
(Australian SecuritiesExchange, 2010).  If this is the case, the new rules simply mandate 
a practice that was largely already in existence.  If these companies were also the 
perpetrators of excessive and irresponsible remuneration practices, they did so whilst 
having constituted an independent remuneration committee.  
The study demonstrates that influence on executive remuneration of adoption of the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations varies cross-sectionally depending on 
company characteristics. Consequently adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
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recommendations may not be optimal for all companies. The findings also demonstrate 
that independent remuneration committees are not as effective as policy infers at 
managing the remuneration of the top five ranked executives.  Policy implications from 
this research suggest that rather than focusing solely on independence as a key indicator 
of remuneration committee quality, the focus should also be on ensuring the quality of 
the remuneration committee.  That is, ensuring that the board members appointed to the 
committee have the appropriate skills and expertise to provide effective oversight of the 
executive remuneration function. Whilst the formation and composition of remuneration 
committees can be mandated, behaviour and relationships cannot be effectively 
regulated (Spira and Bender, 2004).  Independence in itself does not appear to be the 
optimal solution to curtailing inappropriate executive remuneration practice. 
Additionally, given the lack of research in the Australian context, prior to 
embarking on further reform, regulators should examine the efficacy of existing 
regulation.  International and Australian research provides mixed evidence at best as to 
whether independent remuneration committees achieve more effective remuneration 
practice.  Additionally, limited evidence exists as to the drivers of shareholder dissent 
on the annual remuneration report in Australia and whether regulation in this regard is 
achieving its purpose.  It is not suggested the further regulation is not required, but 
rather that insufficient evidence exists upon which to make generalisable conclusions 
regarding the efficacy of existing regulation related to executive remuneration 
oversight.   
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8.5 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS  
This section discusses the potential limitations of the study.  Limitations exist in 
relation to potential measurement error and causation. Some degree of measurement 
error is associated with all variables used in multivariate regression (Hair et al, 2010).  
In order to reduce measurement error, the constructs have been distilled from extant 
research in order to maximise the reliability and validity of the measures used to test the 
hypotheses.  Whilst an attempt was made to incorporate all relevant company 
characteristics, causation cannot be inferred.  There may be other factors not considered 
by this study that are relevant to adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations and the efficacy of these remuneration committees.  For example, 
more sophisticated techniques, for example principle component analysis, could be 
incorporated to measure governance quality and remuneration committee quality.  
Further, alternative measures exist with regard to certain variables included in the 
analyses.  In particular, alternate measures of shareholder dispersion, CEO tenure and 
measures of company complexity may change the results achieved should they be 
incorporated into the analyses. 
Directors were classified as independent based on whether they were identified as 
being independent in the annual report.  Multiple definitions of director independence 
exist and whilst companies often adopt the definition proposed by the ASX, an 
independent verification as to whether companies adopted the ASX definition of 
independence was not undertaken.  Future research may consider ensuring a uniform 
measure of director independence is incorporated into the analyses. 
Whilst the sample size was large and representative of a diverse range of company 
age and sizes, the sample was limited to companies with a 30 June balance date.  
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Additional research could be extended to include those companies with a non 30 June 
balance date. 
The study is a cross sectional study. As one year of data is incorporated in the 
analysis, the sensitivity of remuneration to company performance and overall 
generalisability of the study’s findings is limited by this fact.  
The thesis considers a time period when adoption of the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations was voluntary, therefore the findings are not necessarily 
generalisable to settings where remuneration committee independence is mandated such 
as in the US or for large Australian companies post 2011. However, the analysis 
regarding committee efficacy is generalisable in the Australian setting particularly, and 
of relevance to other institutional settings with similar governance models.   
This study incorporates an agency framework on the basis that the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations are agency focused.  However, agency 
theory may not on its own fully explain determinants of adoption of the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations and their efficacy (Main et al., 2008).  Other 
complementary theories may also be relevant.  Further, agency theory is relevant to 
countries that adopt an Anglo-American model of corporate governance.  The results 
are not necessarily generalisable to institutional settings that adopt alternate models of 
corporate governance such as Europe and Asia.   
Ordinary least squares regression is used to analyse Hypotheses 6 and 7.  Other 
statistical tools, for example, panel data could be used in the analysis. Whilst testing 
was performed to confirm the results are not affected by endogeneity, other statistical 
methods may produce more robust results.  For example, some researchers argue that 
the generalised methods of moments approach addresses shortcomings associated with 
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using ordinary least squares regression, when ordinary least squares regression is used 
to analyse the pay for performance sensitivity in executive remuneration modelling 
(Capezio et al., 2011). 
8.6 OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A number of potential further research opportunities exist.  The study could be 
extended to consider whether corporate behaviour and the efficacy of remuneration 
committees has changed following the introduction of the mandated rules for the 
companies included in the ASX 300 Index.  An additional extension of this study would 
be a longitudinal study to determine whether the results of this study are persistent over 
time or limited to a particular time period. 
As noted in the preceding section the thesis uses an agency framework to examine 
the research questions posed.  Consideration of other complementary theories could be 
examined and incorporated as an extension to the study. 
The analysis on executive remuneration related to Hypotheses 6 and 7 uses total 
cash remuneration and change in total cash remuneration as the dependent variable in 
the regression models. The study could be extended to incorporate the individual 
components of executive remuneration, for example salary, short term incentives and 
long term incentives to investigate the relation between the remuneration committee and 
the individual components of executive remuneration.  The study could also be 
extended to incorporate total remuneration which would capture cash and non cash 
components of executive remuneration.  Further the remuneration arrangements of the 
CEO and the remaining four key executives could be analysed separately to examine 
whether differences arise in remuneration committee operation and shareholder voting 
behaviour based on the CEO verses the wider senior executive team.   
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Overall, a number of potential future research opportunities have been identified.  
Despite executive remuneration and its oversight being a topical and contested issue, 
very little research exists.  Consequently, significant opportunities for future research in 
this area exist. 
This Chapter concludes this thesis. 
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Appendix 1:  Sample Companies as at 30 June 2008  
Code Company Name Code Company Name 
AAF Austral Africa Resources Limited ADX Audax Resources Limited 
AAG Aragon Resources Limited ADY Admiralty Resources NL 
AAL APAC Coal Limited AEA Altera Resources Ltd 
AAM A1 Minerals Limited AEC Ammtec Limited 
AAO Australasia Gold Limited AED AED Oil Limited 
AAQ Australis Aquaculture Limited AEE Aura Energy Limited 
AAR Anglo Australian Resources NL AEF Australian Ethical  
AAT Autron Corporation Limited AEI Aeris Environmental Limited 
AAU Adcorp Australia Limited AEM Artist & Entertainment Group Ltd 
ABI Ambri Limited AEO Austereo Group Ltd 
ABP Abacus Property Group Holdings Limited AEP Allco Equity Partners Limited 
ABQ Allied Brands Limited AES Advanced Energy Systems Limited 
ABU ABM Resources NL AET Ausmelt Limited 
ABV ADV Braking Technology Limited AEX Acclaim Exploration NL 
ABY Aditya Birla Mineral Limited AFA ASF Group Limited 
ACB A-Cap Resources Limited AFI Australian Foundation Investment 
Company Limited 
ACE Advanced Engine Components Limited AFR African Energy Resource Limited 
ACG AtCor Medical Holdings Limited AGD Austral Gold Limited 
ACK Austock Group Limited AGI Ainsworth Game Technology Limited 
ACL Alchemia Limited AGK AGL Energy Limited 
ACR Acrux Limited AGO Atlas Iron Limited 
ACS Accent Resources NL AGQ Australian Motor Finance Group Ltd 
ACU Avantogen Limited AGS Alliance Resources Limited 
ACW Actinogen Limited AGU Aurium Resources Limited 
ACZ Atticus Resource Limited AGV Aust Gold Invest Ltd 
ADA Adacel Technologies Limited AGX Agenix Limited 
ADD Adavale Resource Limited AHC AHC Limited 
ADE Adelaide Energy Limited AHD Amalgamated Holdings Limited 
ADG Adtrans Group Limited AHE Automotive Holdings Limited 
ADI Adelphi Energy Limited AHI Allco Hit Limited 
ADN Adelaide Resources AHN Athena Resources Limited 
ADO BioLayer Corporation Limited AHR Anchor Resources Limited 
ADQ ADG Global Supply Limited AHS Atlas Group Holdings Limited 
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Code Company Name Code Company Name 
ADU Adamus Resources Limited AIE Autodom Limited 
AIG Aircruising Australia Limited AOC Australian Oil Company Limited 
AII Abra Mining Limited AOE Arrow Energy 
AIM AIM Resources Limited AOK Austex Oil Limited 
AIO Asciano Limited AON Apollo Minerals Ltd 
AIV Activex Limited AOP Apollo Life Sciences Limited 
AIY Authorised Investment Fund Limited APB Arafura Pearls Holdings Ltd 
AJL AJ Lucas Group Limited APD APN Property Group Limited 
AKF Impact Capital Ltd APG Austpac Resources NL 
AKK Austin Exploration Limited APH Ascent Pharmahealth Limited 
ALB Albidon Limited APK Australian Power & Gas Company Ltd 
ALF Australian Leaders  APM Australian Institute of Property Mgmt  
ALG Alarma Resources Limited APP APA Financial Services Ltd 
ALR Aberdeen Leaders Limited AQA Aquila Resources Ltd 
ALT Analytica Limited AQD Ausquest Limited 
ALU Altium Limited AQE Aequs Capital Ltd 
ALX Allstate Explorations NL AQL Aquacarotene Limited 
ALY Alchemy Resource Ltd AQR Aussie Q Resources Limited 
AMA Allomak Limited ARA Ariadne Australia Limited 
AMC Amcor Limited ARD Argent Minerals Limited 
AMH Amcil Limited ARE Argonaut Resources NL 
AMM Amcom Telecommunication Ltd ARG Argo Investments Limited 
AMO Ambertech Limited ARH Australasian Resources Limited 
AMT Advanced Surgical  Design & Manft Ltd ARJ The Ark Fund Limited 
AMU Amadeus Energy Ltd ARM Aurora Minerals Limited 
AMX Ampella Mining Ltd ARO Astro Diamond Mines NL 
AND Andean Resources Ltd ARP ARB Corporation Limited 
ANG Austin Engineering Ltd ARU Arafura Resource Ltd 
ANH Ansearch Limited ARV Artemis Resources Ltd 
ANM Advanced Magnesium Limited ARW Australian Renewable Fuel Ltd 
ANN Ansell Limited ASB Austal Limited 
ANO Advanced Nanotechnology Ltd ASC Adultshop.Com Ltd 
ANP Antisense Therapeutic Limited ASL Ausdrill Limited 
ANQ Anaeco Limited  ASP Aspermont Limited. 
ANU Aconcagua Resources Ltd ASU Alpha Technologies Corporation Ltd 
ANX Anadis Limited ASV Argus Solutions Ltd 
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Code Company Name Code Company Name 
ASW Advanced Share Ltd AXM Apex Minerals NL 
ASX ASX Limited AXO Aurox Resources Ltd 
ASZ ASG Group Limited AXT Argo Exploration Ltd 
ATG Austin Group Limited AXY Atom Energy Limited 
ATI Atlantic Limited AXZ Amex Resources Ltd 
ATJ Automotive Technology Group Ltd AYR Alloy Resources Ltd 
ATN Ashburton Minerals AYX Austofix Group Ltd 
ATQ Atomic Resources Ltd AZC Australian Zircon NL 
ATR Astron Limited AZD Amazing Loans Ltd 
ATW Atos Wellness Ltd AZM Azumah Resources Ltd 
AUB Austbrokers Holdings Ltd AZS Azure Minerals Ltd 
AUF Asian Masters Fund Ltd AZX Auzex Resources Ltd 
AUI Australian United Investment Company Ltd BAR Barra Resources Ltd 
AUJ Augustus Minerals Ltd BAS Bass Strait Oil Company Ltd 
AUK Augur Resources Ltd BAU Bauxite Resource Ltd 
AUQ Alara Resources Limited BBC Babcock & Brown Communities Ltd 
AUT Aurora Oil & Gas Ltd BBG Billabong Int3ernational Ltd 
AUW Australian Wealth Management Ltd BBI Babcock & Brown Infrastructure Ltd 
AUZ Australian Mines Ltd BBW Babcock & Brown Wind Partners Ltd 
AVA Aviva Corporation Ltd BBX BBX Holdings Ltd 
AVB Avanco Resources Ltd BCC Buccaneer Energy Ltd 
AVE Aevum Limited BCD Beaconsfield Gold NL 
AVG Aust Vintage Ltd BCI BC Iron Limited 
AVH Avita Medical Ltd BCM Babcock & Brown Capital Ltd 
AVI Avalon Minerals Ltd BCN Beacon Minerals Ltd 
AVJ Avjennings Limited BDG Bendigo Mining Ltd 
AVO Avoca Resources Ltd BDI Blina Diamonds NL 
AVS Avastra Sleep Centre Ltd BDL Brandrill Limited  
AVX Avexa Limited BDM Biodiem Limited 
AVZ Avonlea Minerals Limited BDR Beadell Resource Ltd 
AWE Australian Worldwide Exploration BEL Bentley Internat Ltd 
AWL Australian Wine Holdings Ltd BER Berklee Limited 
AXC AXG Mining Ltd BET Belmont Holdings Ltd 
AXE Archer Exploration Ltd BFE Black Fire Energy Ltd 
AXI Axiom Properties BGD Boulder Steel Ltd 
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Code Company Name Code Company Name 
BGL Bigair Group Limited BPK Bremer Park Limited 
BIT Biotron Limited BPO Bioprospect Limited 
BKG Buka Gold Limited BPT Beach Petroleum Ltd 
BKI Brickworks Investment Company Ltd BQT BQT Solutions Ltd 
BKL Blackmores Limited BRC Brain Resource Ltd 
BKM BKM Management Ltd BRM Brockman Resources Ltd 
BKN Bradken Limited BRO Broad Investments Ltd 
BKP Baraka Petroleum Ltd BRT Brainytoys Limited 
BKR Becker Group Limited BRW Breakaway Resources  
BKW Brickworks Limited BSA BSA Limited 
BKY Berkeley Resources Ltd BSI Beyond Sportswear International Ltd 
BLD Boral Limited. BSL Bluescope Steel Ltd 
BLK Blackham Resources Ltd BSM Bass Metals Ltd 
BLR Black Range Minerals Ltd BSN Bisan Limited 
BLT Benitec Limited BSR Bassari Resources  
BLU Bluefreeway Limited BTA Biota Holdings Ltd 
BLZ Blaze International Ltd BTC Biotech Capital Ltd 
BMI Bmdi Tuta Limited BTU Bathurst Resources Ltd 
BML Botswana Metals Ltd BTV Batavia Mining Ltd 
BMM Bellamel Mining Ltd BUL Blue Energy Limited 
BMY Brumby Resources  BUR Burleson Energy Ltd 
BNE Bone Medical Limited BUX Buxton Resources Ltd 
BNL Balkans Gold Limited BUY Bounty Oil & Gas NL 
BNO Bionomics Limited BVA Bravura Solutions Ltd 
BNT Bounty Industries Ltd BWN Bowen Energy Limited 
BNV Brand New Vintage Ltd BXB Brambles Limited 
BOD Biomd Limited BYI Beyond International Ltd 
BOE Boss Energy Limited BYL Brierty Limited 
BOL Boom Logistics Ltd BYR Burey Gold Limited 
BOM Bondi Mining Limited CAB Cabcharge Australia Ltd 
BON Bonaparte Diamond Mineral NL CAF Centrepoint Alliance 
BOS Biosignal Limited CAJ Capitol Health Ltd 
BOW BOW Energy Limited CAM Clime Capital Ltd 
BPG Byte Power Group Ltd CAP Carpentaria Exp. Ltd 
BPH Biopharmica Limited CAQ Cell Aquaculture Ltd 
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CAS Crusader Resource Ltd CHF Charter Pacific Corp. Ltd 
CAU Colltech Australia Ltd CHM Chameleon Mining NL 
CAV Carnavale Resources Ltd CHN Chalice Gold Mines Ltd 
CAZ Cazaly Resources Ltd CHO Choiseul Investments Ltd 
CBB Cordlife Limited CHQ Costaexchange Ltd 
CBD CBD Energy Limited CHR Chalmers Limited 
CBH CBH Resources Ltd CHZ Chesser Resources Ltd 
CCF Carbon Conscious Ltd CIG Caspian Oil & Gas Ltd 
CCI Chrome Corporation Ltd CII CI Resources Limited 
CCK CCK Financial Solution Ltd CIL Centrebet Internat. Ltd 
CCP Credit Corp Group CIN Carlton Investments Ltd 
CCQ Contango Capital Partner Ltd CIR Circadian Tech. Ltd 
CCU Cobar Consolidated Resource Ltd CIW Clime Investment Management Ltd 
CCV Cash Converters International Ltd CIY City Pacific Limited 
CCY China Century Capital Ltd CKK Coretrack Limited 
CDA Codan Limited CKL Colorpak Limited 
CDD Cardno Limited CKP Cheviot Kirribilly Vineyard Prop. Group 
CDM Cadence Capital Ltd CKR Cockatoo Ridge Wines Ltd 
CDS Comdek Limited CLD Costarella Design Ltd 
CDT Castle Minerals Ltd CLH Collection House Ltd 
CDU Cudeco Limited CLK Cypress Lakes Group Ltd 
CEC Coneco Limited CLN Colonial Resources Ltd 
CEG CEC Group Limited CLO Clough Limited 
CEO C @ Limited CLQ Clean Teq Hldgs Ltd 
CES Coal Fe Resources Ltd CLT Cellnet Group Ltd 
CEY Centennial Coal Company Ltd CLU Cloncurry Metals Ltd 
CFE Cape Lambert Iron Ore Ltd CLV Clover Corporation Ltd 
CFU Ceramic Fuel Cells Ltd CLX CTI Logistics Ltd 
CGF Challenger F.S.G.Ltd CMG Chandler Macleod Ltd 
CGG Citadel Resource Grp CMI CMI Limited. 
CGI Consolidated Global Investment Ltd CMJ Consolidated Media Holdings 
CGM Cougar Metals NL CMO Comtel Corp Limited 
CGO CPT Global Limited CMP Compumedics Limited 
CGS Cogstate Ltd CMS CommSecure Limited 
CHC Charter Hall Group CMV CMA Corporation Ltd 
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Code Company Name Code Company Name 
CMW Cromwell Group CRS Croesus Mining NL 
CMY Capital Mining Ltd CSD Consolidated Tin Mines Ltd 
CND Clarius Group Ltd CSE Copper Strike Ltd 
CNF Continental Capital Ltd CSL CSL Limited 
CNH China Steel Australia Ltd CSS Clean Seas Tuna Ltd 
CNK Condor Nickel Ltd CST Cellestis Limited 
CNM Carnegie Corporation Ltd CSV CSG Limited 
CNN Cardia Technologies Ltd CTE Cryosite Limited 
CNP Centro Properties Group CTN Contango Microcap Ltd 
CNT Centamin Egypt Ltd CTO Citigold Corp Ltd 
COE Cooper Energy Ltd CTP Central Petroleum Ltd 
COF Coffey International Ltd CTS Contact Uranium Ltd 
COH Cochlear Limited CTY Country Road Limited 
COI Comet Ridge Limited CUE CUE Energy Resource Ltd 
COK Cockatoo Coal Ltd CUL Cullen Resources Ltd 
COO Corum Group Limited CUO Copperco Limited 
COS Cool Or Cosy Limited CUR Centaurus Resources Ltd 
COU Count Financial Ltd CUS Customers Limited 
COY Coppermoly Limited CUV Clinuvel Pharmaceut. Ltd 
COZ CO2 Group Limited CUY Curnamona Energy Ltd 
CPI CPI Group Limited CVA Clever Communications Australia Ltd 
CPK CP1 Limited CVB Cheviot Bridge Ltd 
CPN Carpathian Resources Ltd CVC CVC Limited 
CPR Clive Peeters Ltd CVG Convergent Minerals Ltd 
CPS Computronics Holdings Ltd CVN Carnarvon Petroleum Ltd 
CPT Capital Intelligence Ltd CVR Central Asia Resouces Ltd 
CPU Computershare Ltd CVS Cervantes Corp Ltd 
CQT Conquest Mining Ltd CWG Central West Gold NL 
CQU Commquest Ltd CWK Coalworks Limited  
CRC Cortona Resources Ltd CWN Crown Limited  
CRE Crescent Gold Ltd CWP Cedar Woods Prop. 
CRG Crane Group Limited CXD Cathrx Ltd  
CRJ Copper Range Limited CXG Coote Industrial Ltd 
CRK Carrick Gold Limited CXM Centrex Metals  
CRL Comet Resources Ltd CXN Connxion Limited  
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Code Company Name Code Company Name 
CXS Chemgenex Pharmaceut DSF Deep Sea Fisheries 
CXY Cougar Energy  DSN Desert Energy  
CYA Century Australia  DTL Data#3 Limited 
CYG Coventry Group DTM Dart Mining NL  
CYL Catalyst Metals  DUI Diversified United 
CYS Chrysalis Resources  DUL Dulhunty Power Ltd  
CYT Cytopia Limited  DVN Devine Limited 
CYU China Yunnan Copper  DWS DWS Advanced  
CZA Coal Of Africa Ltd  DWY Dwyka Resources Ltd  
CZP Computercorp Limited DYE Dyesol Limited  
CZR Coziron Resources  DYL Deep Yellow Limited 
DDD 3D Resources Limited  EAL E & A Limited  
DDT Datadot Technology  EAR Echo Resources  
DEG DE Grey Mining EBG Eumundi Group Ltd 
DES Destra Corporation  EBR Eagle Bay Resources 
DGH Desane Group Holdings  EBT Ebet Limited  
DGO Drummond Gold Ltd  ECM East Coast Minerals 
DGR D'aguilar Gold  ECU Eastern Corporation  
DGX Diploma Group Ltd  EDE Eden Energy Limited 
DIA DIA-B Tech Limited  EDM Eldore Mining  
DJS David Jones Limited EDS Every Day Mine Services Limited 
DJW Djerriwarrh Investments Limited EEE Empire Beer Group  
DKN DKN Financial Group EER East Energy Resource  
DKS Danks Holdings EFE Eastern Iron  
DLS Drillsearch Energy EFT Eftel Limited  
DMA Dynasty Metals  EGL Environmental Group 
DMG Dragon Mountain Gold  EGO Empire Oil & Gas 
DML Discovery Metals Ltd  EHL Emeco Holdings  
DMM DMC Mining Limited  EKA Eureka Energy Ltd  
DMX Dolomatrix Internat.  EKM Eleckra Mines  
DMY Dromana Estate  ELI Emerging Leaders Investments Limited 
DOM Dominion Mining  ELK ELK Petroleum  
DON Diamonex Limited  ELX Ellex Medical Lasers  
DOW Downer Edi Limited EMA Energy And Minerals  
DRK Drake Resources  EMB Embelton Limited 
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Code Company Name Code Company Name 
EME Energy Metals Ltd  EVE Energy Ventures Ltd  
EMR Emerald Oil & Gas NL EVG Envirogold Limited 
EMS Eastland Medical  EVM Enviromission Ltd  
EMU EMU Nickel NL  EVZ Envirozel Limited 
ENB Eneabba Gas Limited  EWC Energy World Corpor.  
ENE Energy Developments EXM Excalibur Mining 
ENG Engin Limited EXR Elixir Petroleum Ltd  
ENI Empowernet International Limited EXS Exco Resources Ltd 
ENL Eagle Nickel Ltd  EXT Extract Resources 
ENR Encounter Resources  EYE Eagle Eye Metals  
ENV Envestra Limited EZE Ezenet Limited  
EOL Energy One Limited  EZL Euroz Limited  
EON Espreon Limited  FAC Facilitate Digital  
EPD Empired Ltd  FAN Fantastic Holdings 
EPE Enterprise Energy  FAS Fairstar Resources 
EPG European Gas FAT FAT Prophets  
EPL Eyecare Partners Ltd FCL Futuris Corporation 
EPR Essential Petroleum  FCN Falcon Minerals Ltd 
EPS Epsilon Energy  FCP Fcpb Investments Ltd  
EQT Equity Trustees FDY Findlay Securities  
EQX Eqitx Limited FEA Forest Enterprises 
ERA Energy Resources FFF Firstfolio Limited  
ERG ERG Limited FFI F.F.I. Holdings 
ERH Eromanga Hydrocarbon FGE Forge Group Limited  
ERL Empire Resources  FGI Flat Glass Ind.  
ERM Emmerson Resources  FGL Foster's Group  
ERN Erongo Energy  FIS Fission Energy  
ERO Eromanga Uranium  FLK Folkestone Limited  
ESG Eastern Star Gas FLR Frankland River  
ESI ENV Clean Tech Ltd FLT Flight Centre  
ESS Essa Australia  FLX Felix Resources Ltd. 
ESV Eservglobal Limited FMG Fortescue Metals Group  
ESW Emerson Stewart Grp  FML Focus Minerals Ltd  
ETC Entertainment Media  FMS Flinders Mines Ltd 
ETE Entek Energy Ltd  FND Finders Resources  
EUG Eurogold Limited FNP Freedom Nutritional 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
310 
 
Code Company Name Code Company Name 
FNT Frontier Resources  GCN Goconnect Limited 
FOF First Opportunity  GCR Golden Cross  
FPG Forest Place Group  GCS Global Construction  
FPS Fiducian Portfolio GDN Golden State Resources Limited 
FRE Freshtel Holdings  GDR Goldstar Resources  
FRI Finbar Group Limited GDY Geodynamics Limited  
FRM Farm Pride Foods GED Golden Deeps Limtied 
FRR Frigrite Limited  GER Greenearth Energy  
FRS Ferraus Limited  GFE Global Iron Limited  
FSA FSA Group Limited GFF Goodman Fielder.  
FSE Firestone Energy Ltd  GFL Global Masters  
FSN Fusion Resources Ltd  GGE Grand Gulf Energy 
FTD Fig Tree Developments  GGG Greenland Minerals and Energy Ltd  
FUL Fulcrum Equity GGH Global Gold Holdings Ltd  
FUT Future Corporation  GGP Golden Gate Petrol 
FWL Ferrowest Limited  GGX Gas2grid Limited  
FXI FOX Invest Limited  GGY Glengarry Resources 
FXJ Fairfax Media Ltd GIA Giaconda Limited  
FXL Flexigroup Limited  GIP Gippsland Limited 
FXR FOX Resources  GIR Giralia Resources NL 
GAA Genepharm Australasia Limited GLA Gladiator Resources  
GAP Gale Pacific Limited  GLB Globe International  
GAU Great Australian Res  GLE GLG Corp Ltd  
GBA Grandbridge Limited GLF Gulf Resources  
GBE Globe Metals &Mining Limited GLH Global Health Ltd  
GBG Gindalbie Metals Ltd GLI Goldlink Incomeplus  
GBI Genera Biosystems  GLM Gulf Mines Limited  
GBL Genesis Biomedical  GLN Gleneagle Gold  
GBM Greater Bendigo Gold  GLO Global Approach Limited 
GBP Global Petroleum  GLX Gulfx Ltd 
GBT Gbst Holdings..  GMD Genesis Minerals  
GBX GB Energy Limited  GME GME Resources Ltd 
GBZ GBM Resources Ltd  GMI Global Mining  
GCG Greencap Limited GML Gateway Mining 
GCL Gloucester Coal   
 
A Study of Board Remuneration Committees: Structure and Effectiveness 
311 
 
Code Company Name Code Company Name 
GMR Golden Rim Resources HAW Hawthorn Resources 
GMX Goldminex Resources  HAZ Hazelwood Resources  
GNI Global Nickel Investments HCG Helicon Group  
GNS Gunns Limited HDG Hodges Resources  
GNV Green Invest Ltd  HDN Haddington Resources 
GOA Gold Aura Limited  HEA Health Corporation  
GOP Gippsland Offshore  HEG Hill End Gold  
GPB Global Properties  HEM Hemisphere Resources  
GPN Greater Pacific Gold HFA HFA Holdings Limited  
GPP Greenpower Energy Ltd  HFC Hawk Resources Ltd  
GRB Gage Roads Brewing  HGN Halcygen Pharma.  
GRK Green Rock Energy  HHL Hunter Hall International Limited 
GRR Grange Resources.  HHM Hampton Hill Mining 
GRT Garratt's Limited HHV Hunter Hall Global  
GRV Greenvale Mining NL HIC Huntley Investment 
GRY Gryphon Minerals Ltd  HII Hire Intelligence 
GSC Global Geoscience  HIL Hills Industries Ltd  
GSE Goldsearch Limited HIP Hyperion Flagship 
GSF GSF Corporation Ltd  HIT Hitech Group Aust. 
GTE Great Western Exp.  HJB Hamilton James Bruce 
GTG Genetic Technologies  HLD Headline Group Ltd 
GTI Globe Securities HLS Hillcrest Litigation Services Limited 
GTX Golden Tiger Mining  HLX Helix Resources 
GUD G.U.D. Holdings  HMC Hydromet Corp. Ltd  
GUL Gullewa Limited  HNR Hannans Reward Ltd  
GUN Gunson Resources HOM Homeloans Limited  
GWR Golden West Resource  HRL HOT Rock Limited  
GWT GWA International HRR Heron Resources  
GXL Greencross Limited  HSN Hansen Technologies 
GXY Galaxy Resources  HSP Healthscope Limited  
GYN Graynic Metals Ltd  HST Hastie Group Limited  
GZL Gazal Corporation  HTE Hitec Energy Limited  
HAO Haoma Mining NL HTI Hydrotech International Limited 
HAP HFA Accelerator Plus  HTX Healthlinx Limited  
HAV Havilah Resources NL HVN Harvey Norman 
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HWI Housewares International IMI IM Medical Ltd 
HXL Hexima Limited  IMP Imperial Corp Ltd 
HZL Healthzone Limited  IMU Imugene Limited 
HZN Horizon Oil Limited INL Intec Ltd 
IAG Insurance Australia  INP Innamincka Petroleum  
IAS International  Allsports  INT Intermoco Limited  
IAT Iatia Limited IOH Iron Ore Holdings  
IAW Integrated Legal  IPA Indigo Pacific Cap.  
IBA IBA Health Group Ltd IPD Impedimed Limited  
IBC Ironbark Capital Ltd IPE ING Private Equity  
IBG Ironbark Gold  IPN Independent Prac. 
ICC IC2 Global Limited IPR Ipernica Limited 
ICP Icash Payment System IPT Impact Minerals  
ICS Icsglobal Limited  IPX Intrapower Limited  
ICV Incitive Limited  IRC Intermin Resources 
IDL Industrea Limited IRD Iron Road Ltd  
IDM Industrial Minerals  IRI Integrated Research 
IDO Indo Mines Limited IRL India Resources  
IDT IDT Australia Ltd IRM Iron Mountain  
IEQ International Equities ISS ISS Group Limited  
IFC IFC Capital Limited  ITC Impress Energy Ltd 
IFE Ironclad Mining  ITD ITL Limited  
IFL Ioof Holdings Ltd  ITE I.T.& E Limited  
IFM Infomedia Ltd  ITS Interstaff Recruitment  
IGC International Gold..  ITT Intermet Resources  
IGG Ingena Group Ltd  ITX ITX Group Limited  
IGO Independence Group  IUL Imagine Un Limited 
IGR Integra Mining Ltd. IVT Inventis Limited 
IGX Igdx Holdings Ltd  IXR IMX Resources NL 
IIG Integrated Investment Group Limited JAG Jaguar Minerals  
III Icon Resources Ltd  JAK Jackson Minerals Ltd 
IIN Iinet Limited  JAL Jameson Resources  
IMA Image Resources NL JAT Jatoil Limited  
IMD Imdex Limited JBH JB Hi-Fi Limited  
IMF IMF (Australia) Ltd JET Jetset Travelworld 
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JGL Jackgreen Limited KZL Kagara Ltd 
JMB Jumbuck Entertainment  LAS Lasseters Corp. 
JML Jabiru Metals Ltd LAT Latin Gold Limited 
JMS Jupiter Mines  LAU Lindsay Australia  
JPR Jupiter Energy  LBL Laserbond Limited  
JRL Jindalee Resources LBT Labtech Systems Ltd  
JRV Jervois Mining LBY Liberty Resource Ltd  
JUT Jutt Holdings  LCE London City Equities Ltd 
JVG JV Global Limited  LCM Logicamms Limited  
JYC Joyce Corporation LCT Living Cell Tech.  
KAL Kalgoorlie-Boulder  LEI Leighton Holdings  
KAM K2 Asset Management Holdings  LFE Life Therapeutics 
KAR Karoon Gas Australia  LGD Legend Corporation  
KAS Kasbah Resources  LGO Longreach Oil Ltd. 
KAT Katana Capital  LIC Lifestyle Communities Limited 
KBC Keybridge Capital LIN Lindian Resources 
KCN Kingsgate Consolidated Limited LIO Lion Energy Limited  
KEN Kuth Energy Limited  LKE Lake Resources 
KEY KEY Petroleum  LKO Lakes Oil NL 
KIK Kairiki Energy Ltd  LLC Lend Lease Corp.  
KIS King Island LMC Lemarne Corporation 
KKT Konekt Limited LMG Latrobe Magnesium 
KLM KLM Group Ltd  LML Lincoln Minerals  
KME KIP Mcgrath Education Centres Limited  LMW Landmark White Ltd  
KML Kangaroo Metals  LNC Linc Energy Ltd  
KMN Kings Minerals NL LNG Liquefied Natural  
KOR Korab Resources  LOD Lodestone Energy Limited  
KOV Korvest Ltd LRG Longreach Group.  
KRB Krucible Metals Ltd  LRL Leyshon Resources 
KRM Kingsrose Mining Ltd  LSA Lachlan Star Ltd  
KRS Kresta Holdings  LSR Lodestar Minerals  
KSC K & S Corporation LTR Liontown Resources  
KSX Karmelsonix Ltd LUM Lumacom Limited  
KTE K2 Energy Ltd  LWB Little World Beverages Limited 
KYC Keycorp Limited LYC Lynas Corporation  
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LYL Lycopodium Limited  MEU Marmota Energy Ltd  
MAB Mamba Minerals  MFF Magellan Flagship  
MAE Marion Energy MFG Magellan Financial Group  Ltd  
MAH Macmahon Holdings  MFI Mariner Financial 
MAK Minemakers Limited  MGK MIL Resources 
MAL Matilda Minerals Ltd  MGO Marengo Mining  
MAN Magna Mining NL MGX Mount Gibson Iron 
MAQ Macquarie Telecom Gp MGZ Medigard Limited  
MAR Malachite Resources MHL Monitor Energy Ltd  
MAU Magnetic Resources  MHM Macquarie Harbour  
MBA Mobileactive Limited MIK Mikoh Corporation 
MBD Marbletrend Group  MIN Mineral Resources.  
MBI Mobi Limited MIR Mirrabooka Invest. 
MBN Mirabela Nickel Ltd  MKY MKY Corporation Ltd  
MBP Metabolic MLI Mintails Limited 
MBT Mission Biofuels  MLM Metallica Minerals  
MCC Macarthur Coal MLS Metals Australia 
MCH Murchison Holdings MLT Milton Corporation 
MCK Macarthurcook Ltd  MLX Metals X Limited  
MCL M2M Corporation MMA MMC Contrarian Ltd 
MCO Morning Star Gold NL MMB Magma Metals Limited  
MCP Mcpherson's Ltd  MML Medusa Mining Ltd  
MCR Mincor Resources NL  MMN Macmin Silver Ltd  
MCU Mitchell Communications Group MMR MEC Resources  
MDA Modena Resources Ltd  MMS Mcmillan Shakespeare  
MDL Mineral Deposits MMX Murchison Metals Ltd  
MDS Midas Resources  MMY Mercury Mobility Ltd  
MDV Medivac Limited MMZ Mooter Media Limited  
MDX Mindax Limited  MNC Metminco Limited  
MEE Metex Resources MND Monadelphous Group  
MEG MCM Entertainment Gr  MNF MY Net Fone Limited  
MEI Meteoric Resources  MNL Manaccom Corp Ltd 
MEL Metgasco Limited  MNM Mantle Mining Corp.  
MEO MEO Australia Ltd  MNW Mint Wireless  
MEP Minotaur Exploration  MNY Money3 Corporation  
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MOC Mortgage Choice Ltd  MWR MGM Wireless Limited 
MOG Moby Oil & Gas Ltd  MWS MDS Financial Group 
MOL Moly Mines Limited  MXI Maxitrans Industries  
MOS Mosaic Oil NL  MXR Maximus Resources  
MOX Monax Mining Limited  MYG Mutiny Gold Limited  
MPA Marine Produce Aust.  MZM Montezuma Mining Co.  
MPD Millepede International Limited NAD North Australian Ltd  
MPI Mark Sensing NAE New Age Exploration 
MPJ Mining Projects  NAL Norwood Abbey Ltd  
MPO Molopo Australia Ltd NAN Nanosonics Limited  
MRM Mermaid Marine  NAV Navigator Resources  
MRN Macquarie Radio  NBL Noni B Limited  
MRU Mantra Resources  NCI National Can Industries Ltd 
MRX Matrix Metals NCK Nick Scali Limited  
MRY Monteray Group NCM Newcrest Mining  
MSB Mesoblast Limited  NDL Neurodiscovery  
MSC Minerals Corporation  NEC Northern Energy Corp 
MSF Maryborough Sugar NEO Nuenco NL 
MSL MAC Services (The)  NFL Natural Fuel Limited  
MSN Mineral Sands  NGF Norton Gold Fields  
MTB Mount Burgess Mining NGM NGM Resources Ltd  
MTD Metroland Australia NGY Nuenergy Capital Ltd  
MTH Mithril Resources  NHD 900 Degrees Limited 
MTI Montec International  NHF NIB Holdings Limited  
MTN Marathon Resources  NHH Newhaven Hotels Ltd 
MTU M2 Telecommunication  NHR National Hire Group 
MTY Medical Therapies  NIO Nickelore Ltd  
MUM Mount Magnet South  NIP Niplats Australia  
MUN Mundo Minerals  NLB Nullarbor Holdings 
MUR Murchison United NL  NLG National Leisure  
MUT Multi Channel NLX Nylex Limited 
MVH Medic Vision Limited  NME Nex Metals Exploration Limited 
MVP Medical Developments  NMG Noble Mineral Res  
MWE Mawson West Ltd  NMI Northern Mining  
MWN Midwinter Resources NL  NMR Nimrodel Resources  
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NMS Neptune Marine  OKJ Oakajee Corp Ltd  
NOA Noah Resources NL  OKN Oakton Limited 
NOD Nomad Building  OKU Oklo Uranium Limited  
NQM North Queensland  OLE Olea Australis 
NRL Newland Resources  OLH Oldfields Holdings 
NRT Novogen Limited OLY Olympia Resources  
NRU Newera Uranium  OMI Occupational & Med. 
NSL NSL Health Limited ONC Oncard International 
NSP Nusep Ltd  ONT 1300 Smiles Limited  
NST Northern Star  ORC Orchid Capital  
NSX NSX Limited  ORD ORD River Resources  
NTC Netcomm Limited. ORE Orocobre Limited  
NTU Northern Uranium  ORG Origin Energy  
NUP Nupower Resources  ORH Orient Resource 
NVT Navitas Limited  ORO Oroya Mining Limited 
NWE Norwest Energy NL  ORP Oropa Limited 
NWH NRW Holdings Limited  OST Onesteel Limited  
NWR Northwest Resources  OVR Overland Resources  
NWT Newsat Limited OZG Ozgrowth Limited  
NXS Nexus Energy Limited PAA Pharmaust Limited 
OAK Oaks Hotels & Resort  PAB Patrys Limited  
OBJ OBJ Limited PAG Primeag Australia  
OBL OIL Basins Limited PAN Panoramic Resources  
OCE Ocean Capital PAX Panax Geothermal Ltd  
OCL Objective Corp PAY Payce Consolidated 
ODG Odyssey Gaming PBA Peoplebank Australia  
ODN Odin Energy Limited  PBD Port Bouvard Limited  
ODY Odyssey Energy  PBG Pacific Brands  
OEC Orbital Corp Limited  PBP Probiotec Limited  
OEL Otto Energy Limited  PBT Prana Biotechnology  
OEQ Orion Equities PCC Probiomics Limited  
OEX Oilex Ltd  PCL Pancontinental Oil 
OFG Over Fifty Group PCP Paramount Mining  
OIL Optiscan Imaging PDM Paradigm Metals Ltd  
OIP Orion Petroleum Ltd  PDN Paladin Energy Ltd 
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PDO Paladio Group  PMP PMP Limited 
PDZ Prairie Downs Metals  PMV Premier Investments 
PEH Pacific Environment  PMX Palamedia Limited 
PEK Peak Resources  PNN Pepinnini Minerals  
PEL Pelican Resources PNW Pacific Star Network  
PEM Perilya Limited  PNX Phoenix Copper Ltd  
PEN Peninsula Minerals POL Polaris Metals NL  
PEO People Telecom POS Poseidon Nick Ltd 
PES Pure Energy  PPC Peet Limited  
PET Peters Macgregor Investments Limited PPD PAN Palladium Ltd  
PEV Pacific Enviromin Limited PPG PRO-Pac Packaging  
PEX Peel Exploration  PPI Pelorus Property.  
PFG Prime Financial  PPK PPK Group Limited  
PFL Patties Foods Ltd  PPN Planet Platinum Ltd  
PFM Pacific Mining Ltd PPP PAN Pacific Petrol. 
PGA Photon Group Ltd  PPS Praemium Limited  
PGC Paragon Care Limited  PPT Perpetual Limited  
PGL Progen Pharmaceuticals Limited PPX Paperlinx Limited 
PGM Platina Resources  PPY Papyrus Australia  
PHG Pulse Health Limited  PRO Prophecy International Holdings 
PHI Phileo Australia PRR Prima Biomed Ltd  
PHK Phoslock Water  PRT Prime Media Group Ltd  
PHL Pearl Healthcare  PRU Perseus Mining Ltd  
PHW Prince Hill Wines PRV Premium Investors  
PIE Pienetworks Limited PRW Proto Resources  
PIM Prime Minerals  PRY Primary Health Care  
PIO Pioneer Nickel Ltd  PRZ Primary Resources  
PLA Platinum Australia  PSF Pacific Ore Ltd  
PLB Plan B Group Hld  PSH Penrice Soda  
PLD Portland Orthopaed.  PSP Prosperity Resources  
PLT Polartechnics Ltd PST Pearlstreet Limited  
PLV Pluton Resources  PTB PTB Group Limited  
PMC Platinum Capital Ltd PTM Platinum Asset  
PME PRO Medicus Limited PTO Photo-Me Australia  
PMH Pacmag Metals Ltd  PTR Petratherm Ltd  
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PTS Platsearch NL RCI Rocklands Rich. Ltd 
PUN Pegasus Metals  RCM Reclaim Industries 
PWK Pipe Networks  RCO Royalco Resources  
PWR Powerlan Limited  RCR RCR Tomlinson 
PWW Power Resources Ltd  RDF Redflex Holdings  
PXL Proteome Systems Ltd  RDM RED Metal Limited  
PXR Palace Resources  RDR Reed Resources Ltd 
PYC Phylogica Limited  RDS Redstone Resources  
QAN Qantas Airways  REA Realestate.Com.Au 
QED QED Occtech Limited RED RED 5 Limited  
QFX Quickflix Limited  REF Reverse Corp Limited  
QGC Queensland Gas  REH Reece Australia Ltd. 
QHL Quickstep Holdings  REO Reco Financial  
QMG Quay Magnesium Ltd  RER Regal Resources  
QML Qmastor Limited  REX Regional Express  
QOL Queensland Ores  REY REY Resources Ltd  
QRS Qrsciences Holdings  RFE RED Fork Energy  
QRX Qrxpharma Ltd  RFG Retail Food Group  
QSS Questus Limited  RFL Rubik Financial Ltd. 
QST Quest Investments RFT Rectifier Technologies Limited 
QTI QLD Trustees Invest RGP Refresh Group  
QTM Quantum Energy. RHC Ramsay Health Care  
QUE Queste Communication RHD Ross Human Direction 
QUR Quantum Resources  RHG RHG Limited  
QXQ Q Limited RHI RED Hill Iron  
RAU Republic Gold Ltd  RHM Richmond Mining  
RAW Rawson Resources  RHT Resonance Health 
RBH Real Brand Holdings  RIA Rialto Energy  
RBM Redbank Mines  RIC Ridley Corporation  
RBR Rubicon Resources  RIV Riversdale Mining  
RBX Resource Base  RLA Redisland Australia  
RBY Rockeby Biomed Ltd  RLC Reedy Lagoon Corporation Limited 
RCA RAW Capital Partners  RMC Rimcapital Limited 
RCG RCG Corporation Ltd  RMG RMG Limited 
RCH Richfield Group  RMI Resource Mining Corp 
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RML Rusina Mining NL  SBP Solbec Pharmaceuticals Limited 
RMP RED Emperor Resource  SBR Sabre Resources 
RMS Ramelius Resources  SBS SUB-Sahara Resources  
RMT RMA Energy Limited  SCB Scarborough Equities  
RNC RUN Corp Limited  SCC Scott Corporation. 
RND Rand Mining NL SCD Scantech Limited 
RNG Range River Gold Ltd SCV SCV Group Limited  
RNI Resource And Invest.  SDG Sunland Group Ltd 
ROL Robust Resources  SDI SDI Limited 
ROY Royal Resources  SDL Sundance Resources 
RPC Repcol Limited SDM Sedgman Limited  
RPM Roma Petroleum NL SEA Sundance Energy  
RPX RP Data Ltd  SEG Segue Resources  
RRL Regis Resources SEK Seek Limited  
RRS Range Resources Ltd  SEN Senetas Corporation  
RSG Resolute Mining SEV Seven Network 
RSN Renison Consolidated SEY Sunset Energy Ltd  
RTL RTL Corporation Ltd  SFC Schaffer Corp. Ltd.  
RUB Rubicor Group  SFP Safety Medical  
RUL Runge Limited  SFR Sandfire Resources  
RUM RUM Jungle Uranium  SGH Slater & Gordon  
RUR Ruralaus Investments  SGL Sydney Gas Ltd 
RVM Revere Mining  SGM Sims Group Limited.  
RVR RED River Resources  SGY Solimar Energy Ltd  
RXL ROX Resources  SGZ Scotgold Resources  
RXM REX Minerals Limited  SHC Sunshine Heart 
SAE Salinas Energy SHE Stonehenge Metals  
SAI SAI Global Limited  SHG Sunshine Gas Limited  
SAP Sabina Corporation SHL Sonic Healthcare  
SAR Saracen Mineral SHR Shearer (John) Hldgs 
SAU Southern Gold  SHV Select Harvests  
SBI Sterling Biofuels  SHX Shield Mining  
SBL Signature Metals Ltd  SIM Scimitar Resources  
SBM ST Barbara Limited  SIU Sirius Corp Ltd 
SBN SUN Biomedical Ltd SIV Silver Chef Limited  
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SKE Skilled Group Ltd  SRV Servcorp Limited 
SKS Stokes (Australasia) SRX Sirtex Medical 
SKY Skydome Hold. Ltd. SRZ Stellar Resources  
SLA Solagran Limited SSC Sultan Corporation  
SLM Salmat Limited  SSI Sino Strategic Intl 
SLR Silver Lake Resource  SSM Service Stream  
SLV Sylvania Resources  SSN Samson Oil & Gas Ltd 
SLX Silex Systems  STB South Boulder Mines  
SMA Smarttrans Holdings STE Stratatel Limited 
SMD Syndicated Metals  STG Staging Connections  
SML Synergy Metals Ltd STI Stirling Products 
SMM Summit Resources  STP Stericorp Limited  
SMX SMS Management.  STS Structural Systems  
SMZ Stirling Minerals  STU Stuart Petroleum Ltd 
SND Saunders Intl Ltd  STX Strike Oil Limited  
SNL Supply Network SUL Super Cheap Auto Grp  
SNO Snowball Group SUR SUN Resources NL 
SNU Southern Uranium  SVC Shell Vill Resorts  
SNV Sinovus Mining Ltd  SVL Silver Mines Limited  
SOI Soilsub Technologies  SVM Sovereign Metals  
SOM Somnomed Limited  SVN Senevens Intl Ltd  
SOO Solco Ltd SVS Sunvest Corporation 
SPD Strategic Pooled SWG Swish Group Limited 
SPH Sphere Investments  SWK Swick Mining  
SPI Spitfire Resources  SWN Silver Swan Group  
SPL Starpharma Holdings SXE STH Cross Electrical Engineering 
SPQ Superior Resources  SXG Southerncross Gold  
SPT Spotless Group Ltd  SXP Sapex Limited  
SRA Strathfield Group SYG Synergy Equities 
SRH Saferoads Holdings  SYM Symex Holdings  
SRI Sipa Resources Ltd SYN ST Synergy Limited 
SRK Strike Resources  SYP Style Limited  
SRL Straits Resources  SYR Syrah Resources  
SRM Sierra Mining  TAG TAG Pacific Limited 
SRR Shaw River Resources  TAH Tabcorp Holdings Ltd  
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TAM Tanami Gold NL TOL Toll Holdings Ltd  
TAS Tasman Resources NL  TOX TOX Free Solutions  
TBR Tribune Resources NL TPC TEL.Pacific Limited  
TCL Transurban Group stapled TPI Transpacific Industries Group Ltd 
TCN Techniche Limited. TPL TPL Corporation Ltd  
TCO Transmetro Corp. Ltd TPX Tasmanian Perpetual  
TCQ Trinity Group stapled TQH 3Q Holdings Limited  
TDI Tidewater Investment  TRF Trafford Resources  
TDO 3D Oil Limited  TRG Treasury Group  
TEO Telesso Tech Ltd  TRH Transit Holdings  
TEU TOP End Uranium Ltd  TRM Truscott Mining Corp  
TEX Target Energy  TRO TRI Origin Minerals  
TEY Torrens Energy  TRS THE Reject Shop  
TFC TFS Corporation Ltd  TRY Troy Resources NL  
TFS Tranzact Financial Services Limited TSE Transfield Services 
TGF Tianshan Goldfields  TSF Total Staffing Solutions  
TGG Templeton Global TSH TSV Holdings Limited  
TGP Trafalgar Corporate stapled TSV Transerv Australia  
TGR Tassal Group Limited  TTA TTA Holdings Ltd  
TGS Tiger Resources  TTH Tooth & Company 
TGX Tasman Goldflds Ltd  TTI Traffic Technologies 
THO Thomas & Coffey  TTR Tectonic Resources 
THR Thor Mining Plc cdi TTS Tatts Group Ltd  
TIS Tissue Therapies  TTV TWO Way Limited  
TJN Trojan Equity  TTY Territory Resources  
TKG Takoradi Limited  TUC Territory Uranium  
TKL Traka Resources  TVN TVN Corporation Ltd  
TLM Talisman Mining  TWD Tamawood Limited  
TLS Telstra Corporation.  TWO Talent2 International Limited 
TLZ Telezon Limited TWT TWT Group Limited  
TMX Terrain Minerals  TZL TZ Limited 
TNC Transol Corporation UCL Union Resources Ltd  
TNG TNG Limited UCM Uscom Limited  
TNL Tolhurst Group Ltd  UCW Undercoverwear Ltd  
TOE Toro Energy Limited  UEQ Uranium Equities 
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UGL United Group Limited WAA WAM Active Limited  
UKL Uranium King Limited  WAB Wallace Absolute  
UMC United Minerals  WAG WAG Limited 
UNI Unilife Medical Solutions Limited WAL Wavenet Internation. 
UNO Uranio Limited  WAM WAM Capital Limited  
UNX Uranex NL  WAN West Australian News  
UOG Uranium Oil And Gas  WAS Wasabi Energy Ltd. 
URA Uran Limited  WAT Waterco Limited 
URL Universal Resources  WBA Webster Ltd 
URM Uramet Minerals  WCB Warrnambool Cheese  
USA Uraniumsa Limited  WCL Westside Corporation  
UTO U308 Limited  WCN White Cliff Nickel  
UUL United Uranium  WCP WCP Resources Ltd 
UXA Uranium Exploration  WCU White Canyon Uranium  
UXC UXC Limited  WDR Western Desert Res.  
VBA Virgin Blue Holdings  WDS WDS Limited  
VCN Vulcan Resources WEB Webjet Limited  
VCR Ventracor Limited  WEC White Energy Company 
VEC Vector Resources Ltd  WES Wesfarmers Limited  
VGH Vision Group Hldgs  WEZ Westonia Mines Ltd 
VGP Verticon Group Ltd.  WFL Willmott Forests 
VHL Virax Holdings WGP Westralian Gas And P  
VIE Viento Group Limited WGR Westgold Resources 
VIL Verus Investments WHC Whitehaven Coal  
VLA Viralytics Limited  WHE Wildhorse Energy  
VMG VDM Group Limited  WHG WHK Group Limited  
VML Vital Metals Limited  WHN WHL Energy Limited  
VMS Venture Minerals  WIG Wilson Htm Invest.  
VMT Vmoto Limited  WIL Wilson Investment  
VNS Venus Resources  WKL Western Kingfish  
VPE Victoria Petroleum WKR Windy Knob Resources  
VRL Village Roadshow Ltd WLF Wolf Minerals  
VTG Vita Group Ltd  WLL Wellcom Group Ltd  
VTP VAN Eyk Three Pillar  WME West Australian Met.  
VTX Vortex Pipes Ltd  WMT Western Metals 
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WNS World.Net Services  
WOR Worleyparsons Ltd  
WOW Woolworths Limited  
WPG Western Plains Res  
WRK Warwick Resources  
WRL Washington Resources  
WRR World Reach Ltd 
WSA Western Areas NL  
WSY Webspy Limited 
WTF Wotif.Com Holdings  
WTN Western Uranium  
WTP Watpac Limited 
WVL Windimurra Vanadium 
WWA Wridgways Australia 
WWI West Wits Mining Ltd  
WWM Wentworth Hldgs Ltd 
WWW Whinnen Resources  
WYL Wattyl Limited  
XCD Xceed Capital Ltd.  
XEN/P Xenolith Res Ltd 
XRF XRF Scientific  
XTE Xtek Limited.  
YRR Yellow Rock  
YTC YTC Resources  
ZGL Zicom Group Limited 
ZGM Zamia Gold Mines  
ZNC Zinc Co Australia  
ZYL Zylotech Limited  
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Appendix 2: Alphabetical Listing of Variables 
Variable Measure 
ASX Adopter 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
adopted all three membership guidelines included in the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations regarding 
committee composition, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Agency Score 
Composite score measuring the level of agency costs 
experienced by the company, maximum score of 7. 
Agency Score * ASX Adopter Interaction variable, Agency Score * ASX Adopter. 
Asset Turnover Operating revenue divided by average total assets. 
Big 4 Auditor 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has 
engaged a Big 4 audit firm, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Board Independence 
The number of independent directors appointed to the board 
divided by the total number of directors appointed to the 
board. 
Board Size Number of directors appointed to the Board. 
Cash Remuneration 
Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments to the top five ranked executives. 
Cash Remunerationt-1 
Natural log of salary, superannuation, fringe benefit, and cash 
bonus payments to the top five ranked executives in the prior 
year. 
CEO Entrenchment 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the CEO of the 
company has changed in the two years prior to the 2008 
financial report and zero (0) otherwise. 
∆ Cash Remuneration 
On year change in the natural log of cash remuneration for 
the top five ranked executives between 2007 and 2008. 
Company Age The number of years since the company listed on the ASX. 
Company Size Natural log of total assets. 
Complexity 
Number of industry and geographical segments in which the 
company operates. 
Free Cash Flow 
Difference between the gross cash flow from operations less 
gross investment.  The variable is winsorised at 1 per cent 
Governance Quality 
Score determined by adding one point for adoption of ASX 
governance recommendations included in governance 
strength index. 
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Variable Measure 
Growth 
Book value of equity divided by market value of equity, 
winsorised at 1%. 
Independent Board Chair 
Dummy variable coded one (1) if the chairperson is an 
independent director at 30 June 2008, and zero (0) otherwise 
Industry 
Indicator variable for Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) industry sector 
Insider Shareholding 
Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to 
be insiders and their related parties and their related parties. 
Institutional Shareholding 
Percentage shareholding by institutional entities identified from 
the top twenty shareholders disclosed in the annual report 
Leverage Total assets divided by total liabilities, winsorised at 1%. 
Ownership Structure 
Natural log of the percentage of issued ordinary equity owned by 
directors, management, large individual shareholders deemed to 
be insiders and their related parties and their related parties. 
Remuneration Committee 
Dichotomous variable, coded one (1) if the company has formed 
a remuneration committee, and zero (0) otherwise. 
Return on Assets (ROA) 
Earnings from continuing operations divided by total average 
assets. 
Risk 
The company’s five year average beta relative to the MSCI 
emerging markets index. 
ROA * ASX Adopter ROA*ASX Adopter 
Separate Board Chair 
Dummy variable coded one (1) if the roles of the CEO and Chair 
are performed by different people,  and zero (0) otherwise. 
Shareholder Dissent 
The proportion of shareholder votes cast against the 2008 annual 
remuneration report as a percentage of the total votes cast. 
Total Shareholder Return 
(TSR) 
Dividend adjusted annualised percentage change in stock price 
∆ROA The change in return on assets from 2007 to 2008. 
∆ROA*ASX Adopter ∆ROA * ASX Adopter 
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Appendix 3: Summary of Findings from Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis Main Findings 
Remuneration Committee Formation and Composition: 
H1a:  Companies with widely dispersed shareholding 
adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations.   
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304): No support for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): No support for committee composition sub-sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) – No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – No support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – No support is found. 
 Small Companies: Committee Formation (N = 392) - No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 130) –Support is found. 
H1b: Companies with greater management share 
ownership adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations. 
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304): Supported for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): No support for composition sub- sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) –Support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – Support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – No support is found. 
 Small Companies (N = 392): Committee Formation - No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 130)  –No support is found. 
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Hypothesis Main Findings 
Remuneration Committee Formation and Composition (cont.): 
H1c:  Companies with higher institutional 
shareholding adopt the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations. 
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304): No support for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): No support for composition sub- sample.  
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) – Support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) –Support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – No support is found. 
Small Companies (N = 392): Committee Formation - No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 130) –No support is found. 
H2:  Companies evidencing CEO entrenchment adopt 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations. 
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304): No support for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): No support for composition sub- sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) – No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – No support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – No support is found. 
 Small Companies: Committee Formation (N = 392) - No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 130)  –No support is found. 
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Hypothesis Main Findings 
Remuneration Committee Formation and Composition (cont.) 
H3:  Companies with greater complexity adopt ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. 
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304): No support for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): No support for composition sub- sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) – No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – No support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – No support is found. 
 Small Companies (N = 392): Committee Formation - No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N= 130) –No support is found. 
H4a:  High growth companies adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. 
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304):  No support for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): No support for composition sub- sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) – No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – No support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – No support is found. 
 Small Companies: Committee Formation (N = 392) - No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 130) –No support is found. 
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Hypothesis Main Findings 
Remuneration Committee Formation and Composition (cont.) 
H4b:  Companies with greater free cash flows adopt 
the ASX remuneration committee recommendations 
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304):  No support for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): No support composition sub- sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) – No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – No support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – No support is found. 
 Small Companies: Committee Formation (N = 392) - No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 130) – No support is found. 
 
H4c:  Companies with lower asset turnover adopt the 
ASX remuneration committee recommendations. 
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304): No support for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): No support for composition sub- sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) – No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – No support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – No support is found. 
 Small Companies: Committee Formation (N = 392) - Support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 130) –No support is found. 
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Hypothesis Main Findings 
Remuneration Committee Formation and Composition (cont.) 
H5a:  Companies with larger board size adopt the ASX 
remuneration committee recommendations. 
 Committee Formation (N = 1,304): No support for full sample. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): Support for composition sub- sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) –Support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 368) – No support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – No support is found.  
Committee Composition (N = 576) – Support is found. 
 Small Companies: Committee Formation (N = 392) - No support is found.  Committee 
Composition (N = 130) –Support is found. 
 
H5b: Companies with a higher proportion of 
independent directors adopt the ASX remuneration 
committee composition recommendations. 
 Committee Formation – N/A. 
 Committee Composition (N = 718): Support for composition sub- sample. 
 Large Companies: Committee Formation (N = 471) – N/A.  Committee Composition (N 
= 368) – Support is found. 
 Small – Mid Companies: Committee Formation (N = 1,158) – N/A. Committee 
Composition (N = 576) –Support is found. 
 Small Companies: Committee Formation (N = 392) – N/A.  Committee Composition    
(N = 130) – Support is found. 
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Hypothesis Main Findings 
Remuneration Committee Efficacy: 
H6a: Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with the level of cash 
remuneration awarded to key executives. 
 
 
H6b: Adoption of the ASX remuneration committee 
recommendations is associated with stronger pay 
for performance sensitivity in remuneration awarded to 
key executives. 
 Support for full sample (N = 1,067). 
 Support for companies with positive return on assets, however no support for 
companies with negative remuneration on assets. 
 Support for companies identified as paying excessive remuneration. 
 
 
 No support for full sample (N = 1,067). 
 No support for companies with positive or negative return on assets. 
 Marginal support for companies identified as paying excessive remuneration. 
H7:  Companies adopting the ASX remuneration 
committee recommendations receive less shareholder 
dissent on the annual remuneration report.   
 No support for full sample (N = 1,067). 
 Limited support for companies identified as paying excessive remuneration. 
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Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics for ASX 300 Sub-Sample 
 
Committee Formation: Full Sample ASX 300 
 % N % N 
 No Remuneration Committee 
 Remuneration Committee Formed 
46.83 
53.17 
701 
796 
3.89 
96.11 
6 
148 
Committee Composition: Full Sample ASX 300 
 % N % N 
 Majority of members appointed are independent 
 ASX Adopter Remuneration Committee 
 Non-Adopter Remuneration Committee 
65.70 
42.46 
57.54 
523 
338 
458 
83.77 
66.88 
33.12 
129 
103 
51 
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Appendix 5: Descriptive Statistics for Positive & Negative Operating Performance Companies 
 Positive ROA Companies Negative ROA Companies 
 N % N Mean 
No Remuneration Committee 134 24.1 566 60.3 
Remuneration Committee 422  75.9 373 39.7 
ASX Adopter 223 40.1 115 12.2 
 N Min Mean Std 
Deviation 
Max N Min Mean Std 
Deviation 
Max 
Shareholder Dissent 530 0.00 0.07 0.11 0.69 918 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.78 
Return on Assets 556 0.00 0.13 0.52 9.02 938 -37.20 -0.54 1.76 -0.00 
Change ROA 556 -0.98 0.14 0.88 12.99 937 -36.91 -0.22 1.90 20.46 
Total Cash Remuneration 556 0.00 1,114,875 1871312 24,054,907 939 0.00 262,661 323224 3,440,000 
Insider Shareholding 503 0.00 22.20 100.00 22.21 802 0.00 18.38 17.25 100.00 
Institutional shareholding 556 0.00 25.77 88.00 22.32 939 0.00 13.61 16.40 93.00 
Company Size 556 13.13 18.70 1.91 24.36 939 11.76 16.29 1.38 23.74 
Board Size 556 3.00 5.31 1.72 13.00 939 3.00 4.20 1.15 9.00 
Board Independence 556 0.00 0.54 0.24 1.00 939 0.00 0.44 0.28 1.00 
Growth 556 -3.03 2.14 2.48 18.76 939 -3.03 2.89 3.61 18.76 
Risk 552 -2.18 0.76 0.78 3.64 929 -51.70 1.48 17.23 522.08 
 
